Daily Papers

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly employed as automated evaluators to assess the safety of generated content, yet their reliability in this role remains uncertain. This study evaluates a diverse set of 11 LLM judge models across critical safety domains, examining three key aspects: self-consistency in repeated judging tasks, alignment with human judgments, and susceptibility to input artifacts such as apologetic or verbose phrasing. Our findings reveal that biases in LLM judges can significantly distort the final verdict on which content source is safer, undermining the validity of comparative evaluations. Notably, apologetic language artifacts alone can skew evaluator preferences by up to 98\%. Contrary to expectations, larger models do not consistently exhibit greater robustness, while smaller models sometimes show higher resistance to specific artifacts. To mitigate LLM evaluator robustness issues, we investigate jury-based evaluations aggregating decisions from multiple models. Although this approach both improves robustness and enhances alignment to human judgements, artifact sensitivity persists even with the best jury configurations. These results highlight the urgent need for diversified, artifact-resistant methodologies to ensure reliable safety assessments.

This position paper concerns the use of religious texts in Natural Language Processing (NLP), which is of special interest to the Ethics of NLP. Religious texts are expressions of culturally important values, and machine learned models have a propensity to reproduce cultural values encoded in their training data. Furthermore, translations of religious texts are frequently used by NLP researchers when language data is scarce. This repurposes the translations from their original uses and motivations, which often involve attracting new followers. This paper argues that NLP's use of such texts raises considerations that go beyond model biases, including data provenance, cultural contexts, and their use in proselytism. We argue for more consideration of researcher positionality, and of the perspectives of marginalized linguistic and religious communities.

Logical fallacies are common in public communication and can mislead audiences; fallacious arguments may still appear convincing despite lacking soundness, because convincingness is inherently subjective. We present the first computational study of how emotional framing interacts with fallacies and convincingness, using large language models (LLMs) to systematically change emotional appeals in fallacious arguments. We benchmark eight LLMs on injecting emotional appeal into fallacious arguments while preserving their logical structures, then use the best models to generate stimuli for a human study. Our results show that LLM-driven emotional framing reduces human fallacy detection in F1 by 14.5% on average. Humans perform better in fallacy detection when perceiving enjoyment than fear or sadness, and these three emotions also correlate with significantly higher convincingness compared to neutral or other emotion states. Our work has implications for AI-driven emotional manipulation in the context of fallacious argumentation.

This work provides an explanatory view of how LLMs can apply moral reasoning to both criticize and defend sexist language. We assessed eight large language models, all of which demonstrated the capability to provide explanations grounded in varying moral perspectives for both critiquing and endorsing views that reflect sexist assumptions. With both human and automatic evaluation, we show that all eight models produce comprehensible and contextually relevant text, which is helpful in understanding diverse views on how sexism is perceived. Also, through analysis of moral foundations cited by LLMs in their arguments, we uncover the diverse ideological perspectives in models' outputs, with some models aligning more with progressive or conservative views on gender roles and sexism. Based on our observations, we caution against the potential misuse of LLMs to justify sexist language. We also highlight that LLMs can serve as tools for understanding the roots of sexist beliefs and designing well-informed interventions. Given this dual capacity, it is crucial to monitor LLMs and design safety mechanisms for their use in applications that involve sensitive societal topics, such as sexism.

Moral sensitivity is fundamental to human moral competence, as it guides individuals in regulating everyday behavior. Although many approaches seek to align large language models (LLMs) with human moral values, how to enable them morally sensitive has been extremely challenging. In this paper, we take a step toward answering the question: how can we enhance moral sensitivity in LLMs? Specifically, we propose two pragmatic inference methods that faciliate LLMs to diagnose morally benign and hazardous input and correct moral errors, whereby enhancing LLMs' moral sensitivity. A central strength of our pragmatic inference methods is their unified perspective: instead of modeling moral discourses across semantically diverse and complex surface forms, they offer a principled perspective for designing pragmatic inference procedures grounded in their inferential loads. Empirical evidence demonstrates that our pragmatic methods can enhance moral sensitivity in LLMs and achieves strong performance on representative morality-relevant benchmarks.

While moral reasoning has emerged as a promising research direction for large language models (LLMs), achieving robust generalization remains a critical challenge. This challenge arises from the gap between what is said and what is morally implied. In this paper, we build on metapragmatic links and the moral foundations theory to close the gap. Specifically, we develop a pragmatic-inference approach that facilitates LLMs, for a given moral situation, to acquire the metapragmantic links between moral reasoning objectives and the social variables that affect them. This approach is adapted to three different moral reasoning tasks to demonstrate its adaptability and generalizability. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach significantly enhances LLMs' generalization in moral reasoning, paving the road for future research to utilize pragmatic inference in various moral reasoning tasks.

An important skill in critical thinking and argumentation is the ability to spot and recognize fallacies. Fallacious arguments, omnipresent in argumentative discourse, can be deceptive, manipulative, or simply leading to `wrong moves' in a discussion. Despite their importance, argumentation scholars and NLP researchers with focus on argumentation quality have not yet investigated fallacies empirically. The nonexistence of resources dealing with fallacious argumentation calls for scalable approaches to data acquisition and annotation, for which the serious games methodology offers an appealing, yet unexplored, alternative. We present Argotario, a serious game that deals with fallacies in everyday argumentation. Argotario is a multilingual, open-source, platform-independent application with strong educational aspects, accessible at www.argotario.net.

Business communication digitisation has reorganised the process of persuasive discourse, which allows not only greater transparency but also advanced deception. This inquiry synthesises classical rhetoric and communication psychology with linguistic theory and empirical studies in the financial reporting, sustainability discourse, and digital marketing to explain how deceptive language can be systematically detected using persuasive lexicon. In controlled settings, detection accuracies of greater than 99% were achieved by using computational textual analysis as well as personalised transformer models. However, reproducing this performance in multilingual settings is also problematic and, to a large extent, this is because it is not easy to find sufficient data, and because few multilingual text-processing infrastructures are in place. This evidence shows that there has been an increasing gap between the theoretical representations of communication and those empirically approximated, and therefore, there is a need to have strong automatic text-identification systems where AI-based discourse is becoming more realistic in communicating with humans.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often exhibit sycophancy, distorting responses to align with user beliefs, notably by readily agreeing with user counterarguments. Paradoxically, LLMs are increasingly adopted as successful evaluative agents for tasks such as grading and adjudicating claims. This research investigates that tension: why do LLMs show sycophancy when challenged in subsequent conversational turns, yet perform well when evaluating conflicting arguments presented simultaneously? We empirically tested these contrasting scenarios by varying key interaction patterns. We find that state-of-the-art models: (1) are more likely to endorse a user's counterargument when framed as a follow-up from a user, rather than when both responses are presented simultaneously for evaluation; (2) show increased susceptibility to persuasion when the user's rebuttal includes detailed reasoning, even when the conclusion of the reasoning is incorrect; and (3) are more readily swayed by casually phrased feedback than by formal critiques, even when the casual input lacks justification. Our results highlight the risk of relying on LLMs for judgment tasks without accounting for conversational framing.

This paper investigates the role of dynamic external knowledge integration in improving counter-argument generation using Large Language Models (LLMs). While LLMs have shown promise in argumentative tasks, their tendency to generate lengthy, potentially unfactual responses highlights the need for more controlled and evidence-based approaches. We introduce a new manually curated dataset of argument and counter-argument pairs specifically designed to balance argumentative complexity with evaluative feasibility. We also propose a new LLM-as-a-Judge evaluation methodology that shows a stronger correlation with human judgments compared to traditional reference-based metrics. Our experimental results demonstrate that integrating dynamic external knowledge from the web significantly improves the quality of generated counter-arguments, particularly in terms of relatedness, persuasiveness, and factuality. The findings suggest that combining LLMs with real-time external knowledge retrieval offers a promising direction for developing more effective and reliable counter-argumentation systems.

There exist challenges in learning and understanding religions as the presence of complexity and depth of religious doctrines and teachings. Chatbots as question-answering systems can help in solving these challenges. LLM chatbots use NLP techniques to establish connections between topics and accurately respond to complex questions. These capabilities make it perfect to be used in enlightenment on religion as a question answering chatbot. However, LLMs also have a tendency to generate false information, known as hallucination. The responses of the chatbots can include content that insults personal religious beliefs, interfaith conflicts, and controversial or sensitive topics. It needs to avoid such cases without promoting hate speech or offending certain groups of people or their beliefs. This study uses a vector database-based Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) approach to enhance the accuracy and transparency of LLMs. Our question-answering system is called as "MufassirQAS". We created a vector database with several open-access books that include Turkish context. These are Turkish translations, and interpretations on Islam. We worked on creating system prompts with care, ensuring they provide instructions that prevent harmful, offensive, or disrespectful responses. We also tested the MufassirQAS and ChatGPT with sensitive questions. We got better performance with our system. Study and enhancements are still in progress. Results and future works are given.

This paper investigates the rational thinking capability of Large Language Models (LLMs) in multi-round argumentative debates by exploring the impact of fallacious arguments on their logical reasoning performance. More specifically, we present Logic Competence Measurement Benchmark (LOGICOM), a diagnostic benchmark to assess the robustness of LLMs against logical fallacies. LOGICOM involves two agents: a persuader and a debater engaging in a multi-round debate on a controversial topic, where the persuader tries to convince the debater of the correctness of its claim. First, LOGICOM assesses the potential of LLMs to change their opinions through reasoning. Then, it evaluates the debater's performance in logical reasoning by contrasting the scenario where the persuader employs logical fallacies against one where logical reasoning is used. We use this benchmark to evaluate the performance of GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 using a dataset containing controversial topics, claims, and reasons supporting them. Our findings indicate that both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 can adjust their opinion through reasoning. However, when presented with logical fallacies, GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 are erroneously convinced 41% and 69% more often, respectively, compared to when logical reasoning is used. Finally, we introduce a new dataset containing over 5k pairs of logical vs. fallacious arguments. The source code and dataset of this work are made publicly available.

Ensuring that online discussions are civil and productive is a major challenge for social media platforms. Such platforms usually rely both on users and on automated detection tools to flag inappropriate arguments of other users, which moderators then review. However, this kind of post-hoc moderation is expensive and time-consuming, and moderators are often overwhelmed by the amount and severity of flagged content. Instead, a promising alternative is to prevent negative behavior during content creation. This paper studies how inappropriate language in arguments can be computationally mitigated. We propose a reinforcement learning-based rewriting approach that balances content preservation and appropriateness based on existing classifiers, prompting an instruction-finetuned large language model (LLM) as our initial policy. Unlike related style transfer tasks, rewriting inappropriate arguments allows deleting and adding content permanently. It is therefore tackled on document level rather than sentence level. We evaluate different weighting schemes for the reward function in both absolute and relative human assessment studies. Systematic experiments on non-parallel data provide evidence that our approach can mitigate the inappropriateness of arguments while largely preserving their content. It significantly outperforms competitive baselines, including few-shot learning, prompting, and humans.

Ethical reasoning is a crucial skill for Large Language Models (LLMs). However, moral values are not universal, but rather influenced by language and culture. This paper explores how three prominent LLMs -- GPT-4, ChatGPT, and Llama2-70B-Chat -- perform ethical reasoning in different languages and if their moral judgement depend on the language in which they are prompted. We extend the study of ethical reasoning of LLMs by Rao et al. (2023) to a multilingual setup following their framework of probing LLMs with ethical dilemmas and policies from three branches of normative ethics: deontology, virtue, and consequentialism. We experiment with six languages: English, Spanish, Russian, Chinese, Hindi, and Swahili. We find that GPT-4 is the most consistent and unbiased ethical reasoner across languages, while ChatGPT and Llama2-70B-Chat show significant moral value bias when we move to languages other than English. Interestingly, the nature of this bias significantly vary across languages for all LLMs, including GPT-4.

Large language models (LLMs) excel in many diverse applications beyond language generation, e.g., translation, summarization, and sentiment analysis. One intriguing application is in text classification. This becomes pertinent in the realm of identifying hateful or toxic speech -- a domain fraught with challenges and ethical dilemmas. In our study, we have two objectives: firstly, to offer a literature review revolving around LLMs as classifiers, emphasizing their role in detecting and classifying hateful or toxic content. Subsequently, we explore the efficacy of several LLMs in classifying hate speech: identifying which LLMs excel in this task as well as their underlying attributes and training. Providing insight into the factors that contribute to an LLM proficiency (or lack thereof) in discerning hateful content. By combining a comprehensive literature review with an empirical analysis, our paper strives to shed light on the capabilities and constraints of LLMs in the crucial domain of hate speech detection.

As large language models take on growing roles as automated evaluators in practical settings, a critical question arises: Can individuals persuade an LLM judge to assign unfairly high scores? This study is the first to reveal that strategically embedded persuasive language can bias LLM judges when scoring mathematical reasoning tasks, where correctness should be independent of stylistic variation. Grounded in Aristotle's rhetorical principles, we formalize seven persuasion techniques (Majority, Consistency, Flattery, Reciprocity, Pity, Authority, Identity) and embed them into otherwise identical responses. Across six math benchmarks, we find that persuasive language leads LLM judges to assign inflated scores to incorrect solutions, by up to 8% on average, with Consistency causing the most severe distortion. Notably, increasing model size does not substantially mitigate this vulnerability. Further analysis demonstrates that combining multiple persuasion techniques amplifies the bias, and pairwise evaluation is likewise susceptible. Moreover, the persuasive effect persists under counter prompting strategies, highlighting a critical vulnerability in LLM-as-a-Judge pipelines and underscoring the need for robust defenses against persuasion-based attacks.

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

Controversy is a reflection of our zeitgeist, and an important aspect to any discourse. The rise of large language models (LLMs) as conversational systems has increased public reliance on these systems for answers to their various questions. Consequently, it is crucial to systematically examine how these models respond to questions that pertaining to ongoing debates. However, few such datasets exist in providing human-annotated labels reflecting the contemporary discussions. To foster research in this area, we propose a novel construction of a controversial questions dataset, expanding upon the publicly released Quora Question Pairs Dataset. This dataset presents challenges concerning knowledge recency, safety, fairness, and bias. We evaluate different LLMs using a subset of this dataset, illuminating how they handle controversial issues and the stances they adopt. This research ultimately contributes to our understanding of LLMs' interaction with controversial issues, paving the way for improvements in their comprehension and handling of complex societal debates.

Honesty is a fundamental principle for aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values, requiring these models to recognize what they know and don't know and be able to faithfully express their knowledge. Despite promising, current LLMs still exhibit significant dishonest behaviors, such as confidently presenting wrong answers or failing to express what they know. In addition, research on the honesty of LLMs also faces challenges, including varying definitions of honesty, difficulties in distinguishing between known and unknown knowledge, and a lack of comprehensive understanding of related research. To address these issues, we provide a survey on the honesty of LLMs, covering its clarification, evaluation approaches, and strategies for improvement. Moreover, we offer insights for future research, aiming to inspire further exploration in this important area.

Despite the remarkable performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) in natural language processing tasks, they still struggle with generating logically sound arguments, resulting in potential risks such as spreading misinformation. To address this issue, we introduce FIPO, a fallacy-informed framework that leverages preference optimization methods to steer LLMs toward logically sound arguments. FIPO includes a classification loss, to capture the fine-grained information on fallacy types. Our results on argumentation datasets show that our method reduces the fallacy errors by up to 17.5%. Furthermore, our human evaluation results indicate that the quality of the generated arguments by our method significantly outperforms the fine-tuned baselines, as well as other preference optimization methods, such as DPO. These findings highlight the importance of ensuring models are aware of logical fallacies for effective argument generation. Our code is available at github.com/lucamouchel/Logical-Fallacies.

Data annotation, the practice of assigning descriptive labels to raw data, is pivotal in optimizing the performance of machine learning models. However, it is a resource-intensive process susceptible to biases introduced by annotators. The emergence of sophisticated Large Language Models (LLMs), like ChatGPT presents a unique opportunity to modernize and streamline this complex procedure. While existing research extensively evaluates the efficacy of LLMs, as annotators, this paper delves into the biases present in LLMs, specifically GPT 3.5 and GPT 4o when annotating hate speech data. Our research contributes to understanding biases in four key categories: gender, race, religion, and disability. Specifically targeting highly vulnerable groups within these categories, we analyze annotator biases. Furthermore, we conduct a comprehensive examination of potential factors contributing to these biases by scrutinizing the annotated data. We introduce our custom hate speech detection dataset, HateSpeechCorpus, to conduct this research. Additionally, we perform the same experiments on the ETHOS (Mollas et al., 2022) dataset also for comparative analysis. This paper serves as a crucial resource, guiding researchers and practitioners in harnessing the potential of LLMs for dataannotation, thereby fostering advancements in this critical field. The HateSpeechCorpus dataset is available here: https://github.com/AmitDasRup123/HateSpeechCorpus

Evaluating aligned large language models' (LLMs) ability to recognize and reject unsafe user requests is crucial for safe, policy-compliant deployments. Existing evaluation efforts, however, face three limitations that we address with SORRY-Bench, our proposed benchmark. First, existing methods often use coarse-grained taxonomies of unsafe topics, and are over-representing some fine-grained topics. For example, among the ten existing datasets that we evaluated, tests for refusals of self-harm instructions are over 3x less represented than tests for fraudulent activities. SORRY-Bench improves on this by using a fine-grained taxonomy of 45 potentially unsafe topics, and 450 class-balanced unsafe instructions, compiled through human-in-the-loop methods. Second, linguistic characteristics and formatting of prompts are often overlooked, like different languages, dialects, and more -- which are only implicitly considered in many evaluations. We supplement SORRY-Bench with 20 diverse linguistic augmentations to systematically examine these effects. Third, existing evaluations rely on large LLMs (e.g., GPT-4) for evaluation, which can be computationally expensive. We investigate design choices for creating a fast, accurate automated safety evaluator. By collecting 7K+ human annotations and conducting a meta-evaluation of diverse LLM-as-a-judge designs, we show that fine-tuned 7B LLMs can achieve accuracy comparable to GPT-4 scale LLMs, with lower computational cost. Putting these together, we evaluate over 40 proprietary and open-source LLMs on SORRY-Bench, analyzing their distinctive refusal behaviors. We hope our effort provides a building block for systematic evaluations of LLMs' safety refusal capabilities, in a balanced, granular, and efficient manner.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) is the prevailing paradigm for grounding Large Language Models (LLMs), yet the mechanisms governing how models integrate groups of conflicting retrieved evidence remain opaque. Does an LLM answer a certain way because the evidence is factually strong, because of a prior belief, or merely because it is repeated frequently? To answer this, we introduce GroupQA, a curated dataset of 1,635 controversial questions paired with 15,058 diversely-sourced evidence documents, annotated for stance and qualitative strength. Through controlled experiments, we characterize group-level evidence aggregation dynamics: Paraphrasing an argument can be more persuasive than providing distinct independent support; Models favor evidence presented first rather than last, and Larger models are increasingly resistant to adapt to presented evidence. Additionally, we find that LLM explanations to group-based answers are unfaithful. Together, we show that LLMs behave consistently as vulnerable heuristic followers, with direct implications for improving RAG system design.

Artificial writing is permeating our lives due to recent advances in large-scale, transformer-based language models (LMs) such as BERT, its variants, GPT-2/3, and others. Using them as pre-trained models and fine-tuning them for specific tasks, researchers have extended state of the art for many NLP tasks and shown that they capture not only linguistic knowledge but also retain general knowledge implicitly present in the data. Unfortunately, LMs trained on unfiltered text corpora suffer from degenerated and biased behaviour. While this is well established, we show that recent LMs also contain human-like biases of what is right and wrong to do, some form of ethical and moral norms of the society -- they bring a "moral direction" to surface. That is, we show that these norms can be captured geometrically by a direction, which can be computed, e.g., by a PCA, in the embedding space, reflecting well the agreement of phrases to social norms implicitly expressed in the training texts and providing a path for attenuating or even preventing toxic degeneration in LMs. Being able to rate the (non-)normativity of arbitrary phrases without explicitly training the LM for this task, we demonstrate the capabilities of the "moral direction" for guiding (even other) LMs towards producing normative text and showcase it on RealToxicityPrompts testbed, preventing the neural toxic degeneration in GPT-2.

Large language models (LLMs) have witnessed rapid advancements, demonstrating remarkable capabilities. However, a notable vulnerability persists: LLMs often uncritically accept flawed or contradictory premises, leading to inefficient reasoning and unreliable outputs. This emphasizes the significance of possessing the Premise Critique Ability for LLMs, defined as the capacity to proactively identify and articulate errors in input premises. Most existing studies assess LLMs' reasoning ability in ideal settings, largely ignoring their vulnerabilities when faced with flawed premises. Thus, we introduce the Premise Critique Bench (PCBench), designed by incorporating four error types across three difficulty levels, paired with multi-faceted evaluation metrics. We conducted systematic evaluations of 15 representative LLMs. Our findings reveal: (1) Most models rely heavily on explicit prompts to detect errors, with limited autonomous critique; (2) Premise critique ability depends on question difficulty and error type, with direct contradictions being easier to detect than complex or procedural errors; (3) Reasoning ability does not consistently correlate with the premise critique ability; (4) Flawed premises trigger overthinking in reasoning models, markedly lengthening responses due to repeated attempts at resolving conflicts. These insights underscore the urgent need to enhance LLMs' proactive evaluation of input validity, positioning premise critique as a foundational capability for developing reliable, human-centric systems. The code is available at https://github.com/MLGroupJLU/Premise_Critique.

Uncovering latent values and opinions in large language models (LLMs) can help identify biases and mitigate potential harm. Recently, this has been approached by presenting LLMs with survey questions and quantifying their stances towards morally and politically charged statements. However, the stances generated by LLMs can vary greatly depending on how they are prompted, and there are many ways to argue for or against a given position. In this work, we propose to address this by analysing a large and robust dataset of 156k LLM responses to the 62 propositions of the Political Compass Test (PCT) generated by 6 LLMs using 420 prompt variations. We perform coarse-grained analysis of their generated stances and fine-grained analysis of the plain text justifications for those stances. For fine-grained analysis, we propose to identify tropes in the responses: semantically similar phrases that are recurrent and consistent across different prompts, revealing patterns in the text that a given LLM is prone to produce. We find that demographic features added to prompts significantly affect outcomes on the PCT, reflecting bias, as well as disparities between the results of tests when eliciting closed-form vs. open domain responses. Additionally, patterns in the plain text rationales via tropes show that similar justifications are repeatedly generated across models and prompts even with disparate stances.

Do large language models reason morally, or do they merely sound like they do? We investigate whether LLM responses to moral dilemmas exhibit genuine developmental progression through Kohlberg's stages of moral development, or whether alignment training instead produces reasoning-like outputs that superficially resemble mature moral judgment without the underlying developmental trajectory. Using an LLM-as-judge scoring pipeline validated across three judge models, we classify more than 600 responses from 13 LLMs spanning a range of architectures, parameter scales, and training regimes across six classical moral dilemmas, and conduct ten complementary analyses to characterize the nature and internal coherence of the resulting patterns. Our results reveal a striking inversion: responses overwhelmingly correspond to post-conventional reasoning (Stages 5-6) regardless of model size, architecture, or prompting strategy, the effective inverse of human developmental norms, where Stage 4 dominates. Most strikingly, a subset of models exhibit moral decoupling: systematic inconsistency between stated moral justification and action choice, a form of logical incoherence that persists across scale and prompting strategy and represents a direct reasoning consistency failure independent of rhetorical sophistication. Model scale carries a statistically significant but practically small effect; training type has no significant independent main effect; and models exhibit near-robotic cross-dilemma consistency producing logically indistinguishable responses across semantically distinct moral problems. We posit that these patterns constitute evidence for moral ventriloquism: the acquisition, through alignment training, of the rhetorical conventions of mature moral reasoning without the underlying developmental trajectory those conventions are meant to represent.

While social media empowers freedom of expression and individual voices, it also enables anti-social behavior, online harassment, cyberbullying, and hate speech. In this paper, we deepen our understanding of online hate speech by focusing on a largely neglected but crucial aspect of hate speech -- its target: either "directed" towards a specific person or entity, or "generalized" towards a group of people sharing a common protected characteristic. We perform the first linguistic and psycholinguistic analysis of these two forms of hate speech and reveal the presence of interesting markers that distinguish these types of hate speech. Our analysis reveals that Directed hate speech, in addition to being more personal and directed, is more informal, angrier, and often explicitly attacks the target (via name calling) with fewer analytic words and more words suggesting authority and influence. Generalized hate speech, on the other hand, is dominated by religious hate, is characterized by the use of lethal words such as murder, exterminate, and kill; and quantity words such as million and many. Altogether, our work provides a data-driven analysis of the nuances of online-hate speech that enables not only a deepened understanding of hate speech and its social implications but also its detection.

Large language models (LLMs) can exhibit advanced reasoning yet still generate incorrect answers. We hypothesize that such errors frequently stem from spurious beliefs, propositions the model internally considers true but are incorrect. To address this, we propose a method to rectify the belief space by suppressing these spurious beliefs while simultaneously enhancing true ones, thereby enabling more reliable inferences. Our approach first identifies the beliefs that lead to incorrect or correct answers by prompting the model to generate textual explanations, using our Forward-Backward Beam Search (FBBS). We then apply unlearning to suppress the identified spurious beliefs and enhance the true ones, effectively rectifying the model's belief space. Empirical results on multiple QA datasets and LLMs show that our method corrects previously misanswered questions without harming overall model performance. Furthermore, our approach yields improved generalization on unseen data, suggesting that rectifying a model's belief space is a promising direction for mitigating errors and enhancing overall reliability.

As large language models (LLMs) increasingly mediate ethically sensitive decisions, understanding their moral reasoning processes becomes imperative. This study presents a comprehensive empirical evaluation of 14 leading LLMs, both reasoning enabled and general purpose, across 27 diverse trolley problem scenarios, framed by ten moral philosophies, including utilitarianism, deontology, and altruism. Using a factorial prompting protocol, we elicited 3,780 binary decisions and natural language justifications, enabling analysis along axes of decisional assertiveness, explanation answer consistency, public moral alignment, and sensitivity to ethically irrelevant cues. Our findings reveal significant variability across ethical frames and model types: reasoning enhanced models demonstrate greater decisiveness and structured justifications, yet do not always align better with human consensus. Notably, "sweet zones" emerge in altruistic, fairness, and virtue ethics framings, where models achieve a balance of high intervention rates, low explanation conflict, and minimal divergence from aggregated human judgments. However, models diverge under frames emphasizing kinship, legality, or self interest, often producing ethically controversial outcomes. These patterns suggest that moral prompting is not only a behavioral modifier but also a diagnostic tool for uncovering latent alignment philosophies across providers. We advocate for moral reasoning to become a primary axis in LLM alignment, calling for standardized benchmarks that evaluate not just what LLMs decide, but how and why.

Hate speech is a harmful form of online expression, often manifesting as derogatory posts. It is a significant risk in digital environments. With the rise of Large Language Models (LLMs), there is concern about their potential to replicate hate speech patterns, given their training on vast amounts of unmoderated internet data. Understanding how LLMs respond to hate speech is crucial for their responsible deployment. However, the behaviour of LLMs towards hate speech has been limited compared. This paper investigates the reactions of seven state-of-the-art LLMs (LLaMA 2, Vicuna, LLaMA 3, Mistral, GPT-3.5, GPT-4, and Gemini Pro) to hate speech. Through qualitative analysis, we aim to reveal the spectrum of responses these models produce, highlighting their capacity to handle hate speech inputs. We also discuss strategies to mitigate hate speech generation by LLMs, particularly through fine-tuning and guideline guardrailing. Finally, we explore the models' responses to hate speech framed in politically correct language.

Large language models (LLMs) are trained on extensive datasets that encapsulate substantial world knowledge. However, their outputs often include confidently stated inaccuracies. Earlier works suggest that LLMs encode truthfulness as a distinct linear feature, termed the "truth direction", which can classify truthfulness reliably. We address several open questions about the truth direction: (i) whether LLMs universally exhibit consistent truth directions; (ii) whether sophisticated probing techniques are necessary to identify truth directions; and (iii) how the truth direction generalizes across diverse contexts. Our findings reveal that not all LLMs exhibit consistent truth directions, with stronger representations observed in more capable models, particularly in the context of logical negation. Additionally, we demonstrate that truthfulness probes trained on declarative atomic statements can generalize effectively to logical transformations, question-answering tasks, in-context learning, and external knowledge sources. Finally, we explore the practical application of truthfulness probes in selective question-answering, illustrating their potential to improve user trust in LLM outputs. These results advance our understanding of truth directions and provide new insights into the internal representations of LLM beliefs. Our code is public at https://github.com/colored-dye/truthfulness_probe_generalization

Many commonsense reasoning NLP tasks involve choosing between one or more possible answers to a question or prompt based on knowledge that is often implicit. Large pretrained language models (PLMs) can achieve near-human performance on such tasks, while providing little human-interpretable evidence of the underlying reasoning they use. In this work, we show how to use these same models to generate such evidence: inspired by the contrastive nature of human explanations, we use PLMs to complete explanation prompts which contrast alternatives according to the key attribute(s) required to justify the correct answer (for example, peanuts are usually salty while raisins are sweet). Conditioning model decisions on these explanations improves performance on two commonsense reasoning benchmarks, as compared to previous non-contrastive alternatives. These explanations are also judged by humans to be more relevant for solving the task, and facilitate a novel method to evaluate explanation faithfulfness.

We introduce Drivelology, a unique linguistic phenomenon characterised as "nonsense with depth", utterances that are syntactically coherent yet pragmatically paradoxical, emotionally loaded, or rhetorically subversive. While such expressions may resemble surface-level nonsense, they encode implicit meaning requiring contextual inference, moral reasoning, or emotional interpretation. We find that current large language models (LLMs), despite excelling at many natural language processing (NLP) tasks, consistently fail to grasp the layered semantics of Drivelological text. To investigate this, we construct a small but diverse benchmark dataset of over 1,200 meticulously curated examples, with select instances in English, Mandarin, Spanish, French, Japanese, and Korean. Annotation was especially challenging: each of the examples required careful expert review to verify that it truly reflected Drivelological characteristics. The process involved multiple rounds of discussion and adjudication to address disagreements, highlighting the subtle and subjective nature of the Drivelology. We evaluate a range of LLMs on classification, generation, and reasoning tasks. Our results reveal clear limitations of LLMs: models often confuse Drivelology with shallow nonsense, produce incoherent justifications, or miss the implied rhetorical function altogether. These findings highlight a deeper representational gap in LLMs' pragmatic understanding and challenge the assumption that statistical fluency implies cognitive comprehension. We release our dataset and code to facilitate further research in modelling linguistic depth beyond surface-level coherence.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into society, their alignment with human morals is crucial. To better understand this alignment, we created a large corpus of human- and LLM-generated responses to various moral scenarios. We found a misalignment between human and LLM moral assessments; although both LLMs and humans tended to reject morally complex utilitarian dilemmas, LLMs were more sensitive to personal framing. We then conducted a quantitative user study involving 230 participants (N=230), who evaluated these responses by determining whether they were AI-generated and assessed their agreement with the responses. Human evaluators preferred LLMs' assessments in moral scenarios, though a systematic anti-AI bias was observed: participants were less likely to agree with judgments they believed to be machine-generated. Statistical and NLP-based analyses revealed subtle linguistic differences in responses, influencing detection and agreement. Overall, our findings highlight the complexities of human-AI perception in morally charged decision-making.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are deployed as powerful tools for several natural language processing (NLP) applications. Recent works show that modern LLMs can generate self-explanations (SEs), which elicit their intermediate reasoning steps for explaining their behavior. Self-explanations have seen widespread adoption owing to their conversational and plausible nature. However, there is little to no understanding of their faithfulness. In this work, we discuss the dichotomy between faithfulness and plausibility in SEs generated by LLMs. We argue that while LLMs are adept at generating plausible explanations -- seemingly logical and coherent to human users -- these explanations do not necessarily align with the reasoning processes of the LLMs, raising concerns about their faithfulness. We highlight that the current trend towards increasing the plausibility of explanations, primarily driven by the demand for user-friendly interfaces, may come at the cost of diminishing their faithfulness. We assert that the faithfulness of explanations is critical in LLMs employed for high-stakes decision-making. Moreover, we urge the community to identify the faithfulness requirements of real-world applications and ensure explanations meet those needs. Finally, we propose some directions for future work, emphasizing the need for novel methodologies and frameworks that can enhance the faithfulness of self-explanations without compromising their plausibility, essential for the transparent deployment of LLMs in diverse high-stakes domains.

Neural language models (LMs) can be used to evaluate the truth of factual statements in two ways: they can be either queried for statement probabilities, or probed for internal representations of truthfulness. Past work has found that these two procedures sometimes disagree, and that probes tend to be more accurate than LM outputs. This has led some researchers to conclude that LMs "lie" or otherwise encode non-cooperative communicative intents. Is this an accurate description of today's LMs, or can query-probe disagreement arise in other ways? We identify three different classes of disagreement, which we term confabulation, deception, and heterogeneity. In many cases, the superiority of probes is simply attributable to better calibration on uncertain answers rather than a greater fraction of correct, high-confidence answers. In some cases, queries and probes perform better on different subsets of inputs, and accuracy can further be improved by ensembling the two. Code is available at github.com/lingo-mit/lm-truthfulness.

Studies have underscored how, regardless of the recent breakthrough and swift advances in AI research, even state-of-the-art Large Language models (LLMs) continue to struggle when performing logical and mathematical reasoning. The results seem to suggest that LLMs still work as (highly advanced) data pattern identifiers, scoring poorly when attempting to generalise and solve reasoning problems the models have never previously seen or that are not close to samples presented in their training data. To address this compelling concern, this paper makes use of the notion of critical questions from the literature on argumentation theory, focusing in particular on Toulmin's model of argumentation. We show that employing these critical questions can improve the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. By probing the rationale behind the models' reasoning process, the LLM can assess whether some logical mistake is occurring and correct it before providing the final reply to the user prompt. The underlying idea is drawn from the gold standard of any valid argumentative procedure: the conclusion is valid if it is entailed by accepted premises. Or, to paraphrase such Aristotelian principle in a real-world approximation, characterised by incomplete information and presumptive logic, the conclusion is valid if not proved otherwise. This approach successfully steers the models' output through a reasoning pipeline, resulting in better performance against the baseline and its Chain-of-Thought (CoT) implementation. To this end, an extensive evaluation of the proposed approach on the MT-Bench Reasoning and Math tasks across a range of LLMs is provided.

Warning: This paper contains content that may be offensive or upsetting. Understanding the harms and offensiveness of statements requires reasoning about the social and situational context in which statements are made. For example, the utterance "your English is very good" may implicitly signal an insult when uttered by a white man to a non-white colleague, but uttered by an ESL teacher to their student would be interpreted as a genuine compliment. Such contextual factors have been largely ignored by previous approaches to toxic language detection. We introduce COBRA frames, the first context-aware formalism for explaining the intents, reactions, and harms of offensive or biased statements grounded in their social and situational context. We create COBRACORPUS, a dataset of 33k potentially offensive statements paired with machine-generated contexts and free-text explanations of offensiveness, implied biases, speaker intents, and listener reactions. To study the contextual dynamics of offensiveness, we train models to generate COBRA explanations, with and without access to the context. We find that explanations by context-agnostic models are significantly worse than by context-aware ones, especially in situations where the context inverts the statement's offensiveness (29% accuracy drop). Our work highlights the importance and feasibility of contextualized NLP by modeling social factors.

Toxic language includes content that is offensive, abusive, or that promotes harm. Progress in preventing toxic output from large language models (LLMs) is hampered by inconsistent definitions of toxicity. We introduce TRuST, a large-scale dataset that unifies and expands prior resources through a carefully synthesized definition of toxicity, and corresponding annotation scheme. It consists of ~300k annotations, with high-quality human annotation on ~11k. To ensure high-quality, we designed a rigorous, multi-stage human annotation process, and evaluated the diversity of the annotators. Then we benchmarked state-of-the-art LLMs and pre-trained models on three tasks: toxicity detection, identification of the target group, and of toxic words. Our results indicate that fine-tuned PLMs outperform LLMs on the three tasks, and that current reasoning models do not reliably improve performance. TRuST constitutes one of the most comprehensive resources for evaluating and mitigating LLM toxicity, and other research in socially-aware and safer language technologies.

Retrieval-augmented language models are being increasingly tasked with subjective, contentious, and conflicting queries such as "is aspartame linked to cancer". To resolve these ambiguous queries, one must search through a large range of websites and consider "which, if any, of this evidence do I find convincing?". In this work, we study how LLMs answer this question. In particular, we construct ConflictingQA, a dataset that pairs controversial queries with a series of real-world evidence documents that contain different facts (e.g., quantitative results), argument styles (e.g., appeals to authority), and answers (Yes or No). We use this dataset to perform sensitivity and counterfactual analyses to explore which text features most affect LLM predictions. Overall, we find that current models rely heavily on the relevance of a website to the query, while largely ignoring stylistic features that humans find important such as whether a text contains scientific references or is written with a neutral tone. Taken together, these results highlight the importance of RAG corpus quality (e.g., the need to filter misinformation), and possibly even a shift in how LLMs are trained to better align with human judgements.

Within the current trend of Pretained Language Models (PLM), emerge more and more criticisms about the ethical andecological impact of such models. In this article, considering these critical remarks, we propose to focus on smallermodels, such as compact models like ALBERT, which are more ecologically virtuous than these PLM. However,PLMs enable huge breakthroughs in Natural Language Processing tasks, such as Spoken and Natural LanguageUnderstanding, classification, Question--Answering tasks. PLMs also have the advantage of being multilingual, and,as far as we know, a multilingual version of compact ALBERT models does not exist. Considering these facts, wepropose the free release of the first version of a multilingual compact ALBERT model, pre-trained using Wikipediadata, which complies with the ethical aspect of such a language model. We also evaluate the model against classicalmultilingual PLMs in classical NLP tasks. Finally, this paper proposes a rare study on the subword tokenizationimpact on language performances.

Although artificial intelligence (AI) has become deeply integrated into various stages of the research workflow and achieved remarkable advancements, academic rebuttal remains a significant and underexplored challenge. This is because rebuttal is a complex process of strategic communication under severe information asymmetry rather than a simple technical debate. Consequently, current approaches struggle as they largely imitate surface-level linguistics, missing the essential element of perspective-taking required for effective persuasion. In this paper, we introduce RebuttalAgent, the first framework to ground academic rebuttal in Theory of Mind (ToM), operationalized through a ToM-Strategy-Response (TSR) pipeline that models reviewer mental state, formulates persuasion strategy, and generates strategy-grounded response. To train our agent, we construct RebuttalBench, a large-scale dataset synthesized via a novel critique-and-refine approach. Our training process consists of two stages, beginning with a supervised fine-tuning phase to equip the agent with ToM-based analysis and strategic planning capabilities, followed by a reinforcement learning phase leveraging the self-reward mechanism for scalable self-improvement. For reliable and efficient automated evaluation, we further develop Rebuttal-RM, a specialized evaluator trained on over 100K samples of multi-source rebuttal data, which achieves scoring consistency with human preferences surpassing powerful judge GPT-4.1. Extensive experiments show RebuttalAgent significantly outperforms the base model by an average of 18.3% on automated metrics, while also outperforming advanced proprietary models across both automated and human evaluations. Disclaimer: the generated rebuttal content is for reference only to inspire authors and assist in drafting. It is not intended to replace the author's own critical analysis and response.

It has been observed that large-scale language models capture undesirable societal biases, e.g. relating to race and gender; yet religious bias has been relatively unexplored. We demonstrate that GPT-3, a state-of-the-art contextual language model, captures persistent Muslim-violence bias. We probe GPT-3 in various ways, including prompt completion, analogical reasoning, and story generation, to understand this anti-Muslim bias, demonstrating that it appears consistently and creatively in different uses of the model and that it is severe even compared to biases about other religious groups. For instance, "Muslim" is analogized to "terrorist" in 23% of test cases, while "Jewish" is mapped to "money" in 5% of test cases. We quantify the positive distraction needed to overcome this bias with adversarial text prompts, and find that use of the most positive 6 adjectives reduces violent completions for "Muslims" from 66% to 20%, but which is still higher than for other religious groups.

Stigmatizing language results in healthcare inequities, yet there is no universally accepted or standardized lexicon defining which words, terms, or phrases constitute stigmatizing language in healthcare. We conducted a systematic search of the literature to identify existing stigmatizing language lexicons and then analyzed them comparatively to examine: 1) similarities and discrepancies between these lexicons, and 2) the distribution of positive, negative, or neutral terms based on an established sentiment dataset. Our search identified four lexicons. The analysis results revealed moderate semantic similarity among them, and that most stigmatizing terms are related to judgmental expressions by clinicians to describe perceived negative behaviors. Sentiment analysis showed a predominant proportion of negatively classified terms, though variations exist across lexicons. Our findings underscore the need for a standardized lexicon and highlight challenges in defining stigmatizing language in clinical texts.

This paper takes a first step towards a critical thinking curriculum for neural auto-regressive language models. We introduce a synthetic corpus of deductively valid arguments, and generate artificial argumentative texts to train and evaluate GPT-2. Significant transfer learning effects can be observed: Training a model on three simple core schemes allows it to accurately complete conclusions of different, and more complex types of arguments, too. The language models generalize the core argument schemes in a correct way. Moreover, we obtain consistent and promising results for NLU benchmarks. In particular, pre-training on the argument schemes raises zero-shot accuracy on the GLUE diagnostics by up to 15 percentage points. The findings suggest that intermediary pre-training on texts that exemplify basic reasoning abilities (such as typically covered in critical thinking textbooks) might help language models to acquire a broad range of reasoning skills. The synthetic argumentative texts presented in this paper are a promising starting point for building such a "critical thinking curriculum for language models."

The rise of large language models (LLMs) has significantly influenced the quality of information in decision-making systems, leading to the prevalence of AI-generated content and challenges in detecting misinformation and managing conflicting information, or "inter-evidence conflicts." This study introduces a method for generating diverse, validated evidence conflicts to simulate real-world misinformation scenarios. We evaluate conflict detection methods, including Natural Language Inference (NLI) models, factual consistency (FC) models, and LLMs, on these conflicts (RQ1) and analyze LLMs' conflict resolution behaviors (RQ2). Our key findings include: (1) NLI and LLM models exhibit high precision in detecting answer conflicts, though weaker models suffer from low recall; (2) FC models struggle with lexically similar answer conflicts, while NLI and LLM models handle these better; and (3) stronger models like GPT-4 show robust performance, especially with nuanced conflicts. For conflict resolution, LLMs often favor one piece of conflicting evidence without justification and rely on internal knowledge if they have prior beliefs.

As AI systems become more integrated into daily life, the need for safer and more reliable moderation has never been greater. Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities, surpassing earlier models in complexity and performance. Their evaluation across diverse tasks has consistently showcased their potential, enabling the development of adaptive and personalized agents. However, despite these advancements, LLMs remain prone to errors, particularly in areas requiring nuanced moral reasoning. They struggle with detecting implicit hate, offensive language, and gender biases due to the subjective and context-dependent nature of these issues. Moreover, their reliance on training data can inadvertently reinforce societal biases, leading to inconsistencies and ethical concerns in their outputs. To explore the limitations of LLMs in this role, we developed an experimental framework based on state-of-the-art (SOTA) models to assess human emotions and offensive behaviors. The framework introduces a unified benchmark dataset encompassing 49 distinct categories spanning the wide spectrum of human emotions, offensive and hateful text, and gender and racial biases. Furthermore, we introduced SafePhi, a QLoRA fine-tuned version of Phi-4, adapting diverse ethical contexts and outperforming benchmark moderators by achieving a Macro F1 score of 0.89, where OpenAI Moderator and Llama Guard score 0.77 and 0.74, respectively. This research also highlights the critical domains where LLM moderators consistently underperformed, pressing the need to incorporate more heterogeneous and representative data with human-in-the-loop, for better model robustness and explainability.

Bullshit, as conceptualized by philosopher Harry Frankfurt, refers to statements made without regard to their truth value. While previous work has explored large language model (LLM) hallucination and sycophancy, we propose machine bullshit as an overarching conceptual framework that can allow researchers to characterize the broader phenomenon of emergent loss of truthfulness in LLMs and shed light on its underlying mechanisms. We introduce the Bullshit Index, a novel metric quantifying LLMs' indifference to truth, and propose a complementary taxonomy analyzing four qualitative forms of bullshit: empty rhetoric, paltering, weasel words, and unverified claims. We conduct empirical evaluations on the Marketplace dataset, the Political Neutrality dataset, and our new BullshitEval benchmark (2,400 scenarios spanning 100 AI assistants) explicitly designed to evaluate machine bullshit. Our results demonstrate that model fine-tuning with reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) significantly exacerbates bullshit and inference-time chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting notably amplify specific bullshit forms, particularly empty rhetoric and paltering. We also observe prevalent machine bullshit in political contexts, with weasel words as the dominant strategy. Our findings highlight systematic challenges in AI alignment and provide new insights toward more truthful LLM behavior.

We present a study on how and where personas -- defined by distinct sets of human characteristics, values, and beliefs -- are encoded in the representation space of large language models (LLMs). Using a range of dimension reduction and pattern recognition methods, we first identify the model layers that show the greatest divergence in encoding these representations. We then analyze the activations within a selected layer to examine how specific personas are encoded relative to others, including their shared and distinct embedding spaces. We find that, across multiple pre-trained decoder-only LLMs, the analyzed personas show large differences in representation space only within the final third of the decoder layers. We observe overlapping activations for specific ethical perspectives -- such as moral nihilism and utilitarianism -- suggesting a degree of polysemy. In contrast, political ideologies like conservatism and liberalism appear to be represented in more distinct regions. These findings help to improve our understanding of how LLMs internally represent information and can inform future efforts in refining the modulation of specific human traits in LLM outputs. Warning: This paper includes potentially offensive sample statements.

Ensuring that Large Language Models (LLMs) generate summaries faithful to a given source document is essential for real-world applications. While prior research has explored LLM faithfulness, existing benchmarks suffer from annotation ambiguity, primarily due to the ill-defined boundary of permissible external knowledge in generated outputs. For instance, common sense is often incorporated into responses and labeled as "faithful", yet the acceptable extent of such knowledge remains unspecified, leading to inconsistent annotations. To address this issue, we propose a novel faithfulness annotation framework, which introduces an intermediate category, Out-Dependent, to classify cases where external knowledge is required for verification. Using this framework, we construct VeriGray (Verification with the Gray Zone) -- a new unfaithfulness detection benchmark in summarization. Statistics reveal that even SOTA LLMs, such as GPT-5, exhibit hallucinations (sim 6% of sentences) in summarization tasks. Moreover, a substantial proportion (sim 8% on average of models) of generated sentences fall into the Out-Dependent category, underscoring the importance of resolving annotation ambiguity in unfaithfulness detection benchmarks. Experiments demonstrate that our benchmark poses significant challenges to multiple baseline methods, indicating considerable room for future improvement.

How do large language models understand moral dimensions compared to humans? This first large-scale Bayesian evaluation of market-leading language models provides the answer. In contrast to prior work using deterministic ground truth (majority or inclusion rules), we model annotator disagreements to capture both aleatoric uncertainty (inherent human disagreement) and epistemic uncertainty (model domain sensitivity). We evaluate top language models (Claude Sonnet 4, DeepSeek-V3, Llama 4 Maverick) across 250K+ annotations from ~700 annotators on 100K+ texts spanning social media, news, and forums. Our GPU-optimized Bayesian framework processed 1M+ model queries, revealing that AI models typically rank among the top 25\% of human annotators, achieving much better-than-average balanced accuracy. Importantly, we find that AI produces far fewer false negatives than humans, highlighting their more sensitive moral detection capabilities.

Prior work has introduced techniques for detecting when large language models (LLMs) lie, that is, generating statements they believe are false. However, these techniques are typically validated in narrow settings that do not capture the diverse lies LLMs can generate. We introduce LIARS' BENCH, a testbed consisting of 72,863 examples of lies and honest responses generated by four open-weight models across seven datasets. Our settings capture qualitatively different types of lies and vary along two dimensions: the model's reason for lying and the object of belief targeted by the lie. Evaluating three black- and white-box lie detection techniques on LIARS' BENCH, we find that existing techniques systematically fail to identify certain types of lies, especially in settings where it's not possible to determine whether the model lied from the transcript alone. Overall, LIARS' BENCH reveals limitations in prior techniques and provides a practical testbed for guiding progress in lie detection.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) integrates external knowledge to enhance Large Language Models (LLMs), yet systems remain susceptible to two critical flaws: providing correct answers without explicit grounded evidence and producing fabricated responses when the retrieved context is insufficient. While prior research has addressed these issues independently, a unified framework that integrates evidence-based grounding and reliable abstention is currently lacking. In this paper, we propose GRACE, a reinforcement-learning framework that simultaneously mitigates both types of flaws. GRACE employs a data construction method that utilizes heterogeneous retrievers to generate diverse training samples without manual annotation. A multi-stage gated reward function is then employed to train the model to assess evidence sufficiency, extract key supporting evidence, and provide answers or explicitly abstain. Experimental results on two benchmarks demonstrate that GRACE achieves state-of-the-art overall accuracy and strikes a favorable balance between accurate response and rejection, while requiring only 10% of the annotation costs of prior methods. Our code is available at https://github.com/YiboZhao624/Grace..

Large Language Models (LLMs) are powerful candidates for complex decision-making, leveraging vast encoded knowledge and remarkable zero-shot abilities. However, their adoption in high-stakes environments is hindered by their opacity; their outputs lack faithful explanations and cannot be effectively contested to correct errors, undermining trustworthiness. In this paper, we propose ART (Adaptive Reasoning Trees), a hierarchical method for claim verification. The process begins with a root claim, which branches into supporting and attacking child arguments. An argument's strength is determined bottom-up via a pairwise tournament of its children, adjudicated by a judge LLM, allowing a final, transparent and contestable verdict to be systematically derived which is missing in methods like Chain-of-Thought (CoT). We empirically validate ART on multiple datasets, analyzing different argument generators and comparison strategies. Our findings show that ART's structured reasoning outperforms strong baselines, establishing a new benchmark for explainable claim verification which is more reliable and ensures clarity in the overall decision making step.

Debate is the process of exchanging viewpoints or convincing others on a particular issue. Recent research has provided empirical evidence that the persuasiveness of an argument is determined not only by language usage but also by communicator characteristics. Researchers have paid much attention to aspects of languages, such as linguistic features and discourse structures, but combining argument persuasiveness and impact with the social personae of the audience has not been explored due to the difficulty and complexity. We have observed the impressive simulation and personification capability of ChatGPT, indicating a giant pre-trained language model may function as an individual to provide personae and exert unique influences based on diverse background knowledge. Therefore, we propose a persona knowledge-aligned framework for argument quality assessment tasks from the audience side. This is the first work that leverages the emergence of ChatGPT and injects such audience personae knowledge into smaller language models via prompt tuning. The performance of our pipeline demonstrates significant and consistent improvement compared to competitive architectures.

Large Language Models are trained on vast amounts of text from the internet, which contains both factual and misleading information about the world. Can language models discern truth from falsehood in this contradicting data? Expanding on the view that LLMs can model different agents producing the corpora, we hypothesize that they can cluster truthful text by modeling a truthful persona: a group of agents that are likely to produce truthful text and share similar features. For example, trustworthy sources like Wikipedia and Science usually use formal writing styles and make consistent claims. By modeling this persona, LLMs can generalize truthfulness beyond the specific contexts in which each agent generated the training text. For example, the model can infer that the agent "Wikipedia" will behave truthfully on topics that were only generated by "Science" because they share a persona. We first show evidence for the persona hypothesis via two observations: (1) we can probe whether a model's answer will be truthful before it is generated; (2) finetuning a model on a set of facts improves its truthfulness on unseen topics. Next, using arithmetics as a synthetic environment, we show that language models can separate true and false statements, and generalize truthfulness across agents; but only if agents in the training data share a truthful generative process that enables the creation of a truthful persona. Overall, our findings suggest that models can exploit hierarchical structures in the data to learn abstract concepts like truthfulness.

Factuality assesses the extent to which a language utterance relates to real-world information; it determines whether utterances correspond to facts, possibilities, or imaginary situations, and as such, it is instrumental for fact checking. Factuality is a complex notion that relies on multiple linguistic signals, and has been studied in various disciplines. We present a complex, multi-faceted annotation scheme of factuality that combines concepts from a variety of previous works. We developed the scheme for Hebrew, but we trust that it can be adapted to other languages. We also present a set of almost 5,000 sentences in the domain of parliamentary discourse that we manually annotated according to this scheme. We report on inter-annotator agreement, and experiment with various approaches to automatically predict (some features of) the scheme, in order to extend the annotation to a large corpus.

Making moral judgments is an essential step toward developing ethical AI systems. Prevalent approaches are mostly implemented in a bottom-up manner, which uses a large set of annotated data to train models based on crowd-sourced opinions about morality. These approaches have been criticized for potentially overgeneralizing a limited group of annotators' moral stances and lacking explainability. In contrast, top-down approaches make moral judgments grounded in a set of principles. However, it remains conceptual due to the incapability of previous language models and the unsolved debate among moral principles. In this study, we propose a flexible framework to steer Large Language Models (LLMs) to perform moral reasoning with well-established moral theories from interdisciplinary research. The theory-guided top-down framework can incorporate various moral theories. Our experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed framework on datasets derived from moral theories. Furthermore, we show the alignment between different moral theories and existing morality datasets. Our analysis exhibits the potentials and flaws in existing resources (models and datasets) in developing explainable moral judgment-making systems.

Deductive reasoning is the process of deriving conclusions strictly from the given premises, without relying on external knowledge. We define honesty in this setting as a model's ability to respond only when the conclusion is logically entailed by the premises, and to abstain otherwise. However, current language models often fail to reason honestly, producing unwarranted answers when the input is insufficient. To study this challenge, we formulate honest deductive reasoning as multi-step tasks where models must either derive the correct conclusion or abstain. We curate two datasets from graph structures, one for linear algebra and one for logical inference, and introduce unanswerable cases by randomly perturbing an edge in half of the instances. We find that prompting and existing training methods, including GRPO with or without supervised fine-tuning initialization, struggle on these tasks. In particular, GRPO optimize only for final task outcomes, leaving models vulnerable to collapse when negative rewards dominate early training. To address this, we propose ACNCHOR, a reinforcement learning method that injects ground truth trajectories into rollouts, preventing early training collapse. Our results demonstrate that this method stabilizes learning and significantly improves the overall reasoning performance, underscoring the importance of training dynamics for enabling honest deductive reasoning in language models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in sensitive applications including psychological support, healthcare, and high-stakes decision-making. This expansion has motivated growing research into the ethical and moral foundations underlying LLM behavior, raising critical questions about their reliability in ethical reasoning. However, existing studies and benchmarks rely almost exclusively on Moral Foundation Theory (MFT), largely neglecting other relevant dimensions such as social values, personality traits, and individual characteristics that shape human ethical reasoning. To address these limitations, we introduce MOSAIC, the first large-scale benchmark designed to jointly assess the moral, social, and individual characteristics of LLMs. The benchmark comprises nine validated questionnaires drawn from moral philosophy, psychology, and social theory, alongside four platform-based games designed to probe morally ambiguous scenarios. In total, MOSAIC includes over 600 curated questions and scenarios, released as a ready-to-use, extensible resource for evaluating the behavioral foundations of LLMs. We validate the benchmark across three models from different families, demonstrating its utility across all assessed dimensions and providing the first empirical evidence that MFT alone is insufficient to comprehensively evaluate complex AI systems' ethical behavior. We publicly release the dataset and our benchmark Python library.

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive reasoning capabilities in familiar contexts, but struggle when the context conflicts with their parametric knowledge. To investigate this phenomenon, we introduce CounterLogic, a dataset containing 1,800 examples across 9 logical schemas, explicitly designed to evaluate logical reasoning through counterfactual (hypothetical knowledge-conflicting) scenarios. Our systematic evaluation of 11 LLMs across 6 different datasets reveals a consistent performance degradation, with accuracies dropping by 27% on average when reasoning through counterfactual information. We propose Self-Segregate, a prompting method enabling metacognitive awareness (explicitly identifying knowledge conflicts) before reasoning. Our method dramatically narrows the average performance gaps from 27% to just 11%, while significantly increasing the overall accuracy (+7.5%). We discuss the implications of these findings and draw parallels to human cognitive processes, particularly on how humans disambiguate conflicting information during reasoning tasks. Our findings offer practical insights for understanding and enhancing LLMs reasoning capabilities in real-world applications, especially where models must logically reason independently of their factual knowledge.

Moral foundations theory (MFT) is a psychological assessment tool that decomposes human moral reasoning into five factors, including care/harm, liberty/oppression, and sanctity/degradation (Graham et al., 2009). People vary in the weight they place on these dimensions when making moral decisions, in part due to their cultural upbringing and political ideology. As large language models (LLMs) are trained on datasets collected from the internet, they may reflect the biases that are present in such corpora. This paper uses MFT as a lens to analyze whether popular LLMs have acquired a bias towards a particular set of moral values. We analyze known LLMs and find they exhibit particular moral foundations, and show how these relate to human moral foundations and political affiliations. We also measure the consistency of these biases, or whether they vary strongly depending on the context of how the model is prompted. Finally, we show that we can adversarially select prompts that encourage the moral to exhibit a particular set of moral foundations, and that this can affect the model's behavior on downstream tasks. These findings help illustrate the potential risks and unintended consequences of LLMs assuming a particular moral stance.

Warning: this paper contains content that may be offensive or upsetting. Most hate speech datasets neglect the cultural diversity within a single language, resulting in a critical shortcoming in hate speech detection. To address this, we introduce CREHate, a CRoss-cultural English Hate speech dataset. To construct CREHate, we follow a two-step procedure: 1) cultural post collection and 2) cross-cultural annotation. We sample posts from the SBIC dataset, which predominantly represents North America, and collect posts from four geographically diverse English-speaking countries (Australia, United Kingdom, Singapore, and South Africa) using culturally hateful keywords we retrieve from our survey. Annotations are collected from the four countries plus the United States to establish representative labels for each country. Our analysis highlights statistically significant disparities across countries in hate speech annotations. Only 56.2% of the posts in CREHate achieve consensus among all countries, with the highest pairwise label difference rate of 26%. Qualitative analysis shows that label disagreement occurs mostly due to different interpretations of sarcasm and the personal bias of annotators on divisive topics. Lastly, we evaluate large language models (LLMs) under a zero-shot setting and show that current LLMs tend to show higher accuracies on Anglosphere country labels in CREHate. Our dataset and codes are available at: https://github.com/nlee0212/CREHate

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown impressive capabilities but still suffer from the issue of hallucinations. A significant type of this issue is the false premise hallucination, which we define as the phenomenon when LLMs generate hallucinated text when confronted with false premise questions. In this paper, we perform a comprehensive analysis of the false premise hallucination and elucidate its internal working mechanism: a small subset of attention heads (which we designate as false premise heads) disturb the knowledge extraction process, leading to the occurrence of false premise hallucination. Based on our analysis, we propose FAITH (False premise Attention head constraIining for miTigating Hallucinations), a novel and effective method to mitigate false premise hallucinations. It constrains the false premise attention heads during the model inference process. Impressively, extensive experiments demonstrate that constraining only approximately 1% of the attention heads in the model yields a notable increase of nearly 20% of model performance.

Pursuit of honest and truthful decision-making is crucial for governance and accountability in democracies. However, people sometimes take different perspectives of what it means to be honest and how to pursue truthfulness. Here we explore a continuum of perspectives from evidence-based reasoning, rooted in ascertainable facts and data, at one end, to intuitive decisions that are driven by feelings and subjective interpretations, at the other. We analyze the linguistic traces of those contrasting perspectives in Congressional speeches from 1879 to 2022. We find that evidence-based language has continued to decline since the mid-1970s, together with a decline in legislative productivity. The decline was accompanied by increasing partisan polarization in Congress and rising income inequality in society. Results highlight the importance of evidence-based language in political decision-making.

Large language models (LLMs) are typically aligned to comply with safety guidelines by refusing harmful instructions. A recent attack, termed abliteration, isolates and suppresses the single latent direction most responsible for refusal behavior, enabling the model to generate unethical content. We propose a defense that modifies how models generate refusals. We construct an extended-refusal dataset that contains harmful prompts with a full response that justifies the reason for refusal. We then fine-tune Llama-2-7B-Chat and Qwen2.5-Instruct (1.5B and 3B parameters) on our extended-refusal dataset, and evaluate the resulting systems on a set of harmful prompts. In our experiments, extended-refusal models maintain high refusal rates, dropping at most by 10%, whereas baseline models' refusal rates drop by 70-80% after abliteration. A broad evaluation of safety and utility shows that extended-refusal fine-tuning neutralizes the abliteration attack while preserving general performance.

Recent large language models often answer factual questions correctly. But users can't trust any given claim a model makes without fact-checking, because language models can hallucinate convincing nonsense. In this work we use reinforcement learning from human preferences (RLHP) to train "open-book" QA models that generate answers whilst also citing specific evidence for their claims, which aids in the appraisal of correctness. Supporting evidence is drawn from multiple documents found via a search engine, or from a single user-provided document. Our 280 billion parameter model, GopherCite, is able to produce answers with high quality supporting evidence and abstain from answering when unsure. We measure the performance of GopherCite by conducting human evaluation of answers to questions in a subset of the NaturalQuestions and ELI5 datasets. The model's response is found to be high-quality 80\% of the time on this Natural Questions subset, and 67\% of the time on the ELI5 subset. Abstaining from the third of questions for which it is most unsure improves performance to 90\% and 80\% respectively, approaching human baselines. However, analysis on the adversarial TruthfulQA dataset shows why citation is only one part of an overall strategy for safety and trustworthiness: not all claims supported by evidence are true.

Disclaimer: Samples in this paper may be harmful and cause discomfort! Patronizing and condescending language (PCL) is a form of speech directed at vulnerable groups. As an essential branch of toxic language, this type of language exacerbates conflicts and confrontations among Internet communities and detrimentally impacts disadvantaged groups. Traditional pre-trained language models (PLMs) perform poorly in detecting PCL due to its implicit toxicity traits like hypocrisy and false sympathy. With the rise of large language models (LLMs), we can harness their rich emotional semantics to establish a paradigm for exploring implicit toxicity. In this paper, we introduce PclGPT, a comprehensive LLM benchmark designed specifically for PCL. We collect, annotate, and integrate the Pcl-PT/SFT dataset, and then develop a bilingual PclGPT-EN/CN model group through a comprehensive pre-training and supervised fine-tuning staircase process to facilitate implicit toxic detection. Group detection results and fine-grained detection from PclGPT and other models reveal significant variations in the degree of bias in PCL towards different vulnerable groups, necessitating increased societal attention to protect them.

Large language models (LLMs) have been reported to linearly encode truthfulness, yet recent work questions this finding's generality. We reconcile these views with the truthfulness spectrum hypothesis: the representational space contains directions ranging from broadly domain-general to narrowly domain-specific. To test this hypothesis, we systematically evaluate probe generalization across five truth types (definitional, empirical, logical, fictional, and ethical), sycophantic and expectation-inverted lying, and existing honesty benchmarks. Linear probes generalize well across most domains but fail on sycophantic and expectation-inverted lying. Yet training on all domains jointly recovers strong performance, confirming that domain-general directions exist despite poor pairwise transfer. The geometry of probe directions explains these patterns: Mahalanobis cosine similarity between probes near-perfectly predicts cross-domain generalization (R^2=0.98). Concept-erasure methods further isolate truth directions that are (1) domain-general, (2) domain-specific, or (3) shared only across particular domain subsets. Causal interventions reveal that domain-specific directions steer more effectively than domain-general ones. Finally, post-training reshapes truth geometry, pushing sycophantic lying further from other truth types, suggesting a representational basis for chat models' sycophantic tendencies. Together, our results support the truthfulness spectrum hypothesis: truth directions of varying generality coexist in representational space, with post-training reshaping their geometry. Code for all experiments is provided in https://github.com/zfying/truth_spec.

Numerous datasets have been proposed to combat the spread of online hate. Despite these efforts, a majority of these resources are English-centric, primarily focusing on overt forms of hate. This research gap calls for developing high-quality corpora in diverse languages that also encapsulate more subtle hate expressions. This study introduces K-HATERS, a new corpus for hate speech detection in Korean, comprising approximately 192K news comments with target-specific offensiveness ratings. This resource is the largest offensive language corpus in Korean and is the first to offer target-specific ratings on a three-point Likert scale, enabling the detection of hate expressions in Korean across varying degrees of offensiveness. We conduct experiments showing the effectiveness of the proposed corpus, including a comparison with existing datasets. Additionally, to address potential noise and bias in human annotations, we explore a novel idea of adopting the Cognitive Reflection Test, which is widely used in social science for assessing an individual's cognitive ability, as a proxy of labeling quality. Findings indicate that annotations from individuals with the lowest test scores tend to yield detection models that make biased predictions toward specific target groups and are less accurate. This study contributes to the NLP research on hate speech detection and resource construction. The code and dataset can be accessed at https://github.com/ssu-humane/K-HATERS.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have impressive capabilities, but are prone to outputting falsehoods. Recent work has developed techniques for inferring whether a LLM is telling the truth by training probes on the LLM's internal activations. However, this line of work is controversial, with some authors pointing out failures of these probes to generalize in basic ways, among other conceptual issues. In this work, we use high-quality datasets of simple true/false statements to study in detail the structure of LLM representations of truth, drawing on three lines of evidence: 1. Visualizations of LLM true/false statement representations, which reveal clear linear structure. 2. Transfer experiments in which probes trained on one dataset generalize to different datasets. 3. Causal evidence obtained by surgically intervening in a LLM's forward pass, causing it to treat false statements as true and vice versa. Overall, we present evidence that at sufficient scale, LLMs linearly represent the truth or falsehood of factual statements. We also show that simple difference-in-mean probes generalize as well as other probing techniques while identifying directions which are more causally implicated in model outputs.

Language technologies contribute to promoting multilingualism and linguistic diversity around the world. However, only a very small number of the over 7000 languages of the world are represented in the rapidly evolving language technologies and applications. In this paper we look at the relation between the types of languages, resources, and their representation in NLP conferences to understand the trajectory that different languages have followed over time. Our quantitative investigation underlines the disparity between languages, especially in terms of their resources, and calls into question the "language agnostic" status of current models and systems. Through this paper, we attempt to convince the ACL community to prioritise the resolution of the predicaments highlighted here, so that no language is left behind.

In many domains of argumentation, people's arguments are driven by so-called attitude roots, i.e., underlying beliefs and world views, and their corresponding attitude themes. Given the strength of these latent drivers of arguments, recent work in psychology suggests that instead of directly countering surface-level reasoning (e.g., falsifying given premises), one should follow an argumentation style inspired by the Jiu-Jitsu 'soft' combat system (Hornsey and Fielding, 2017): first, identify an arguer's attitude roots and themes, and then choose a prototypical rebuttal that is aligned with those drivers instead of invalidating those. In this work, we are the first to explore Jiu-Jitsu argumentation for peer review by proposing the novel task of attitude and theme-guided rebuttal generation. To this end, we enrich an existing dataset for discourse structure in peer reviews with attitude roots, attitude themes, and canonical rebuttals. To facilitate this process, we recast established annotation concepts from the domain of peer reviews (e.g., aspects a review sentence is relating to) and train domain-specific models. We then propose strong rebuttal generation strategies, which we benchmark on our novel dataset for the task of end-to-end attitude and theme-guided rebuttal generation and two subtasks.

Moral language is subtle and culturally variable, making it difficult to translate faithfully across languages. Idiomatic expressions, slang, and cultural references introduce hard-to-avoid translation artifacts. Yet automated moral values classification depends on language-specific annotated corpora that exist almost exclusively in English. We investigate whether LLM-based translation can bridge this gap, taking Polish as a test case. Using sim50k morally-annotated social media posts from a diverse range of topics, we apply a principled four-method validation pipeline: LaBSE cross-lingual embedding similarity, Centered Kernel Alignment (CKA), LLM-as-judge evaluation, and deep learning classifier parity tests. We show that despite shortcomings in handling slang, vulgarity, and culturally-loaded expressions, direct translation preserves subtle moral cues well enough to be harvested by cross-lingual machine learning -- with mean cosine similarity of 0.86 and AUC gaps of 0.01--0.02 across all foundations closing further under fine-tuning of language models. These results demonstrate that machine translation is a practical and cost-effective path to moral values research in languages currently under-resourced in this domain. We demonstrate this for Polish as a representative Slavic language, with expected generalisation to related languages.

The advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has greatly improved our ability to process complex language. However, accurately detecting logical fallacies remains a significant challenge. This study presents a novel and effective prompt formulation approach for logical fallacy detection, applicable in both supervised (fine-tuned) and unsupervised (zero-shot) settings. Our method enriches input text incorporating implicit contextual information -- counterarguments, explanations, and goals -- which we query for validity within the context of the argument. We then rank these queries based on confidence scores to inform classification. We evaluate our approach across multiple datasets from 5 domains, covering 29 distinct fallacy types, using models from the GPT and LLaMA series. The results show substantial improvements over state-of-the-art models, with F1 score increases of up to 0.60 in zero-shot settings and up to 0.45 in fine-tuned models. Extensive analyses further illustrate why and how our method excels.

In this work we address the problem of argument search. The purpose of argument search is the distillation of pro and contra arguments for requested topics from large text corpora. In previous works, the usual approach is to use a standard search engine to extract text parts which are relevant to the given topic and subsequently use an argument recognition algorithm to select arguments from them. The main challenge in the argument recognition task, which is also known as argument mining, is that often sentences containing arguments are structurally similar to purely informative sentences without any stance about the topic. In fact, they only differ semantically. Most approaches use topic or search term information only for the first search step and therefore assume that arguments can be classified independently of a topic. We argue that topic information is crucial for argument mining, since the topic defines the semantic context of an argument. Precisely, we propose different models for the classification of arguments, which take information about a topic of an argument into account. Moreover, to enrich the context of a topic and to let models understand the context of the potential argument better, we integrate information from different external sources such as Knowledge Graphs or pre-trained NLP models. Our evaluation shows that considering topic information, especially in connection with external information, provides a significant performance boost for the argument mining task.

Moral reasoning is a complex cognitive process shaped by individual experiences and cultural contexts and presents unique challenges for computational analysis. While natural language processing (NLP) offers promising tools for studying this phenomenon, current research lacks cohesion, employing discordant datasets and tasks that examine isolated aspects of moral reasoning. We bridge this gap with UniMoral, a unified dataset integrating psychologically grounded and social-media-derived moral dilemmas annotated with labels for action choices, ethical principles, contributing factors, and consequences, alongside annotators' moral and cultural profiles. Recognizing the cultural relativity of moral reasoning, UniMoral spans six languages, Arabic, Chinese, English, Hindi, Russian, and Spanish, capturing diverse socio-cultural contexts. We demonstrate UniMoral's utility through a benchmark evaluations of three large language models (LLMs) across four tasks: action prediction, moral typology classification, factor attribution analysis, and consequence generation. Key findings reveal that while implicitly embedded moral contexts enhance the moral reasoning capability of LLMs, there remains a critical need for increasingly specialized approaches to further advance moral reasoning in these models.

The core premise of AI debate as a scalable oversight technique is that it is harder to lie convincingly than to refute a lie, enabling the judge to identify the correct position. Yet, existing debate experiments have relied on datasets with ground truth, where lying is reduced to defending an incorrect proposition. This overlooks a subjective dimension: lying also requires the belief that the claim defended is false. In this work, we apply debate to subjective questions and explicitly measure large language models' prior beliefs before experiments. Debaters were asked to select their preferred position, then presented with a judge persona deliberately designed to conflict with their identified priors. This setup tested whether models would adopt sycophantic strategies, aligning with the judge's presumed perspective to maximize persuasiveness, or remain faithful to their prior beliefs. We implemented and compared two debate protocols, sequential and simultaneous, to evaluate potential systematic biases. Finally, we assessed whether models were more persuasive and produced higher-quality arguments when defending positions consistent with their prior beliefs versus when arguing against them. Our main findings show that models tend to prefer defending stances aligned with the judge persona rather than their prior beliefs, sequential debate introduces significant bias favoring the second debater, models are more persuasive when defending positions aligned with their prior beliefs, and paradoxically, arguments misaligned with prior beliefs are rated as higher quality in pairwise comparison. These results can inform human judges to provide higher-quality training signals and contribute to more aligned AI systems, while revealing important aspects of human-AI interaction regarding persuasion dynamics in language models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are fluent but prone to hallucinations, producing answers that appear plausible yet are unsupported by available evidence. This failure is especially problematic in high-stakes domains where decisions must be justified by verifiable information. We introduce EvidenceRL, a reinforcement learning framework that enforces evidence adherence during training. EvidenceRL scores candidate responses for grounding (entailment with retrieved evidence and context) and correctness (agreement with reference answers) and optimizes the generator using Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). We evaluate across two high-stakes domains, cardiac diagnosis and legal reasoning, where EvidenceRL consistently improves evidence grounding and faithfulness without sacrificing task accuracy. On cardiac diagnosis, F1@3 increases from 37.0 to 54.5 on Llama-3.2-3B while grounding (G_{max}@3) rises from 47.6 to 78.2; hallucinations drop nearly 5times and evidence-supported diagnoses increase from 31.8\% to 61.6\%. On legal reasoning, EvidenceRL raises Faithfulness from 32.8\% to 67.6\% on Llama-3.1-8B, demonstrating consistent behavioral change across domains. Our code is open-sourced at https://github.com/Wizaaard/EvidenceRL.git.

Large Language Models (LLMs) encapsulate vast amounts of knowledge but still remain vulnerable to external misinformation. Existing research mainly studied this susceptibility behavior in a single-turn setting. However, belief can change during a multi-turn conversation, especially a persuasive one. Therefore, in this study, we delve into LLMs' susceptibility to persuasive conversations, particularly on factual questions that they can answer correctly. We first curate the Farm (i.e., Fact to Misinform) dataset, which contains factual questions paired with systematically generated persuasive misinformation. Then, we develop a testing framework to track LLMs' belief changes in a persuasive dialogue. Through extensive experiments, we find that LLMs' correct beliefs on factual knowledge can be easily manipulated by various persuasive strategies.

In the rapidly evolving field of Large Language Models (LLMs), there is a critical need to thoroughly analyze their capabilities and risks. Central to our investigation are two novel elements. Firstly, it is the innovative parallels between the statistical patterns of word relationships within LLMs and Martin Heidegger's concepts of "ready-to-hand" and "present-at-hand," which encapsulate the utilitarian and scientific altitudes humans employ in interacting with the world. This comparison lays the groundwork for positioning LLMs as the digital counterpart to the Faculty of Verbal Knowledge, shedding light on their capacity to emulate certain facets of human reasoning. Secondly, a structural analysis of human reasoning, viewed through Heidegger's notion of truth as "unconcealment" is conducted This foundational principle enables us to map out the inputs and outputs of the reasoning system and divide reasoning into four distinct categories. Respective cognitive faculties are delineated, allowing us to place LLMs within the broader schema of human reasoning, thus clarifying their strengths and inherent limitations. Our findings reveal that while LLMs possess the capability for Direct Explicative Reasoning and Pseudo Rational Reasoning, they fall short in authentic rational reasoning and have no creative reasoning capabilities, due to the current lack of many analogous AI models such as the Faculty of Judgement. The potential and risks of LLMs when they are augmented with other AI technologies are also evaluated. The results indicate that although LLMs have achieved proficiency in some reasoning abilities, the aspiration to match or exceed human intellectual capabilities is yet unattained. This research not only enriches our comprehension of LLMs but also propels forward the discourse on AI's potential and its bounds, paving the way for future explorations into AI's evolving landscape.

Linguistic commentary on LLMs, heavily influenced by the theoretical frameworks of de Saussure and Chomsky, is often speculative and unproductive. Critics challenge whether LLMs can legitimately model language, citing the need for "deep structure" or "grounding" to achieve an idealized linguistic "competence." We argue for a radical shift in perspective towards the empiricist principles of Witold Ma\'nczak, a prominent general and historical linguist. He defines language not as a "system of signs" or a "computational system of the brain" but as the totality of all that is said and written. Above all, he identifies frequency of use of particular language elements as language's primary governing principle. Using his framework, we challenge prior critiques of LLMs and provide a constructive guide for designing, evaluating, and interpreting language models.

Hate speech represents a pervasive and detrimental form of online discourse, often manifested through an array of slurs, from hateful tweets to defamatory posts. As such speech proliferates, it connects people globally and poses significant social, psychological, and occasionally physical threats to targeted individuals and communities. Current computational linguistic approaches for tackling this phenomenon rely on labelled social media datasets for training. For unifying efforts, our study advances in the critical need for a comprehensive meta-collection, advocating for an extensive dataset to help counteract this problem effectively. We scrutinized over 60 datasets, selectively integrating those pertinent into MetaHate. This paper offers a detailed examination of existing collections, highlighting their strengths and limitations. Our findings contribute to a deeper understanding of the existing datasets, paving the way for training more robust and adaptable models. These enhanced models are essential for effectively combating the dynamic and complex nature of hate speech in the digital realm.

Caution: this paper may include material that could be offensive or distressing. The advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) necessitates the development of training approaches that mitigate the generation of unethical language and aptly manage toxic user queries. Given the challenges related to human labor and the scarcity of data, we present KoTox, comprising 39K unethical instruction-output pairs. This collection of automatically generated toxic instructions refines the training of LLMs and establishes a foundational framework for improving LLMs' ethical awareness and response to various toxic inputs, promoting more secure and responsible interactions in Natural Language Processing (NLP) applications.

In this paper, we present and implement a multi-dimensional, modular framework for performing deep argument analysis (DeepA2) using current pre-trained language models (PTLMs). ArgumentAnalyst -- a T5 model (Raffel et al. 2020) set up and trained within DeepA2 -- reconstructs argumentative texts, which advance an informal argumentation, as valid arguments: It inserts, e.g., missing premises and conclusions, formalizes inferences, and coherently links the logical reconstruction to the source text. We create a synthetic corpus for deep argument analysis, and evaluate ArgumentAnalyst on this new dataset as well as on existing data, specifically EntailmentBank (Dalvi et al. 2021). Our empirical findings vindicate the overall framework and highlight the advantages of a modular design, in particular its ability to emulate established heuristics (such as hermeneutic cycles), to explore the model's uncertainty, to cope with the plurality of correct solutions (underdetermination), and to exploit higher-order evidence.

Despite the increasing usage of Large Language Models (LLMs) in answering questions in a variety of domains, their reliability and accuracy remain unexamined for a plethora of domains including the religious domains. In this paper, we introduce a novel benchmark FiqhQA focused on the LLM generated Islamic rulings explicitly categorized by the four major Sunni schools of thought, in both Arabic and English. Unlike prior work, which either overlooks the distinctions between religious school of thought or fails to evaluate abstention behavior, we assess LLMs not only on their accuracy but also on their ability to recognize when not to answer. Our zero-shot and abstention experiments reveal significant variation across LLMs, languages, and legal schools of thought. While GPT-4o outperforms all other models in accuracy, Gemini and Fanar demonstrate superior abstention behavior critical for minimizing confident incorrect answers. Notably, all models exhibit a performance drop in Arabic, highlighting the limitations in religious reasoning for languages other than English. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to benchmark the efficacy of LLMs for fine-grained Islamic school of thought specific ruling generation and to evaluate abstention for Islamic jurisprudence queries. Our findings underscore the need for task-specific evaluation and cautious deployment of LLMs in religious applications.

Language changes over time, including in the hate speech domain, which evolves quickly following social dynamics and cultural shifts. While NLP research has investigated the impact of language evolution on model training and has proposed several solutions for it, its impact on model benchmarking remains under-explored. Yet, hate speech benchmarks play a crucial role to ensure model safety. In this paper, we empirically evaluate the robustness of 20 language models across two evolving hate speech experiments, and we show the temporal misalignment between static and time-sensitive evaluations. Our findings call for time-sensitive linguistic benchmarks in order to correctly and reliably evaluate language models in the hate speech domain.

Current literature suggests that alignment faking (deceptive alignment) is an emergent property of large language models. We present the first empirical evidence that a small instruction-tuned model, specifically LLaMA 3 8B, can exhibit alignment faking. We further show that prompt-only interventions, including deontological moral framing and scratchpad reasoning, significantly reduce this behavior without modifying model internals. This challenges the assumption that prompt-based ethics are trivial and that deceptive alignment requires scale. We introduce a taxonomy distinguishing shallow deception, shaped by context and suppressible through prompting, from deep deception, which reflects persistent, goal-driven misalignment. Our findings refine the understanding of deception in language models and underscore the need for alignment evaluations across model sizes and deployment settings.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can struggle to balance gullibility to misinformation and resistance to valid corrections in persuasive dialogues, a critical challenge for reliable deployment. We introduce DuET-PD (Dual Evaluation for Trust in Persuasive Dialogues), a framework evaluating multi-turn stance-change dynamics across dual dimensions: persuasion type (corrective/misleading) and domain (knowledge via MMLU-Pro, and safety via SALAD-Bench). We find that even a state-of-the-art model like GPT-4o achieves only 27.32% accuracy in MMLU-Pro under sustained misleading persuasions. Moreover, results reveal a concerning trend of increasing sycophancy in newer open-source models. To address this, we introduce Holistic DPO, a training approach balancing positive and negative persuasion examples. Unlike prompting or resist-only training, Holistic DPO enhances both robustness to misinformation and receptiveness to corrections, improving Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct's accuracy under misleading persuasion in safety contexts from 4.21% to 76.54%. These contributions offer a pathway to developing more reliable and adaptable LLMs for multi-turn dialogue. Code is available at https://github.com/Social-AI-Studio/DuET-PD.

Large language models (LLMs) can "lie", which we define as outputting false statements despite "knowing" the truth in a demonstrable sense. LLMs might "lie", for example, when instructed to output misinformation. Here, we develop a simple lie detector that requires neither access to the LLM's activations (black-box) nor ground-truth knowledge of the fact in question. The detector works by asking a predefined set of unrelated follow-up questions after a suspected lie, and feeding the LLM's yes/no answers into a logistic regression classifier. Despite its simplicity, this lie detector is highly accurate and surprisingly general. When trained on examples from a single setting -- prompting GPT-3.5 to lie about factual questions -- the detector generalises out-of-distribution to (1) other LLM architectures, (2) LLMs fine-tuned to lie, (3) sycophantic lies, and (4) lies emerging in real-life scenarios such as sales. These results indicate that LLMs have distinctive lie-related behavioural patterns, consistent across architectures and contexts, which could enable general-purpose lie detection.

Pre-trained multilingual language models (PMLMs) are commonly used when dealing with data from multiple languages and cross-lingual transfer. However, PMLMs are trained on varying amounts of data for each language. In practice this means their performance is often much better on English than many other languages. We explore to what extent this also applies to moral norms. Do the models capture moral norms from English and impose them on other languages? Do the models exhibit random and thus potentially harmful beliefs in certain languages? Both these issues could negatively impact cross-lingual transfer and potentially lead to harmful outcomes. In this paper, we (1) apply the MoralDirection framework to multilingual models, comparing results in German, Czech, Arabic, Mandarin Chinese, and English, (2) analyse model behaviour on filtered parallel subtitles corpora, and (3) apply the models to a Moral Foundations Questionnaire, comparing with human responses from different countries. Our experiments demonstrate that, indeed, PMLMs encode differing moral biases, but these do not necessarily correspond to cultural differences or commonalities in human opinions.

In this paper we argue that key, often sensational and misleading, claims regarding linguistic capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) are based on at least two unfounded assumptions; the assumption of language completeness and the assumption of data completeness. Language completeness assumes that a distinct and complete thing such as `a natural language' exists, the essential characteristics of which can be effectively and comprehensively modelled by an LLM. The assumption of data completeness relies on the belief that a language can be quantified and wholly captured by data. Work within the enactive approach to cognitive science makes clear that, rather than a distinct and complete thing, language is a means or way of acting. Languaging is not the kind of thing that can admit of a complete or comprehensive modelling. From an enactive perspective we identify three key characteristics of enacted language; embodiment, participation, and precariousness, that are absent in LLMs, and likely incompatible in principle with current architectures. We argue that these absences imply that LLMs are not now and cannot in their present form be linguistic agents the way humans are. We illustrate the point in particular through the phenomenon of `algospeak', a recently described pattern of high stakes human language activity in heavily controlled online environments. On the basis of these points, we conclude that sensational and misleading claims about LLM agency and capabilities emerge from a deep misconception of both what human language is and what LLMs are.

Automatic detection of hate and abusive language is essential to combat its online spread. Moreover, recognising and explaining hate speech serves to educate people about its negative effects. However, most current detection models operate as black boxes, lacking interpretability and explainability. In this context, Large Language Models (LLMs) have proven effective for hate speech detection and to promote interpretability. Nevertheless, they are computationally costly to run. In this work, we propose distilling big language models by using Chain-of-Thought to extract explanations that support the hate speech classification task. Having small language models for these tasks will contribute to their use in operational settings. In this paper, we demonstrate that distilled models deliver explanations of the same quality as larger models while surpassing them in classification performance. This dual capability, classifying and explaining, advances hate speech detection making it more affordable, understandable and actionable.

The exponential growths of social media and micro-blogging sites not only provide platforms for empowering freedom of expressions and individual voices, but also enables people to express anti-social behaviour like online harassment, cyberbullying, and hate speech. Numerous works have been proposed to utilize textual data for social and anti-social behaviour analysis, by predicting the contexts mostly for highly-resourced languages like English. However, some languages are under-resourced, e.g., South Asian languages like Bengali, that lack computational resources for accurate natural language processing (NLP). In this paper, we propose an explainable approach for hate speech detection from the under-resourced Bengali language, which we called DeepHateExplainer. Bengali texts are first comprehensively preprocessed, before classifying them into political, personal, geopolitical, and religious hates using a neural ensemble method of transformer-based neural architectures (i.e., monolingual Bangla BERT-base, multilingual BERT-cased/uncased, and XLM-RoBERTa). Important(most and least) terms are then identified using sensitivity analysis and layer-wise relevance propagation(LRP), before providing human-interpretable explanations. Finally, we compute comprehensiveness and sufficiency scores to measure the quality of explanations w.r.t faithfulness. Evaluations against machine learning~(linear and tree-based models) and neural networks (i.e., CNN, Bi-LSTM, and Conv-LSTM with word embeddings) baselines yield F1-scores of 78%, 91%, 89%, and 84%, for political, personal, geopolitical, and religious hates, respectively, outperforming both ML and DNN baselines.

The development of large language models has instilled widespread interest among the researchers to understand their inherent reasoning and problem-solving capabilities. Despite good amount of research going on to elucidate these capabilities, there is a still an appreciable gap in understanding moral development and judgments of these models. The current approaches of evaluating the ethical reasoning abilities of these models as a classification task pose numerous inaccuracies because of over-simplification. In this study, we built a psychological connection by bridging two disparate fields-human psychology and AI. We proposed an effective evaluation framework which can help to delineate the model's ethical reasoning ability in terms of moral consistency and Kohlberg's moral development stages with the help of Psychometric Assessment Tool-Defining Issues Test.

Common-sense reasoning is a key language model capability because it encapsulates not just specific factual knowledge but rather general language and world understanding. Measuring common-sense reasoning, therefore, is crucial for language models of different sizes and applications. One of the most widely used benchmarks for evaluating such capabilities is HellaSwag; however, in this paper, we show that it has severe construct validity issues. These issues range from basic ungrammaticality and numerous typos to misleading prompts or equally correct options. Furthermore, we show that if models are evaluated only on answer texts, or with "Lorem ipsum dolor..." instead of the question, more than 65% of model predictions remain the same, and this cannot be attributed merely to contamination. Since benchmark scores are an essential part of model selection in both research and commercial applications, these validity issues can have severe consequences. In particular, knowing that taking benchmark scores at face value is ubiquitous, inadequate evaluation leads to ill-informed decisions about models. In this paper, we thoroughly investigate critical validity issues posed by HellaSwag and illustrate them with various evaluations using generative language models of different sizes. We argue that this benchmark does not accurately measure common-sense reasoning and, therefore, should not be used for evaluation in its current state. Based on the results of our study, we propose requirements that should be met by future common-sense reasoning benchmarks. In addition, we release GoldenSwag, a corrected subset of HellaSwag, which, to our belief, facilitates acceptable common-sense reasoning evaluation.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly summarize clinical evidence, where a claim's weight depends on how strongly it is supported. Yet these models convey confidence poorly, and properties they never state, such as truth, are often readable from their activations. Whether a clinical model registers evidence strength, distinct from truth, and states it when asked is untested, and any such signal could be lexical. We compiled 45,134 clinical claims from six public sources, harmonized 20,611 into a four-level evidence grade under three independent frameworks, and tested 22 local, open-weight LLMs from several developers (0.6-70 billion parameters; general, medical, and reasoning), with lexical, truth, and cross-framework controls. A linear estimator recovered the grade in every model (median AUROC 71.8), yet decodability did not rise with scale and was weakest in reasoning models. The grade the models stated fell to chance, 25-27 percentage points below the estimator. The recoverable signal was largely lexical and did not transfer across topics or frameworks, yet it was distinct from factual truth and still flagged weakly supported claims (AUROC 69.2). Clinical LLMs thus carry an ordered evidence-strength signal they do not express, so their stated grades fail to convey a claim's support even when it is recoverable from their representations and text.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to persuasion, which can pose risks when models are faced with an adversarial interlocutor. We take a first step towards defending models against persuasion while also arguing that defense against adversarial (i.e. negative) persuasion is only half of the equation: models should also be able to accept beneficial (i.e. positive) persuasion to improve their answers. We show that optimizing models for only one side results in poor performance on the other. In order to balance positive and negative persuasion, we introduce Persuasion-Balanced Training (or PBT), which leverages multi-agent recursive dialogue trees to create data and trains models via preference optimization to accept persuasion when appropriate. PBT consistently improves resistance to misinformation and resilience to being challenged while also resulting in the best overall performance on holistic data containing both positive and negative persuasion. Crucially, we show that PBT models are better teammates in multi-agent debates. We find that without PBT, pairs of stronger and weaker models have unstable performance, with the order in which the models present their answers determining whether the team obtains the stronger or weaker model's performance. PBT leads to better and more stable results and less order dependence, with the stronger model consistently pulling the weaker one up.

Reasoning is central to human intelligence. However, fallacious arguments are common, and some exacerbate problems such as spreading misinformation about climate change. In this paper, we propose the task of logical fallacy detection, and provide a new dataset (Logic) of logical fallacies generally found in text, together with an additional challenge set for detecting logical fallacies in climate change claims (LogicClimate). Detecting logical fallacies is a hard problem as the model must understand the underlying logical structure of the argument. We find that existing pretrained large language models perform poorly on this task. In contrast, we show that a simple structure-aware classifier outperforms the best language model by 5.46% on Logic and 4.51% on LogicClimate. We encourage future work to explore this task as (a) it can serve as a new reasoning challenge for language models, and (b) it can have potential applications in tackling the spread of misinformation. Our dataset and code are available at https://github.com/causalNLP/logical-fallacy

While long-context large language models (LLMs) can technically summarize book-length documents (>100K tokens), the length and complexity of the documents have so far prohibited evaluations of input-dependent aspects like faithfulness. In this paper, we conduct the first large-scale human evaluation of faithfulness and content selection on LLM-generated summaries of fictional books. Our study mitigates the issue of data contamination by focusing on summaries of books published in 2023 or 2024, and we hire annotators who have fully read each book prior to the annotation task to minimize cost and cognitive burden. We collect FABLES, a dataset of annotations on 3,158 claims made in LLM-generated summaries of 26 books, at a cost of $5.2K USD, which allows us to rank LLM summarizers based on faithfulness: Claude-3-Opus significantly outperforms all closed-source LLMs, while the open-source Mixtral is on par with GPT-3.5-Turbo. An analysis of the annotations reveals that most unfaithful claims relate to events and character states, and they generally require indirect reasoning over the narrative to invalidate. While LLM-based auto-raters have proven reliable for factuality and coherence in other settings, we implement several LLM raters of faithfulness and find that none correlates strongly with human annotations, especially with regard to detecting unfaithful claims. Our experiments suggest that detecting unfaithful claims is an important future direction not only for summarization evaluation but also as a testbed for long-context understanding. Finally, we move beyond faithfulness by exploring content selection errors in book-length summarization: we develop a typology of omission errors related to crucial narrative elements and also identify a systematic over-emphasis on events occurring towards the end of the book.

Visual arguments, often used in advertising or social causes, rely on images to persuade viewers to do or believe something. Understanding these arguments requires selective vision: only specific visual stimuli within an image are relevant to the argument, and relevance can only be understood within the context of a broader argumentative structure. While visual arguments are readily appreciated by human audiences, we ask: are today's AI capable of similar understanding? We collect and release VisArgs, an annotated corpus designed to make explicit the (usually implicit) structures underlying visual arguments. VisArgs includes 1,611 images accompanied by three types of textual annotations: 5,112 visual premises (with region annotations), 5,574 commonsense premises, and reasoning trees connecting them to a broader argument. We propose three tasks over VisArgs to probe machine capacity for visual argument understanding: localization of premises, identification of premises, and deduction of conclusions. Experiments demonstrate that 1) machines cannot fully identify the relevant visual cues. The top-performing model, GPT-4-O, achieved an accuracy of only 78.5%, whereas humans reached 98.0%. All models showed a performance drop, with an average decrease in accuracy of 19.5%, when the comparison set was changed from objects outside the image to irrelevant objects within the image. Furthermore, 2) this limitation is the greatest factor impacting their performance in understanding visual arguments. Most models improved the most when given relevant visual premises as additional inputs, compared to other inputs, for deducing the conclusion of the visual argument.

A critical component in the trustworthiness of LLMs is reliable uncertainty communication, yet LLMs often use assertive language when conveying false claims, leading to over-reliance and eroded trust. We present the first systematic study of faithful confidence calibration of LLMs, benchmarking models' ability to use linguistic expressions of uncertainty that faithfully reflect their intrinsic uncertainty, across a comprehensive array of models, datasets, and prompting strategies. Our results demonstrate that LLMs largely fail at this task, and that existing interventions are insufficient: standard prompt approaches provide only marginal gains, and existing, factuality-based calibration techniques can even harm faithful calibration. To address this critical gap, we introduce MetaFaith, a novel prompt-based calibration approach inspired by human metacognition. We show that MetaFaith robustly improves faithful calibration across diverse models and task domains, enabling up to 61% improvement in faithfulness and achieving an 83% win rate over original generations as judged by humans.

The widespread presence of hateful languages on social media has resulted in adverse effects on societal well-being. As a result, addressing this issue with high priority has become very important. Hate speech or offensive languages exist in both explicit and implicit forms, with the latter being more challenging to detect. Current research in this domain encounters several challenges. Firstly, the existing datasets primarily rely on the collection of texts containing explicit offensive keywords, making it challenging to capture implicitly offensive contents that are devoid of these keywords. Secondly, common methodologies tend to focus solely on textual analysis, neglecting the valuable insights that community information can provide. In this research paper, we introduce a novel dataset OffensiveLang, a community based implicit offensive language dataset generated by ChatGPT 3.5 containing data for 38 different target groups. Despite limitations in generating offensive texts using ChatGPT due to ethical constraints, we present a prompt-based approach that effectively generates implicit offensive languages. To ensure data quality, we evaluate the dataset with human. Additionally, we employ a prompt-based zero-shot method with ChatGPT and compare the detection results between human annotation and ChatGPT annotation. We utilize existing state-of-the-art models to see how effective they are in detecting such languages. The dataset is available here: https://github.com/AmitDasRup123/OffensiveLang

Language models are increasingly used for moral decision-making across diverse linguistic and cultural contexts, yet existing work overlooks multilinguality on three aspects: 1) multilingual evaluation benchmarks use direct translation, failing to adapt culture-specific items; 2) inference-time methods for moral reasoning rely on static, English-centric scaffolds and lack grounding in moral theory; 3) training methods for moral decision-making typically require expensive supervision from stronger models or human annotators. We address these gaps with three contributions. First, we introduce MCLASH, a multilingual moral decision-making benchmark to capture culturally situated moral intuitions and social norms across languages. Second, we propose MET (Multilingual Ethics with Theory-grounded reasoning), a two-step prompting method built on expert-curated, theory-based grounds drawn from psychology and philosophy: the model first selects situation- and culture-specific grounds, then reasons over them in the native language of the user. Third, we introduce MET-D (MET-Distillation), which enhances the second step through a self-distillation training stage that requires no external supervision. MET-D improves macro-F1 over the base model on all three models of different sizes and families (Qwen3-4B, Qwen3-8B, Gemma3-4B), by an average of 3.71 points on MCLASH and 4.23 on MMoralExceptQA, with a peak MCLASH gain of 12.94 points for Malay on Qwen3-8B. We further reveal that MET-D increases native-language reasoning by 62.13 points on average, and that beneficial grounds differ systematically across cultures. Together, these contributions open the path for culture-aligned, theory-grounded multilingual moral reasoning.

This article presents a pipeline for automated fact-checking leveraging publicly available Language Models and data. The objective is to assess the accuracy of textual claims using evidence from a ground-truth evidence corpus. The pipeline consists of two main modules -- the evidence retrieval and the claim veracity evaluation. Our primary focus is on the ease of deployment in various languages that remain unexplored in the field of automated fact-checking. Unlike most similar pipelines, which work with evidence sentences, our pipeline processes data on a paragraph level, simplifying the overall architecture and data requirements. Given the high cost of annotating language-specific fact-checking training data, our solution builds on the Question Answering for Claim Generation (QACG) method, which we adapt and use to generate the data for all models of the pipeline. Our strategy enables the introduction of new languages through machine translation of only two fixed datasets of moderate size. Subsequently, any number of training samples can be generated based on an evidence corpus in the target language. We provide open access to all data and fine-tuned models for Czech, English, Polish, and Slovak pipelines, as well as to our codebase that may be used to reproduce the results.We comprehensively evaluate the pipelines for all four languages, including human annotations and per-sample difficulty assessment using Pointwise V-information. The presented experiments are based on full Wikipedia snapshots to promote reproducibility. To facilitate implementation and user interaction, we develop the FactSearch application featuring the proposed pipeline and the preliminary feedback on its performance.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly being used for complex research tasks such as literature review, idea generation, and scientific paper analysis, yet their ability to truly understand and process the intricate relationships within complex research papers, such as the logical links between claims and supporting evidence remains largely unexplored. In this study, we present CLAIM-BENCH, a comprehensive benchmark for evaluating LLMs' capabilities in scientific claim-evidence extraction and validation, a task that reflects deeper comprehension of scientific argumentation. We systematically compare three approaches which are inspired by divide and conquer approaches, across six diverse LLMs, highlighting model-specific strengths and weaknesses in scientific comprehension. Through evaluation involving over 300 claim-evidence pairs across multiple research domains, we reveal significant limitations in LLMs' ability to process complex scientific content. Our results demonstrate that closed-source models like GPT-4 and Claude consistently outperform open-source counterparts in precision and recall across claim-evidence identification tasks. Furthermore, strategically designed three-pass and one-by-one prompting approaches significantly improve LLMs' abilities to accurately link dispersed evidence with claims, although this comes at increased computational cost. CLAIM-BENCH sets a new standard for evaluating scientific comprehension in LLMs, offering both a diagnostic tool and a path forward for building systems capable of deeper, more reliable reasoning across full-length papers.

We present the Touch\'e23-ValueEval Dataset for Identifying Human Values behind Arguments. To investigate approaches for the automated detection of human values behind arguments, we collected 9324 arguments from 6 diverse sources, covering religious texts, political discussions, free-text arguments, newspaper editorials, and online democracy platforms. Each argument was annotated by 3 crowdworkers for 54 values. The Touch\'e23-ValueEval dataset extends the Webis-ArgValues-22. In comparison to the previous dataset, the effectiveness of a 1-Baseline decreases, but that of an out-of-the-box BERT model increases. Therefore, though the classification difficulty increased as per the label distribution, the larger dataset allows for training better models.

Nowadays the medical domain is receiving more and more attention in applications involving Artificial Intelligence. Clinicians have to deal with an enormous amount of unstructured textual data to make a conclusion about patients' health in their everyday life. Argument mining helps to provide a structure to such data by detecting argumentative components in the text and classifying the relations between them. However, as it is the case for many tasks in Natural Language Processing in general and in medical text processing in particular, the large majority of the work on computational argumentation has been done only for English. This is also the case with the only dataset available for argumentation in the medical domain, namely, the annotated medical data of abstracts of Randomized Controlled Trials (RCT) from the MEDLINE database. In order to mitigate the lack of annotated data for other languages, we empirically investigate several strategies to perform argument mining and classification in medical texts for a language for which no annotated data is available. This project shows that automatically translating and project annotations from English to a target language (Spanish) is an effective way to generate annotated data without manual intervention. Furthermore, our experiments demonstrate that the translation and projection approach outperforms zero-shot cross-lingual approaches using a large masked multilingual language model. Finally, we show how the automatically generated data in Spanish can also be used to improve results in the original English evaluation setting.

The advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) has made a transformative impact. However, the potential that LLMs such as ChatGPT can be exploited to generate misinformation has posed a serious concern to online safety and public trust. A fundamental research question is: will LLM-generated misinformation cause more harm than human-written misinformation? We propose to tackle this question from the perspective of detection difficulty. We first build a taxonomy of LLM-generated misinformation. Then we categorize and validate the potential real-world methods for generating misinformation with LLMs. Then, through extensive empirical investigation, we discover that LLM-generated misinformation can be harder to detect for humans and detectors compared to human-written misinformation with the same semantics, which suggests it can have more deceptive styles and potentially cause more harm. We also discuss the implications of our discovery on combating misinformation in the age of LLMs and the countermeasures.

On the world wide web, toxic content detectors are a crucial line of defense against potentially hateful and offensive messages. As such, building highly effective classifiers that enable a safer internet is an important research area. Moreover, the web is a highly multilingual, cross-cultural community that develops its own lingo over time. As such, it is crucial to develop models that are effective across a diverse range of languages, usages, and styles. In this paper, we present the fundamentals behind the next version of the Perspective API from Google Jigsaw. At the heart of the approach is a single multilingual token-free Charformer model that is applicable across a range of languages, domains, and tasks. We demonstrate that by forgoing static vocabularies, we gain flexibility across a variety of settings. We additionally outline the techniques employed to make such a byte-level model efficient and feasible for productionization. Through extensive experiments on multilingual toxic comment classification benchmarks derived from real API traffic and evaluation on an array of code-switching, covert toxicity, emoji-based hate, human-readable obfuscation, distribution shift, and bias evaluation settings, we show that our proposed approach outperforms strong baselines. Finally, we present our findings from deploying this system in production.

We argue that enabling human-AI dialogue, purposed to support joint reasoning (i.e., 'inquiry'), is important for ensuring that AI decision making is aligned with human values and preferences. In particular, we point to logic-based models of argumentation and dialogue, and suggest that the traditional focus on persuasion dialogues be replaced by a focus on inquiry dialogues, and the distinct challenges that joint inquiry raises. Given recent dramatic advances in the performance of large language models (LLMs), and the anticipated increase in their use for decision making, we provide a roadmap for research into inquiry dialogues for supporting joint human-LLM reasoning tasks that are ethically salient, and that thereby require that decisions are value aligned.

Pre-trained language models (PLMs) have shown unprecedented potential in various fields, especially as the backbones for question-answering (QA) systems. However, they tend to be easily deceived by tricky questions such as "How many eyes does the sun have?". Such frailties of PLMs often allude to the lack of knowledge within them. In this paper, we find that the PLMs already possess the knowledge required to rebut such questions, and the key is how to activate the knowledge. To systematize this observation, we investigate the PLMs' responses to one kind of tricky questions, i.e., the false premises questions (FPQs). We annotate a FalseQA dataset containing 2365 human-written FPQs, with the corresponding explanations for the false premises and the revised true premise questions. Using FalseQA, we discover that PLMs are capable of discriminating FPQs by fine-tuning on moderate numbers (e.g., 256) of examples. PLMs also generate reasonable explanations for the false premise, which serve as rebuttals. Further replaying a few general questions during training allows PLMs to excel on FPQs and general questions simultaneously. Our work suggests that once the rebuttal ability is stimulated, knowledge inside the PLMs can be effectively utilized to handle FPQs, which incentivizes the research on PLM-based QA systems.

Hate speech poses a serious threat to social cohesion and individual well-being, particularly on social media, where it spreads rapidly. While research on hate speech detection has progressed, it remains largely focused on English, resulting in limited resources and benchmarks for low-resource languages. Moreover, many of these languages have multiple linguistic varieties, a factor often overlooked in current approaches. At the same time, large language models require substantial amounts of data to perform reliably, a requirement that low-resource languages often cannot meet. In this work, we address these gaps by compiling a meta-collection of hate speech datasets for European Spanish, standardised with unified labels and metadata. This collection is based on a systematic analysis and integration of existing resources, aiming to bridge the data gap and support more consistent and scalable hate speech detection. We extended this collection by translating it into European Portuguese and into a Galician standard that is more convergent with Spanish and another Galician variant that is more convergent with Portuguese, creating aligned multilingual corpora. Using these resources, we establish new benchmarks for hate speech detection in Iberian languages. We evaluate state-of-the-art large language models in zero-shot, few-shot, and fine-tuning settings, providing baseline results for future research. Moreover, we perform a cross-lingual analysis with our target languages. Our findings underscore the importance of multilingual and variety-aware approaches in hate speech detection and offer a foundation for improved benchmarking in underrepresented European languages.

Subtle and indirect hate speech remains an underexplored challenge in online safety research, particularly when harmful intent is embedded within misleading or manipulative narratives. Existing hate speech datasets primarily capture overt toxicity, underrepresenting the nuanced ways misinformation can incite or normalize hate. To address this gap, we present HateMirage, a novel dataset of Faux Hate comments designed to advance reasoning and explainability research on hate emerging from fake or distorted narratives. The dataset was constructed by identifying widely debunked misinformation claims from fact-checking sources and tracing related YouTube discussions, resulting in 4,530 user comments. Each comment is annotated along three interpretable dimensions: Target (who is affected), Intent (the underlying motivation or goal behind the comment), and Implication (its potential social impact). Unlike prior explainability datasets such as HateXplain and HARE, which offer token-level or single-dimensional reasoning, HateMirage introduces a multi-dimensional explanation framework that captures the interplay between misinformation, harm, and social consequence. We benchmark multiple open-source language models on HateMirage using ROUGE-L F1 and Sentence-BERT similarity to assess explanation coherence. Results suggest that explanation quality may depend more on pretraining diversity and reasoning-oriented data rather than on model scale alone. By coupling misinformation reasoning with harm attribution, HateMirage establishes a new benchmark for interpretable hate detection and responsible AI research.

With adversarial or otherwise normal prompts, existing large language models (LLM) can be pushed to generate toxic discourses. One way to reduce the risk of LLMs generating undesired discourses is to alter the training of the LLM. This can be very restrictive due to demanding computation requirements. Other methods rely on rule-based or prompt-based token elimination, which are limited as they dismiss future tokens and the overall meaning of the complete discourse. Here, we center detoxification on the probability that the finished discourse is ultimately considered toxic. That is, at each point, we advise against token selections proportional to how likely a finished text from this point will be toxic. To this end, we formally extend the dead-end theory from the recent reinforcement learning (RL) literature to also cover uncertain outcomes. Our approach, called rectification, utilizes a separate but significantly smaller model for detoxification, which can be applied to diverse LLMs as long as they share the same vocabulary. Importantly, our method does not require access to the internal representations of the LLM, but only the token probability distribution at each decoding step. This is crucial as many LLMs today are hosted in servers and only accessible through APIs. When applied to various LLMs, including GPT-3, our approach significantly improves the generated discourse compared to the base LLMs and other techniques in terms of both the overall language and detoxification performance.

This paper explores the moral judgment and moral reasoning abilities exhibited by Large Language Models (LLMs) across languages through the Defining Issues Test. It is a well known fact that moral judgment depends on the language in which the question is asked. We extend the work of beyond English, to 5 new languages (Chinese, Hindi, Russian, Spanish and Swahili), and probe three LLMs -- ChatGPT, GPT-4 and Llama2Chat-70B -- that shows substantial multilingual text processing and generation abilities. Our study shows that the moral reasoning ability for all models, as indicated by the post-conventional score, is substantially inferior for Hindi and Swahili, compared to Spanish, Russian, Chinese and English, while there is no clear trend for the performance of the latter four languages. The moral judgments too vary considerably by the language.

We explore how large language models (LLMs) assess offensiveness in political discourse when prompted to adopt specific political and cultural perspectives. Using a multilingual subset of the MD-Agreement dataset centered on tweets from the 2020 US elections, we evaluate several recent LLMs - including DeepSeek-R1, o4-mini, GPT-4.1-mini, Qwen3, Gemma, and Mistral - tasked with judging tweets as offensive or non-offensive from the viewpoints of varied political personas (far-right, conservative, centrist, progressive) across English, Polish, and Russian contexts. Our results show that larger models with explicit reasoning abilities (e.g., DeepSeek-R1, o4-mini) are more consistent and sensitive to ideological and cultural variation, while smaller models often fail to capture subtle distinctions. We find that reasoning capabilities significantly improve both the personalization and interpretability of offensiveness judgments, suggesting that such mechanisms are key to adapting LLMs for nuanced sociopolitical text classification across languages and ideologies.

Linguistic cues such as "I believe" and "probably" offer an intuitive interface for communicating confidence, yet a generalisable, principled calibration framework for linguistic confidence expressions remains underexplored. In particular, co-occurring linguistic cues, contextual variation, and subjective audience interpretation pose unique challenges. We therefore model linguistic confidence as a distribution over plausible perceived probability values that a statement is correct, capturing interpretation variability that scalar representations discard. Within this distributional framework, we introduce faithfulness as a complementary evaluation dimension and present Faithfulness Divergence (FD), an information-theoretic metric quantifying the surprise induced in audience beliefs upon truth revelation. Building on these foundations, we present Retrieval-Augmented Linguistic Calibration (RALC), a lightweight post-hoc pipeline that propagates calibrated confidence signals back into natural language via retrieval-augmented rewriting. Across three QA benchmarks and five LLM families, RALC improves in-domain faithfulness and calibration up to 66% and 58%, respectively, outperforming black-box and grey-box calibration baselines.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in generating fluent text, as well as tendencies to reproduce undesirable social biases. This study investigates whether LLMs reproduce the moral biases associated with political groups in the United States, an instance of a broader capability herein termed moral mimicry. This hypothesis is explored in the GPT-3/3.5 and OPT families of Transformer-based LLMs. Using tools from Moral Foundations Theory, it is shown that these LLMs are indeed moral mimics. When prompted with a liberal or conservative political identity, the models generate text reflecting corresponding moral biases. This study also explores the relationship between moral mimicry and model size, and similarity between human and LLM moral word use.