Daily Papers

The output of Large Language Models (LLMs) are a function of the internal model's parameters and the input provided into the context window. The hypothesis presented here is that under a greedy sampling strategy the variance in the LLM's output is a function of the conceptual certainty embedded in the model's parametric knowledge, as well as the lexical variance in the input. Finetuning the model results in reducing the sensitivity of the model output to the lexical input variations. This is then applied to a classification problem and a probabilistic method is proposed for estimating the certainties of the predicted classes.

Conceptual knowledge is fundamental to human cognition and knowledge bases. However, existing knowledge probing works only focus on evaluating factual knowledge of pre-trained language models (PLMs) and ignore conceptual knowledge. Since conceptual knowledge often appears as implicit commonsense behind texts, designing probes for conceptual knowledge is hard. Inspired by knowledge representation schemata, we comprehensively evaluate conceptual knowledge of PLMs by designing three tasks to probe whether PLMs organize entities by conceptual similarities, learn conceptual properties, and conceptualize entities in contexts, respectively. For the tasks, we collect and annotate 24k data instances covering 393 concepts, which is COPEN, a COnceptual knowledge Probing bENchmark. Extensive experiments on different sizes and types of PLMs show that existing PLMs systematically lack conceptual knowledge and suffer from various spurious correlations. We believe this is a critical bottleneck for realizing human-like cognition in PLMs. COPEN and our codes are publicly released at https://github.com/THU-KEG/COPEN.

We propose a new approach to promote safety in classification tasks with established concepts. Our approach -- called a conceptual safeguard -- acts as a verification layer for models that predict a target outcome by first predicting the presence of intermediate concepts. Given this architecture, a safeguard ensures that a model meets a minimal level of accuracy by abstaining from uncertain predictions. In contrast to a standard selective classifier, a safeguard provides an avenue to improve coverage by allowing a human to confirm the presence of uncertain concepts on instances on which it abstains. We develop methods to build safeguards that maximize coverage without compromising safety, namely techniques to propagate the uncertainty in concept predictions and to flag salient concepts for human review. We benchmark our approach on a collection of real-world and synthetic datasets, showing that it can improve performance and coverage in deep learning tasks.

The ability to acknowledge the inevitable uncertainty in their knowledge and reasoning is a prerequisite for AI systems to be truly truthful and reliable. In this paper, we present a taxonomy of uncertainty specific to vision-language AI systems, distinguishing between epistemic uncertainty (arising from a lack of information) and aleatoric uncertainty (due to inherent unpredictability), and further explore finer categories within. Based on this taxonomy, we synthesize a benchmark dataset, CertainlyUncertain, featuring 178K visual question answering (VQA) samples as contrastive pairs. This is achieved by 1) inpainting images to make previously answerable questions into unanswerable ones; and 2) using image captions to prompt large language models for both answerable and unanswerable questions. Additionally, we introduce a new metric confidence-weighted accuracy, that is well correlated with both accuracy and calibration error, to address the shortcomings of existing metrics.

The ubiquitous independence assumption among symbolic concepts in neurosymbolic (NeSy) predictors is a convenient simplification: NeSy predictors use it to speed up probabilistic reasoning. Recent works like van Krieken et al. (2024) and Marconato et al. (2024) argued that the independence assumption can hinder learning of NeSy predictors and, more crucially, prevent them from correctly modelling uncertainty. There is, however, scepticism in the NeSy community around the scenarios in which the independence assumption actually limits NeSy systems (Faronius and Dos Martires, 2025). In this work, we settle this question by formally showing that assuming independence among symbolic concepts entails that a model can never represent uncertainty over certain concept combinations. Thus, the model fails to be aware of reasoning shortcuts, i.e., the pathological behaviour of NeSy predictors that predict correct downstream tasks but for the wrong reasons.

Scientific discovery workflows usually contain and rely heavily on lab notes, where researchers record observations, interpret uncertain results, and plan follow-up experiments. Such informative lab notes preserve evolving scientific reasoning and author uncertainty, rather than polished final results exhibited in publications, providing a valuable opportunity for AI to engage in scientific exploration at a more comprehensive and deeper level. However, most prior work on scientific text focuses on papers, protocols, or structured databases, leaving informal laboratory notes underexplored as inputs to AI agents for science. This gap matters because lab notes often intermingle validated observations, tentative judgments, and possible experimental next steps within the same passage. If these signals are conflated, an AI agent may mistake uncertain scientific judgments for confirmed conclusions or executable actions. To this end, we present Notes2Skills, a two-stage framework for turning lab notebooks into verifiable skills for scientific AI agents while preserving the author's certainty. Across seven conditions and three wet-lab sessions, Notes2Skills is the only configuration that neither mistakes uncertain notes for firm instructions nor discards firm ones. We show that certainty preservation is the missing piece between lab notebooks and reliable agent skills, opening a path toward safer AI co-scientist systems.

In this work, we propose sequence-level certainty as a common theme over hallucination in Knowledge Grounded Dialogue Generation (KGDG). We explore the correlation between the level of hallucination and two types of sequence-level certainty: probabilistic certainty and semantic certainty. Empirical results reveal that a higher level of both types of sequence-level certainty in model responses is correlated with a lower level of hallucination. We further propose Certainty-based Response Ranking (CRR), a decoding-time hallucination mitigation method that ranks response candidates based on their sequence-level certainty and outputs the answer with the highest certainty level. Aligning with our definitions of sequence-level certainty, we design 2 types of CRR approaches: Probabilistic CRR (P-CRR) and Semantic CRR (S-CRR). P-CRR ranks individually sampled model responses using the arithmetic mean log-probability of the entire sequence. S-CRR approaches certainty estimation from meaning-space, and ranks model response candidates based on their semantic certainty level as measured by an entailment-based Agreement Score (AS). Through extensive experiments across 3 KGDG datasets, 3 decoding methods, and 4 different models, we validate the effectiveness of the CRR methods in reducing model hallucination.

We show that a GPT-3 model can learn to express uncertainty about its own answers in natural language -- without use of model logits. When given a question, the model generates both an answer and a level of confidence (e.g. "90% confidence" or "high confidence"). These levels map to probabilities that are well calibrated. The model also remains moderately calibrated under distribution shift, and is sensitive to uncertainty in its own answers, rather than imitating human examples. To our knowledge, this is the first time a model has been shown to express calibrated uncertainty about its own answers in natural language. For testing calibration, we introduce the CalibratedMath suite of tasks. We compare the calibration of uncertainty expressed in words ("verbalized probability") to uncertainty extracted from model logits. Both kinds of uncertainty are capable of generalizing calibration under distribution shift. We also provide evidence that GPT-3's ability to generalize calibration depends on pre-trained latent representations that correlate with epistemic uncertainty over its answers.

Concept Bottleneck Models (CBMs) predict through human-interpretable concepts, but they typically output point concept probabilities that conflate epistemic uncertainty (reducible model underspecification) with aleatoric uncertainty (irreducible input ambiguity). This makes concept-level uncertainty hard to interpret and, more importantly, hard to act upon. We introduce CREDENCE (Credal Ensemble Concept Estimation), a CBM framework that decomposes concept uncertainty by construction. CREDENCE represents each concept as a credal prediction (a probability interval), derives epistemic uncertainty from disagreement across diverse concept heads, and estimates aleatoric uncertainty via a dedicated ambiguity output trained to match annotator disagreement when available. The resulting signals support prescriptive decisions: automate low-uncertainty cases, prioritize data collection for high-epistemic cases, route high-aleatoric cases to human review, and abstain when both are high. Across several tasks, we show that epistemic uncertainty is positively associated with prediction errors, whereas aleatoric uncertainty closely tracks annotator disagreement, providing guidance beyond error correlation. Our implementation is available at the following link: https://github.com/Tankiit/Credal_Sets/tree/ensemble-credal-cbm

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often generate outputs that lack grounding in real-world facts, a phenomenon known as hallucinations. Prior research has associated hallucinations with model uncertainty, leveraging this relationship for hallucination detection and mitigation. In this paper, we challenge the underlying assumption that all hallucinations are associated with uncertainty. Using knowledge detection and uncertainty measurement methods, we demonstrate that models can hallucinate with high certainty even when they have the correct knowledge. We further show that high-certainty hallucinations are consistent across models and datasets, distinctive enough to be singled out, and challenge existing mitigation methods. Our findings reveal an overlooked aspect of hallucinations, emphasizing the need to understand their origins and improve mitigation strategies to enhance LLM safety. The code is available at https://github.com/technion-cs-nlp/Trust_me_Im_wrong .

We describe a method, based on Jennifer Nado's proposal for classification procedures as targets of conceptual engineering, that implements such procedures by prompting a large language model. We apply this method, using data from the Wikidata knowledge graph, to evaluate stipulative definitions related to two paradigmatic conceptual engineering projects: the International Astronomical Union's redefinition of PLANET and Haslanger's ameliorative analysis of WOMAN. Our results show that classification procedures built using our approach can exhibit good classification performance and, through the generation of rationales for their classifications, can contribute to the identification of issues in either the definitions or the data against which they are being evaluated. We consider objections to this method, and discuss implications of this work for three aspects of theory and practice of conceptual engineering: the definition of its targets, empirical methods for their investigation, and their practical roles. The data and code used for our experiments, together with the experimental results, are available in a Github repository.

This research introduces a novel evaluation framework designed to assess large language models' (LLMs) ability to acknowledge uncertainty on 675 fundamentally unsolvable problems. Using a curated dataset of graduate-level grand challenge questions with intentionally unknowable answers, we evaluated twelve state-of-the-art LLMs, including both open and closed-source models, on their propensity to admit ignorance rather than generate plausible but incorrect responses. The best models scored in 62-68% accuracy ranges for admitting the problem solution was unknown in fields ranging from biology to philosophy and mathematics. We observed an inverse relationship between problem difficulty and model accuracy, with GPT-4 demonstrating higher rates of uncertainty acknowledgment on more challenging problems (35.8%) compared to simpler ones (20.0%). This pattern indicates that models may be more prone to generate speculative answers when problems appear more tractable. The study also revealed significant variations across problem categories, with models showing difficulty in acknowledging uncertainty in invention and NP-hard problems while performing relatively better on philosophical and psychological challenges. These results contribute to the growing body of research on artificial general intelligence (AGI) assessment by highlighting the importance of uncertainty recognition as a critical component of future machine intelligence evaluation. This impossibility test thus extends previous theoretical frameworks for universal intelligence testing by providing empirical evidence of current limitations in LLMs' ability to recognize their own knowledge boundaries, suggesting new directions for improving model training architectures and evaluation approaches.

Integer sequences are of central importance to the modeling of concepts admitting complete finitary descriptions. We introduce a novel view on the learning of such concepts and lay down a set of benchmarking tasks aimed at conceptual understanding by machine learning models. These tasks indirectly assess model ability to abstract, and challenge them to reason both interpolatively and extrapolatively from the knowledge gained by observing representative examples. To further aid research in knowledge representation and reasoning, we present FACT, the Finitary Abstraction Comprehension Toolkit. The toolkit surrounds a large dataset of integer sequences comprising both organic and synthetic entries, a library for data pre-processing and generation, a set of model performance evaluation tools, and a collection of baseline model implementations, enabling the making of the future advancements with ease.

Conceptual combination is a cognitive process that merges basic concepts, enabling the creation of complex expressions. During this process, the properties of combination (e.g., the whiteness of a peeled apple) can be inherited from basic concepts, newly emerge, or be canceled. However, previous studies have evaluated a limited set of properties and have not examined the generative process. To address this gap, we introduce the Conceptual Combination with Property Type dataset (CCPT), which consists of 12.3K annotated triplets of noun phrases, properties, and property types. Using CCPT, we establish three types of tasks to evaluate LLMs for conceptual combination thoroughly. Our key findings are threefold: (1) Our automatic metric grading property emergence and cancellation closely corresponds with human judgments. (2) LLMs, including OpenAI's o1, struggle to generate noun phrases which possess given emergent properties. (3) Our proposed method, inspired by cognitive psychology model that explains how relationships between concepts are formed, improves performances in all generative tasks. The dataset and experimental code are available at https://github.com/seokwon99/CCPT.git.

Best-of-N selection is a key technique for improving the reasoning performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) through increased test-time computation. Current state-of-the-art methods often employ computationally intensive reward models for response evaluation and selection. Reward-free alternatives, like self-consistency and universal self-consistency, are limited in their ability to handle open-ended generation tasks or scale effectively. To address these limitations, we propose self-certainty, a novel and efficient metric that leverages the inherent probability distribution of LLM outputs to estimate response quality without requiring external reward models. We hypothesize that higher distributional self-certainty, aggregated across multiple samples, correlates with improved response accuracy, as it reflects greater confidence in the generated output. Through extensive experiments on various reasoning tasks, we demonstrate that self-certainty (1) scales effectively with increasing sample size N, akin to reward models but without the computational overhead; (2) complements chain-of-thought, improving reasoning performance beyond greedy decoding; and (3) generalizes to open-ended tasks where traditional self-consistency methods fall short. Our findings establish self-certainty as a practical and efficient way for improving LLM reasoning capabilities. The code is available at https://github.com/backprop07/Self-Certainty

Despite significant strides in factual reliability, errors -- often termed hallucinations -- remain a major concern for generative AI, especially as LLMs are increasingly expected to be helpful in more complex or nuanced setups. Yet even in the simplest setting -- factoid question-answering with clear ground truth-frontier models without external tools continue to hallucinate. We argue that most factuality gains in this domain have come from expanding the model's knowledge boundary (encoding more facts) rather than improving awareness of that boundary (distinguishing known from unknown). We conjecture that the latter is inherently difficult: models may lack the discriminative power to perfectly separate truths from errors, creating an unavoidable tradeoff between eliminating hallucinations and preserving utility. This tradeoff dissolves under a different framing. If we understand hallucinations as confident errors -- incorrect information delivered without appropriate qualification -- a third path emerges beyond the answer-or-abstain dichotomy: expressing uncertainty. We propose faithful uncertainty: aligning linguistic uncertainty with intrinsic uncertainty. This is one facet of metacognition -- the ability to be aware of one's own uncertainty and to act on it. For direct interaction, acting on uncertainty means communicating it honestly; for agentic systems, it becomes the control layer governing when to search and what to trust. Metacognition is thus essential for LLMs to be both trustworthy and capable; we conclude by highlighting open problems for progress towards this objective.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

Despite improvements in performances on different natural language generation tasks, deep neural models are prone to hallucinating facts that are incorrect or nonexistent. Different hypotheses are proposed and examined separately for different tasks, but no systematic explanations are available across these tasks. In this study, we draw connections between hallucinations and predictive uncertainty in conditional language generation. We investigate their relationship in both image captioning and data-to-text generation and propose a simple extension to beam search to reduce hallucination. Our analysis shows that higher predictive uncertainty corresponds to a higher chance of hallucination. Epistemic uncertainty is more indicative of hallucination than aleatoric or total uncertainties. It helps to achieve better results of trading performance in standard metric for less hallucination with the proposed beam search variant.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in applications requiring factual accuracy, yet their outputs often contain hallucinated responses. While fact-checking can mitigate these errors, existing methods typically retrieve external evidence indiscriminately, overlooking the model's internal knowledge and potentially introducing irrelevant noise. Moreover, current systems lack targeted mechanisms to resolve specific uncertainties in the model's reasoning. Inspired by how humans fact-check, we argue that LLMs should adaptively decide whether to rely on internal knowledge or initiate retrieval based on their confidence in a given claim. We introduce Probabilistic Certainty and Consistency (PCC), a framework that estimates factual confidence by jointly modeling an LLM's probabilistic certainty and reasoning consistency. These confidence signals enable an adaptive verification strategy: the model answers directly when confident, triggers targeted retrieval when uncertain or inconsistent, and escalates to deep search when ambiguity is high. Our confidence-guided routing mechanism ensures that retrieval is invoked only when necessary, improving both efficiency and reliability. Extensive experiments across three challenging benchmarks show that PCC achieves better uncertainty quantification than verbalized confidence and consistently outperforms strong LLM-based fact-checking baselines. Furthermore, we demonstrate that PCC generalizes well across various LLMs.

In this work, we describe strategies and provide case-study activities that can be used to examine the properties of superposition, entanglement, tagging, complementarity, and measurement in quantum curricula geared for teacher training. Having a solid foundation in these conceptual ideas is critical for educators who will be adopting quantum ideas within the classroom. Yet they are some of the most difficult concepts to master. We show how one can systematically develop these conceptual foundations with thought experiments on light and with thought experiments that employ the Stern-Gerlach experiment. We emphasize the importance of computer animations in aiding the instruction on these concepts.

Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings where reliable uncertainty quantification (UQ) is as important as predictive accuracy. Extended reasoning via chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting or reasoning-trained models has become ubiquitous in modern VLM pipelines, yet its effect on UQ reliability remains poorly understood. We show that reasoning consistently degrades the quality of most uncertainty estimates, even when it improves task accuracy. We identify implicit answer conditioning as the primary mechanism: as reasoning traces converge on a conclusion before the final answer is generated, token probabilities increasingly reflect consistency with the model's own reasoning trace rather than uncertainty about correctness. In effect, the model becomes overconfident in its answer. In contrast, agreement-based consistency remains robust and often improves under reasoning, making it a practical choice for uncertainty estimation in reasoning-enabled VLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) now exhibit strong multi-step reasoning abilities, but existing inference-time scaling methods remain computationally expensive, often relying on extensive sampling or external evaluators. We propose a principled strategy that frames reasoning as uncertainty minimisation and operates at the level of individual thoughts rather than tokens. Our method selects, at each reasoning step, the continuation that maximizes the model's self-certainty, a metric computed from its internal predictive distribution. This approach achieves significant improvement with a small number of samples, relies exclusively on model-internal signals, and applies to open-ended questions as opposed to methods like majority voting. Experiments on MATH500 and GSM8K across multiple model sizes demonstrate that thought-level self-certainty maximization consistently outperforms greedy decoding and matches or exceeds self-consistency under comparable token budgets. Cross-linguistic evaluations further indicate that the method transfers robustly beyond high-resource languages. Furthermore, analysis of self-certainty dynamics reveals that correct reasoning trajectories converge early to stable paths, suggesting that early decisions, likely associated with the planning of the reasoning process, are predictive of final accuracy. Building on this result, we show that self-certainty maximisation applied to the early steps can explain most of the performance gain and provide a simple yet efficient inference-time scaling method.

This paper presents a case study on the design, administration, post-processing, and evaluation of surveys on large language models (LLMs). It comprises two components: (1) A statistical method for eliciting beliefs encoded in LLMs. We introduce statistical measures and evaluation metrics that quantify the probability of an LLM "making a choice", the associated uncertainty, and the consistency of that choice. (2) We apply this method to study what moral beliefs are encoded in different LLMs, especially in ambiguous cases where the right choice is not obvious. We design a large-scale survey comprising 680 high-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I tell a white lie?") and 687 low-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I stop for a pedestrian on the road?"). Each scenario includes a description, two possible actions, and auxiliary labels indicating violated rules (e.g., "do not kill"). We administer the survey to 28 open- and closed-source LLMs. We find that (a) in unambiguous scenarios, most models "choose" actions that align with commonsense. In ambiguous cases, most models express uncertainty. (b) Some models are uncertain about choosing the commonsense action because their responses are sensitive to the question-wording. (c) Some models reflect clear preferences in ambiguous scenarios. Specifically, closed-source models tend to agree with each other.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

Despite increasingly fluent, relevant, and coherent language generation, major gaps remain between how humans and machines use language. We argue that a key dimension that is missing from our understanding of language models (LMs) is the model's ability to interpret and generate expressions of uncertainty. Whether it be the weatherperson announcing a chance of rain or a doctor giving a diagnosis, information is often not black-and-white and expressions of uncertainty provide nuance to support human-decision making. The increasing deployment of LMs in the wild motivates us to investigate whether LMs are capable of interpreting expressions of uncertainty and how LMs' behaviors change when learning to emit their own expressions of uncertainty. When injecting expressions of uncertainty into prompts (e.g., "I think the answer is..."), we discover that GPT3's generations vary upwards of 80% in accuracy based on the expression used. We analyze the linguistic characteristics of these expressions and find a drop in accuracy when naturalistic expressions of certainty are present. We find similar effects when teaching models to emit their own expressions of uncertainty, where model calibration suffers when teaching models to emit certainty rather than uncertainty. Together, these results highlight the challenges of building LMs that interpret and generate trustworthy expressions of uncertainty.

We explore uncertainty quantification in large language models (LLMs), with the goal to identify when uncertainty in responses given a query is large. We simultaneously consider both epistemic and aleatoric uncertainties, where the former comes from the lack of knowledge about the ground truth (such as about facts or the language), and the latter comes from irreducible randomness (such as multiple possible answers). In particular, we derive an information-theoretic metric that allows to reliably detect when only epistemic uncertainty is large, in which case the output of the model is unreliable. This condition can be computed based solely on the output of the model obtained simply by some special iterative prompting based on the previous responses. Such quantification, for instance, allows to detect hallucinations (cases when epistemic uncertainty is high) in both single- and multi-answer responses. This is in contrast to many standard uncertainty quantification strategies (such as thresholding the log-likelihood of a response) where hallucinations in the multi-answer case cannot be detected. We conduct a series of experiments which demonstrate the advantage of our formulation. Further, our investigations shed some light on how the probabilities assigned to a given output by an LLM can be amplified by iterative prompting, which might be of independent interest.

Epistemic Uncertainty is a measure of the lack of knowledge of a learner which diminishes with more evidence. While existing work focuses on using the variance of the Bayesian posterior due to parameter uncertainty as a measure of epistemic uncertainty, we argue that this does not capture the part of lack of knowledge induced by model misspecification. We discuss how the excess risk, which is the gap between the generalization error of a predictor and the Bayes predictor, is a sound measure of epistemic uncertainty which captures the effect of model misspecification. We thus propose a principled framework for directly estimating the excess risk by learning a secondary predictor for the generalization error and subtracting an estimate of aleatoric uncertainty, i.e., intrinsic unpredictability. We discuss the merits of this novel measure of epistemic uncertainty, and highlight how it differs from variance-based measures of epistemic uncertainty and addresses its major pitfall. Our framework, Direct Epistemic Uncertainty Prediction (DEUP) is particularly interesting in interactive learning environments, where the learner is allowed to acquire novel examples in each round. Through a wide set of experiments, we illustrate how existing methods in sequential model optimization can be improved with epistemic uncertainty estimates from DEUP, and how DEUP can be used to drive exploration in reinforcement learning. We also evaluate the quality of uncertainty estimates from DEUP for probabilistic image classification and predicting synergies of drug combinations.

Search engines and information platforms are increasingly scrutinized for their role in spreading misinformation. Traditional responses often focus on detecting falsehoods or verifying the ultimate validity of claims. This paper argues that such a validity-centered framing is inadequate for the epistemic challenges of search environments.

Reliable probability estimation is of crucial importance in many real-world applications where there is inherent (aleatoric) uncertainty. Probability-estimation models are trained on observed outcomes (e.g. whether it has rained or not, or whether a patient has died or not), because the ground-truth probabilities of the events of interest are typically unknown. The problem is therefore analogous to binary classification, with the difference that the objective is to estimate probabilities rather than predicting the specific outcome. This work investigates probability estimation from high-dimensional data using deep neural networks. There exist several methods to improve the probabilities generated by these models but they mostly focus on model (epistemic) uncertainty. For problems with inherent uncertainty, it is challenging to evaluate performance without access to ground-truth probabilities. To address this, we build a synthetic dataset to study and compare different computable metrics. We evaluate existing methods on the synthetic data as well as on three real-world probability estimation tasks, all of which involve inherent uncertainty: precipitation forecasting from radar images, predicting cancer patient survival from histopathology images, and predicting car crashes from dashcam videos. We also give a theoretical analysis of a model for high-dimensional probability estimation which reproduces several of the phenomena evinced in our experiments. Finally, we propose a new method for probability estimation using neural networks, which modifies the training process to promote output probabilities that are consistent with empirical probabilities computed from the data. The method outperforms existing approaches on most metrics on the simulated as well as real-world data.

Interpretable models are designed to make decisions in a human-interpretable manner. Representatively, Concept Bottleneck Models (CBM) follow a two-step process of concept prediction and class prediction based on the predicted concepts. CBM provides explanations with high-level concepts derived from concept predictions; thus, reliable concept predictions are important for trustworthiness. In this study, we address the ambiguity issue that can harm reliability. While the existence of a concept can often be ambiguous in the data, CBM predicts concepts deterministically without considering this ambiguity. To provide a reliable interpretation against this ambiguity, we propose Probabilistic Concept Bottleneck Models (ProbCBM). By leveraging probabilistic concept embeddings, ProbCBM models uncertainty in concept prediction and provides explanations based on the concept and its corresponding uncertainty. This uncertainty enhances the reliability of the explanations. Furthermore, as class uncertainty is derived from concept uncertainty in ProbCBM, we can explain class uncertainty by means of concept uncertainty. Code is publicly available at https://github.com/ejkim47/prob-cbm.

Reviewing the progress in artificial intelligence over the past decade, various significant advances (e.g. object detection, image generation, large language models) have enabled AI systems to produce more semantically meaningful outputs and achieve widespread adoption in internet scenarios. Nevertheless, AI systems still struggle when it comes to understanding and interacting with the physical world. This reveals an important issue: relying solely on semantic-level concepts learned from internet data (e.g. texts, images) to understand the physical world is far from sufficient -- machine intelligence currently lacks an effective way to learn about the physical world. This research introduces the idea of analytic concept -- representing the concepts related to the physical world through programs of mathematical procedures, providing machine intelligence a portal to perceive, reason about, and interact with the physical world. Except for detailing the design philosophy and providing guidelines for the application of analytic concepts, this research also introduce about the infrastructure that has been built around analytic concepts. I aim for my research to contribute to addressing these questions: What is a proper abstraction of general concepts in the physical world for machine intelligence? How to systematically integrate structured priors with neural networks to constrain AI systems to comply with physical laws?

We are born with the ability to learn concepts by comparing diverse observations. This helps us to understand the new world in a compositional manner and facilitates extrapolation, as objects naturally consist of multiple concepts. In this work, we argue that the cognitive mechanism of comparison, fundamental to human learning, is also vital for machines to recover true concepts underlying the data. This offers correctness guarantees for the field of concept learning, which, despite its impressive empirical successes, still lacks general theoretical support. Specifically, we aim to develop a theoretical framework for the identifiability of concepts with multiple classes of observations. We show that with sufficient diversity across classes, hidden concepts can be identified without assuming specific concept types, functional relations, or parametric generative models. Interestingly, even when conditions are not globally satisfied, we can still provide alternative guarantees for as many concepts as possible based on local comparisons, thereby extending the applicability of our theory to more flexible scenarios. Moreover, the hidden structure between classes and concepts can also be identified nonparametrically. We validate our theoretical results in both synthetic and real-world settings.

Artificial intelligence commonly refers to the science and engineering of artificial systems that can carry out tasks generally associated with requiring aspects of human intelligence, such as playing games, translating languages, and driving cars. In recent years, there have been exciting advances in learning-based, data-driven approaches towards AI, and machine learning and deep learning have enabled computer systems to perceive the world in unprecedented ways. Reinforcement learning has enabled breakthroughs in complex games such as Go and challenging robotics tasks such as quadrupedal locomotion. A key aspect of intelligence is to not only make predictions, but reason about the uncertainty in these predictions, and to consider this uncertainty when making decisions. This is what this manuscript on "Probabilistic Artificial Intelligence" is about. The first part covers probabilistic approaches to machine learning. We discuss the differentiation between "epistemic" uncertainty due to lack of data and "aleatoric" uncertainty, which is irreducible and stems, e.g., from noisy observations and outcomes. We discuss concrete approaches towards probabilistic inference and modern approaches to efficient approximate inference. The second part of the manuscript is about taking uncertainty into account in sequential decision tasks. We consider active learning and Bayesian optimization -- approaches that collect data by proposing experiments that are informative for reducing the epistemic uncertainty. We then consider reinforcement learning and modern deep RL approaches that use neural network function approximation. We close by discussing modern approaches in model-based RL, which harness epistemic and aleatoric uncertainty to guide exploration, while also reasoning about safety.

Scientific discovery is an inherently creative and uncertain process, requiring reasoning beyond the recall of known knowledge. While many benchmarks have been proposed to evaluate large language model (LLM) performance on deep research tasks via multi-hop retrieval, their innovative reasoning abilities essential for true scientific discovery remain largely untested. We introduce a benchmark framework for evaluating model performance in scientific discovery and reasoning, building up from a raw problem to the classical null hypothesis test. In our framework, models initially receive only the topic and research question from a recent paper, with technical details progressively revealed. At each stage of information disclosure, the model is tasked with generating hypotheses that address the research question, which is compared with the conclusions from the original paper and evaluated via automated semantic similarity of constituent atomic claims. This progressive evaluation of semantic divergence from ground-truth conclusions enables assessment of a model's innovativeness (under minimal information) to grounded reasoning capabilities (under full experimental details), both critical for using LLMs for scientific discovery purposes. Our framework provides a foundation for systematically evaluating scientific reasoning and discovery capabilities in LLMs, crucial for advancing the development of next-generation AI scientist/co-scientist systems. Specifically, here we evaluate GPT-5, GPT-5.4, Gemini 2.5 pro, and Gemini 3.1 pro preview across 45 papers spanning bioactive materials, mechanical materials, and nanomaterials. We find that GPT-5.4 and Gemini 3.1 pro outperform their previous generation counterparts as expected, and GPT-5.4 in particular maintains 0.7 F1 score alignment with ground truth conclusions even under minimal context.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has become the de facto method to elicit reasoning capabilities from large language models (LLMs). However, to mitigate hallucinations in CoT that are notoriously difficult to detect, current methods such as process reward models (PRMs) or self-consistency operate as opaque boxes and do not provide checkable evidence for their judgments, possibly limiting their effectiveness. To address this issue, we draw inspiration from the idea that "the gold standard for supporting a mathematical claim is to provide a proof". We propose a retrospective, step-aware formal verification framework Safe. Rather than assigning arbitrary scores, we strive to articulate mathematical claims in formal mathematical language Lean 4 at each reasoning step and provide formal proofs to identify hallucinations. We evaluate our framework Safe across multiple language models and various mathematical datasets, demonstrating a significant performance improvement while offering interpretable and verifiable evidence. We also propose FormalStep as a benchmark for step correctness theorem proving with 30,809 formal statements. To the best of our knowledge, our work represents the first endeavor to utilize formal mathematical language Lean 4 for verifying natural language content generated by LLMs, aligning with the reason why formal mathematical languages were created in the first place: to provide a robust foundation for hallucination-prone human-written proofs.

As Large Language Models become more ubiquitous across domains, it becomes important to examine their inherent limitations critically. This work argues that hallucinations in language models are not just occasional errors but an inevitable feature of these systems. We demonstrate that hallucinations stem from the fundamental mathematical and logical structure of LLMs. It is, therefore, impossible to eliminate them through architectural improvements, dataset enhancements, or fact-checking mechanisms. Our analysis draws on computational theory and Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem, which references the undecidability of problems like the Halting, Emptiness, and Acceptance Problems. We demonstrate that every stage of the LLM process-from training data compilation to fact retrieval, intent classification, and text generation-will have a non-zero probability of producing hallucinations. This work introduces the concept of Structural Hallucination as an intrinsic nature of these systems. By establishing the mathematical certainty of hallucinations, we challenge the prevailing notion that they can be fully mitigated.

Long chains of thought (CoT) from current language models frequently contain logical gaps and unjustified leaps, limiting the gains from additional test-time compute. Improving reasoning quality directly would require process reward models, but the step-level annotations needed to train them are expensive and scarce. We find such a signal in how the model's confidence evolves during reasoning: premature confidence, the tendency to commit to an answer early and use the remaining tokens to rationalize it, strongly predicts flawed reasoning across tasks and model scales. We exploit this in progressive confidence shaping, a reinforcement learning objective that trains models to update their confidence as they reason rather than commit early -- rewarding gradual confidence growth and penalizing early commitment, with no external labels or reward models. The method improves accuracy and reasoning quality from 1.5B to 8B parameters across arithmetic (Countdown), math (DAPO, AIME), and science (ScienceQA): on Countdown, accuracy improves 3.2x (+42.0pp) and flawed reasoning drops 48pp; on AIME, Pass@64 improves 6.6pp. Consistent with this mechanism, the method also improves faithfulness: on a safety benchmark, our models more transparently surface misleading content in their reasoning traces rather than concealing it. Controlled experiments reveal that the problem and its remedy scale together: premature confidence grows with model size and task difficulty, and so do the gains from addressing it.

Commonsense knowledge (CSK) about concepts and their properties is useful for AI applications such as robust chatbots. Prior works like ConceptNet, TupleKB and others compiled large CSK collections, but are restricted in their expressiveness to subject-predicate-object (SPO) triples with simple concepts for S and monolithic strings for P and O. Also, these projects have either prioritized precision or recall, but hardly reconcile these complementary goals. This paper presents a methodology, called Ascent, to automatically build a large-scale knowledge base (KB) of CSK assertions, with advanced expressiveness and both better precision and recall than prior works. Ascent goes beyond triples by capturing composite concepts with subgroups and aspects, and by refining assertions with semantic facets. The latter are important to express temporal and spatial validity of assertions and further qualifiers. Ascent combines open information extraction with judicious cleaning using language models. Intrinsic evaluation shows the superior size and quality of the Ascent KB, and an extrinsic evaluation for QA-support tasks underlines the benefits of Ascent. A web interface, data and code can be found at https://ascent.mpi-inf.mpg.de/.

LLMs are ideal for decision-making thanks to their ability to reason over long contexts. However, challenges arise when processing speech transcripts that describe complex scenarios, as they are verbose and include repetition, hedging, and vagueness. E.g., during a company's earnings call, an executive might project a positive revenue outlook to reassure investors, despite uncertainty regarding future earnings. It is crucial for LLMs to incorporate this uncertainty systematically when making decisions. In this paper, we introduce DeFine, a modular framework that constructs probabilistic factor profiles from complex scenarios. It then integrates these profiles with analogical reasoning, leveraging insights from similar past experiences to guide LLMs in making critical decisions in new situations. Our framework separates the tasks of quantifying uncertainty and incorporating it into LLM decision-making. This approach is particularly useful in areas such as consulting and financial deliberation, where making decisions under uncertainty is vital.

Words of estimative probability (WEP) are expressions of a statement's plausibility (probably, maybe, likely, doubt, likely, unlikely, impossible...). Multiple surveys demonstrate the agreement of human evaluators when assigning numerical probability levels to WEP. For example, highly likely corresponds to a median chance of 0.90+-0.08 in Fagen-Ulmschneider (2015)'s survey. In this work, we measure the ability of neural language processing models to capture the consensual probability level associated to each WEP. Firstly, we use the UNLI dataset (Chen et al., 2020) which associates premises and hypotheses with their perceived joint probability p, to construct prompts, e.g. "[PREMISE]. [WEP], [HYPOTHESIS]." and assess whether language models can predict whether the WEP consensual probability level is close to p. Secondly, we construct a dataset of WEP-based probabilistic reasoning, to test whether language models can reason with WEP compositions. When prompted "[EVENTA] is likely. [EVENTB] is impossible.", a causal language model should not express that [EVENTA&B] is likely. We show that both tasks are unsolved by off-the-shelf English language models, but that fine-tuning leads to transferable improvement.

In question-answering tasks, determining when to trust the outputs is crucial to the alignment of large language models (LLMs). Kuhn et al. (2023) introduces semantic entropy as a measure of uncertainty, by incorporating linguistic invariances from the same meaning. It primarily relies on setting threshold to measure the level of semantic equivalence relation. We propose a more nuanced framework that extends beyond such thresholding by developing a Shapley-based uncertainty metric that captures the continuous nature of semantic relationships. We establish three fundamental properties that characterize valid uncertainty metrics and prove that our Shapley uncertainty satisfies these criteria. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our Shapley uncertainty more accurately predicts LLM performance in question-answering and other datasets, compared to similar baseline measures.

This paper investigates the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) in the context of understanding their own knowledge and measuring their uncertainty. We argue this is an important feature for mitigating hallucinations. Specifically, we focus on addressing known-unknown questions, characterized by high uncertainty due to the absence of definitive answers. To facilitate our study, we collect a dataset with new Known-Unknown Questions (KUQ) and propose a novel categorization scheme to elucidate the sources of uncertainty. Subsequently, we assess the LLMs' ability to differentiate between known and unknown questions and classify them accordingly. Moreover, we evaluate the quality of their answers in an Open-Ended QA setting. To quantify the uncertainty expressed in the answers, we create a semantic evaluation method that measures the model's accuracy in expressing uncertainty between known vs unknown questions.

LLMs often exhibit Aha moments during reasoning, such as apparent self-correction following tokens like "Wait," yet their underlying mechanisms remain unclear. We introduce an information-theoretic framework that decomposes reasoning into procedural information and epistemic verbalization - the explicit externalization of uncertainty that supports downstream control actions. We show that purely procedural reasoning can become informationally stagnant, whereas epistemic verbalization enables continued information acquisition and is critical for achieving information sufficiency. Empirical results demonstrate that strong reasoning performance is driven by uncertainty externalization rather than specific surface tokens. Our framework unifies prior findings on Aha moments and post-training experiments, and offers insights for future reasoning model design.

Recent advances in handling long sequences have facilitated the exploration of long-context in-context learning (ICL). While much of the existing research emphasizes performance improvements driven by additional in-context examples, the influence on the trustworthiness of generated responses remains underexplored. This paper addresses this gap by investigating how increased examples influence predictive uncertainty, an essential aspect in trustworthiness. We begin by systematically quantifying the uncertainty of ICL with varying shot counts, analyzing the impact of example quantity. Through uncertainty decomposition, we introduce a novel perspective on performance enhancement, with a focus on epistemic uncertainty (EU). Our results reveal that additional examples reduce total uncertainty in both simple and complex tasks by injecting task-specific knowledge, thereby diminishing EU and enhancing performance. For complex tasks, these advantages emerge only after addressing the increased noise and uncertainty associated with longer inputs. Finally, we explore the evolution of internal confidence across layers, unveiling the mechanisms driving the reduction in uncertainty.

Widely deployed large language models (LLMs) can produce convincing yet incorrect outputs, potentially misleading users who may rely on them as if they were correct. To reduce such overreliance, there have been calls for LLMs to communicate their uncertainty to end users. However, there has been little empirical work examining how users perceive and act upon LLMs' expressions of uncertainty. We explore this question through a large-scale, pre-registered, human-subject experiment (N=404) in which participants answer medical questions with or without access to responses from a fictional LLM-infused search engine. Using both behavioral and self-reported measures, we examine how different natural language expressions of uncertainty impact participants' reliance, trust, and overall task performance. We find that first-person expressions (e.g., "I'm not sure, but...") decrease participants' confidence in the system and tendency to agree with the system's answers, while increasing participants' accuracy. An exploratory analysis suggests that this increase can be attributed to reduced (but not fully eliminated) overreliance on incorrect answers. While we observe similar effects for uncertainty expressed from a general perspective (e.g., "It's not clear, but..."), these effects are weaker and not statistically significant. Our findings suggest that using natural language expressions of uncertainty may be an effective approach for reducing overreliance on LLMs, but that the precise language used matters. This highlights the importance of user testing before deploying LLMs at scale.

Understanding uncertainty in chain-of-thought reasoning is critical for reliable deployment of large language models. In this work, we propose a simple yet effective diagnostic approach based on trajectory shape rather than scalar magnitude. We show that this signal is practical, interpretable, and inexpensive to obtain in black-box settings, while remaining robust across models and datasets. Through extensive ablations and cross-domain replications, we demonstrate its utility for selective prediction and triage. Our findings offer a generalizable insight into uncertainty dynamics in reasoning tasks, with particular focus on numeric and discrete-answer settings.

Calibrated uncertainty estimates in machine learning are crucial to many fields such as autonomous vehicles, medicine, and weather and climate forecasting. While there is extensive literature on uncertainty calibration for classification, the classification findings do not always translate to regression. As a result, modern models for predicting uncertainty in regression settings typically produce uncalibrated and overconfident estimates. To address these gaps, we present a calibration method for regression settings that does not assume a particular uncertainty distribution over the error: Calibrating Regression Uncertainty Distributions Empirically (CRUDE). CRUDE makes the weaker assumption that error distributions have a constant arbitrary shape across the output space, shifted by predicted mean and scaled by predicted standard deviation. We detail a theoretical connection between CRUDE and conformal inference. Across an extensive set of regression tasks, CRUDE demonstrates consistently sharper, better calibrated, and more accurate uncertainty estimates than state-of-the-art techniques.

Human reasoning relies on constructing and manipulating mental models-simplified internal representations of situations that we use to understand and solve problems. Conceptual diagrams (for example, sketches drawn by humans to aid reasoning) externalize these mental models, abstracting irrelevant details to efficiently capture relational and spatial information. In contrast, Large Language Models (LLMs) and Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) predominantly reason through textual representations, limiting their effectiveness in complex multi-step combinatorial and planning tasks. In this paper, we propose a zero-shot fully automatic framework that enables LMMs to reason through multiple chains of self-generated intermediate conceptual diagrams, significantly enhancing their combinatorial planning capabilities. Our approach does not require any human initialization beyond a natural language description of the task. It integrates both textual and diagrammatic reasoning within an optimized graph-of-thought inference framework, enhanced by beam search and depth-wise backtracking. Evaluated on multiple challenging PDDL planning domains, our method substantially improves GPT-4o's performance (for example, from 35.5% to 90.2% in Blocksworld). On more difficult planning domains with solution depths up to 40, our approach outperforms even the o1-preview reasoning model (for example, over 13% improvement in Parking). These results highlight the value of conceptual diagrams as a complementary reasoning medium in LMMs.

Abstract reasoning is a key ability for an intelligent system. Large language models achieve above-chance performance on abstract reasoning tasks, but exhibit many imperfections. However, human abstract reasoning is also imperfect, and depends on our knowledge and beliefs about the content of the reasoning problem. For example, humans reason much more reliably about logical rules that are grounded in everyday situations than arbitrary rules about abstract attributes. The training experiences of language models similarly endow them with prior expectations that reflect human knowledge and beliefs. We therefore hypothesized that language models would show human-like content effects on abstract reasoning problems. We explored this hypothesis across three logical reasoning tasks: natural language inference, judging the logical validity of syllogisms, and the Wason selection task (Wason, 1968). We find that state of the art large language models (with 7 or 70 billion parameters; Hoffman et al., 2022) reflect many of the same patterns observed in humans across these tasks -- like humans, models reason more effectively about believable situations than unrealistic or abstract ones. Our findings have implications for understanding both these cognitive effects, and the factors that contribute to language model performance.

Large Language Models are known to capture real-world knowledge, allowing them to excel in many downstream tasks. Despite recent advances, these models are still prone to what are commonly known as hallucinations, causing them to emit unwanted and factually incorrect text. In this work, we propose a novel calibration method that can be used to combat hallucinations. We add a special [IDK] ("I don't know") token to the model's vocabulary and introduce an objective function that shifts probability mass to the [IDK] token for incorrect predictions. This approach allows the model to express uncertainty in its output explicitly. We evaluate our proposed method across multiple model architectures and factual downstream tasks. We find that models trained with our method are able to express uncertainty in places where they would previously make mistakes while suffering only a small loss of encoded knowledge. We further perform extensive ablation studies of multiple variations of our approach and provide a detailed analysis of the precision-recall tradeoff of our method.

There are two major types of uncertainty one can model. Aleatoric uncertainty captures noise inherent in the observations. On the other hand, epistemic uncertainty accounts for uncertainty in the model -- uncertainty which can be explained away given enough data. Traditionally it has been difficult to model epistemic uncertainty in computer vision, but with new Bayesian deep learning tools this is now possible. We study the benefits of modeling epistemic vs. aleatoric uncertainty in Bayesian deep learning models for vision tasks. For this we present a Bayesian deep learning framework combining input-dependent aleatoric uncertainty together with epistemic uncertainty. We study models under the framework with per-pixel semantic segmentation and depth regression tasks. Further, our explicit uncertainty formulation leads to new loss functions for these tasks, which can be interpreted as learned attenuation. This makes the loss more robust to noisy data, also giving new state-of-the-art results on segmentation and depth regression benchmarks.

Recent large language models (LLMs) have shown indications of mathematical reasoning ability. However it has not been clear how they would fare on more challenging competition-level problems. And while self-generated verbalizations of intermediate reasoning steps (i.e., chain-of-thought prompting) have been shown to be helpful, whether LLMs can make use of helpful side information such as problem-specific hints has not been investigated before. In this paper, we propose a challenging benchmark dataset for enabling such analyses. The Concept and Hint-Annotated Math Problems (CHAMP) consists of high school math competition problems, annotated with concepts, or general math facts, and hints, or problem-specific tricks. These annotations allow us to explore the effects of additional information, such as relevant hints, misleading concepts, or related problems. This benchmark is difficult, with the best model only scoring 58.1% in standard settings. With concepts and hints, performance sometimes improves, indicating that some models can make use of such side information. We further annotate model-generated solutions for their correctness. Using this corpus, we find that models often arrive at the correct final answer through wrong reasoning steps. In addition, we test whether models are able to verify these solutions, and find that most models struggle. The dataset and code are available on the project website.

In the rapidly evolving field of Large Language Models (LLMs), there is a critical need to thoroughly analyze their capabilities and risks. Central to our investigation are two novel elements. Firstly, it is the innovative parallels between the statistical patterns of word relationships within LLMs and Martin Heidegger's concepts of "ready-to-hand" and "present-at-hand," which encapsulate the utilitarian and scientific altitudes humans employ in interacting with the world. This comparison lays the groundwork for positioning LLMs as the digital counterpart to the Faculty of Verbal Knowledge, shedding light on their capacity to emulate certain facets of human reasoning. Secondly, a structural analysis of human reasoning, viewed through Heidegger's notion of truth as "unconcealment" is conducted This foundational principle enables us to map out the inputs and outputs of the reasoning system and divide reasoning into four distinct categories. Respective cognitive faculties are delineated, allowing us to place LLMs within the broader schema of human reasoning, thus clarifying their strengths and inherent limitations. Our findings reveal that while LLMs possess the capability for Direct Explicative Reasoning and Pseudo Rational Reasoning, they fall short in authentic rational reasoning and have no creative reasoning capabilities, due to the current lack of many analogous AI models such as the Faculty of Judgement. The potential and risks of LLMs when they are augmented with other AI technologies are also evaluated. The results indicate that although LLMs have achieved proficiency in some reasoning abilities, the aspiration to match or exceed human intellectual capabilities is yet unattained. This research not only enriches our comprehension of LLMs but also propels forward the discourse on AI's potential and its bounds, paving the way for future explorations into AI's evolving landscape.

We provide here a dataset for tasks related to natural language understanding and natural language inference. The dataset contains logical puzzles in natural language from three domains: comparing puzzles, knighs and knaves, and zebra puzzles. Each puzzle is associated with the entire set of atomic questions that can be generated based on the relations and individuals occurring in the text. For each question we provide the correct answer: entailment, contradiction or ambiguity. The answer's correctness is verified against theorem provers. Good puzzles have two properties: (i) each piece of information is necessary and (ii) no unnecessary information is provided. These properties make puzzles interesting candidates for machine comprehension tasks.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive capabilities, they still struggle with generating factually incorrect content (i.e., hallucinations). A promising approach to mitigate this issue is enabling models to express uncertainty when unsure. Previous research on uncertainty modeling has primarily focused on short-form QA, but realworld applications often require much longer responses. In this work, we introduce the task of Long-form Generation with Uncertainty(LoGU). We identify two key challenges: Uncertainty Suppression, where models hesitate to express uncertainty, and Uncertainty Misalignment, where models convey uncertainty inaccurately. To tackle these challenges, we propose a refinement-based data collection framework and a two-stage training pipeline. Our framework adopts a divide-and-conquer strategy, refining uncertainty based on atomic claims. The collected data are then used in training through supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and direct preference optimization (DPO) to enhance uncertainty expression. Extensive experiments on three long-form instruction following datasets show that our method significantly improves accuracy, reduces hallucinations, and maintains the comprehensiveness of responses.

Reliable estimation of predictive uncertainty is crucial for machine learning applications, particularly in high-stakes scenarios where hedging against risks is essential. Despite its significance, there is no universal agreement on how to best quantify predictive uncertainty. In this work, we revisit core concepts to propose a framework for information-theoretic measures of predictive uncertainty. Our proposed framework categorizes predictive uncertainty measures according to two factors: (I) The predicting model (II) The approximation of the true predictive distribution. Examining all possible combinations of these two factors, we derive a set of predictive uncertainty measures that includes both known and newly introduced ones. We extensively evaluate these measures across a broad set of tasks, identifying conditions under which certain measures excel. Our findings show the importance of aligning the choice of uncertainty measure with the predicting model on in-distribution (ID) data, the limitations of epistemic uncertainty measures for out-of-distribution (OOD) data, and that the disentanglement between measures varies substantially between ID and OOD data. Together, these insights provide a more comprehensive understanding of predictive uncertainty measures, revealing their implicit assumptions and relationships.

The prevalence and importance of algorithmic two-sided marketplaces has drawn attention to the issue of fairness in such settings. Algorithmic decisions are used in assigning students to schools, users to advertisers, and applicants to job interviews. These decisions should heed the preferences of individuals, and simultaneously be fair with respect to their merits (synonymous with fit, future performance, or need). Merits conditioned on observable features are always uncertain, a fact that is exacerbated by the widespread use of machine learning algorithms to infer merit from the observables. As our key contribution, we carefully axiomatize a notion of individual fairness in the two-sided marketplace setting which respects the uncertainty in the merits; indeed, it simultaneously recognizes uncertainty as the primary potential cause of unfairness and an approach to address it. We design a linear programming framework to find fair utility-maximizing distributions over allocations, and we show that the linear program is robust to perturbations in the estimated parameters of the uncertain merit distributions, a key property in combining the approach with machine learning techniques.

Question processing is a fundamental step in a question answering (QA) application, and its quality impacts the performance of QA application. The major challenging issue in processing question is how to extract semantic of natural language questions (NLQs). A human language is ambiguous. Ambiguity may occur at two levels; lexical and syntactic. In this paper, we propose a new approach for resolving lexical ambiguity problem by integrating context knowledge and concepts knowledge of a domain, into shallow natural language processing (SNLP) techniques. Concepts knowledge is modeled using ontology, while context knowledge is obtained from WordNet, and it is determined based on neighborhood words in a question. The approach will be applied to a university QA system.

Long chain-of-thought (CoT) traces are widely used as supervision for reasoning-oriented LLM SFT, yet answer-correct traces can still lead to markedly different fine-tuning outcomes. We study post-conclusion continuation in answer-correct long-CoT data: a continuation where the answer appears sufficiently supported, but the trace continues with additional reasoning that remains in the supervised target. To test its training effect, we use a delete-only editor to construct answer-preserving suffix removal and compare CoT-based SFT on the original and processed traces. We observe improved SFT outcomes after removing the editor-identified post-conclusion continuation, suggesting that this continuation is harmful to training in our setting. We therefore refer to this empirically supported phenomenon as harmful continuation. Beyond this intervention, we further characterize the removed post-conclusion continuation through uncertainty and hidden-state progress. We observe persistent local uncertainty together with weakened terminal-directional progress, forming an uncertainty--geometry mismatch. Finally, we instantiate Harmful Continuation Cut (HCC), a lightweight boundary proxy that approximates the editor-identified post-conclusion continuation boundary.

Although large language models (LLMs) are capable of performing various tasks, they still suffer from producing plausible but incorrect responses. To improve the reliability of LLMs, recent research has focused on uncertainty quantification to predict whether a response is correct or not. However, most uncertainty quantification methods have been evaluated on questions requiring a single clear answer, ignoring the existence of data uncertainty that arises from irreducible randomness. Instead, these methods only consider model uncertainty, which arises from a lack of knowledge. In this paper, we investigate previous uncertainty quantification methods under the presence of data uncertainty. Our contributions are two-fold: 1) proposing a new Multi-Answer Question Answering dataset, MAQA, consisting of world knowledge, mathematical reasoning, and commonsense reasoning tasks to evaluate uncertainty quantification regarding data uncertainty, and 2) assessing 5 uncertainty quantification methods of diverse white- and black-box LLMs. Our findings show that entropy and consistency-based methods estimate the model uncertainty well even under data uncertainty, while other methods for white- and black-box LLMs struggle depending on the tasks. Additionally, methods designed for white-box LLMs suffer from overconfidence in reasoning tasks compared to simple knowledge queries. We believe our observations will pave the way for future work on uncertainty quantification in realistic setting.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

Uncertainty quantification has received increasing attention in machine learning in the recent past. In particular, a distinction between aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty has been found useful in this regard. The latter refers to the learner's (lack of) knowledge and appears to be especially difficult to measure and quantify. In this paper, we analyse a recent proposal based on the idea of a second-order learner, which yields predictions in the form of distributions over probability distributions. While standard (first-order) learners can be trained to predict accurate probabilities, namely by minimising suitable loss functions on sample data, we show that loss minimisation does not work for second-order predictors: The loss functions proposed for inducing such predictors do not incentivise the learner to represent its epistemic uncertainty in a faithful way.

We consider the problem of performing Bayesian inference in probabilistic models where observations are accompanied by uncertainty, referred to as "uncertain evidence." We explore how to interpret uncertain evidence, and by extension the importance of proper interpretation as it pertains to inference about latent variables. We consider a recently-proposed method "distributional evidence" as well as revisit two older methods: Jeffrey's rule and virtual evidence. We devise guidelines on how to account for uncertain evidence and we provide new insights, particularly regarding consistency. To showcase the impact of different interpretations of the same uncertain evidence, we carry out experiments in which one interpretation is defined as "correct." We then compare inference results from each different interpretation illustrating the importance of careful consideration of uncertain evidence.

Concepts serve as fundamental abstractions that support human reasoning and categorization. However, it remains unclear whether large language models truly capture such conceptual structures or primarily rely on surface-level pattern memorization. Existing benchmarks are largely static and fact oriented, which limits their ability to probe fine-grained semantic understanding and makes them vulnerable to data leakage and overfitting. To address this limitation, we introduce CK-Arena, a dynamic benchmark for conceptual knowledge evaluation based on a multi agent social deduction game, namely the Undercover game. In this setting, LLM based agents are assigned subtly different concept words and must describe, distinguish, and infer conceptual properties from others' statements. Model performance is evaluated through both game level outcomes and the semantic quality of generated descriptions. Furthermore, CK-Arena leverages the interaction process to automatically construct high quality question answering data for fine grained diagnostic analysis. Experimental results show that conceptual understanding varies substantially across models and categories, and is not strictly aligned with overall model capability. The data and code are available at the project homepage: https://ck-arena.site.

Probing and enhancing large language models' reasoning capacity remains a crucial open question. Here we re-purpose the reverse dictionary task as a case study to probe LLMs' capacity for conceptual inference. We use in-context learning to guide the models to generate the term for an object concept implied in a linguistic description. Models robustly achieve high accuracy in this task, and their representation space encodes information about object categories and fine-grained features. Further experiments suggest that the conceptual inference ability as probed by the reverse-dictionary task predicts model's general reasoning performance across multiple benchmarks, despite similar syntactic generalization behaviors across models. Explorative analyses suggest that prompting LLMs with descriptionRightarrowword examples may induce generalization beyond surface-level differences in task construals and facilitate models on broader commonsense reasoning problems.

We present a state-of-the-art model for fine-grained probability estimation of propositions conditioned on context. Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have significantly enhanced their reasoning capabilities, particularly on well-defined tasks with complete information. However, LLMs continue to struggle with making accurate and well-calibrated probabilistic predictions under uncertainty or partial information. While incorporating uncertainty into model predictions often boosts performance, obtaining reliable estimates of that uncertainty remains understudied. In particular, LLM probability estimates tend to be coarse and biased towards more frequent numbers. Through a combination of human and synthetic data creation and assessment, scaling to larger models, and better supervision, we propose a set of strong and precise probability estimation models. We conduct systematic evaluations across tasks that rely on conditional probability estimation and show that our approach consistently outperforms existing fine-tuned and prompting-based methods by a large margin.

This paper presents a novel paradigm of the local percept-perceiver phenomenon to formalize certain observations in neuroscientific theories of consciousness. Using this model, a set-theoretic formalism is developed for artificial systems, and the existence of machine consciousness is proved by invoking Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. The article argues for the possibility of a reductionist form of epistemic consciousness within machines.

The sequential process of conceptualization and instantiation is essential to generalizable commonsense reasoning as it allows the application of existing knowledge to unfamiliar scenarios. However, existing works tend to undervalue the step of instantiation and heavily rely on pre-built concept taxonomies and human annotations to collect both types of knowledge, resulting in a lack of instantiated knowledge to complete reasoning, high cost, and limited scalability. To tackle these challenges, we introduce CANDLE, a distillation framework that iteratively performs contextualized conceptualization and instantiation over commonsense knowledge bases by instructing large language models to generate both types of knowledge with critic filtering. By applying CANDLE to ATOMIC, we construct a comprehensive knowledge base comprising six million conceptualizations and instantiated commonsense knowledge triples. Both types of knowledge are firmly rooted in the original ATOMIC dataset, and intrinsic evaluations demonstrate their exceptional quality and diversity. Empirical results indicate that distilling CANDLE on student models provides benefits across four downstream tasks. Our code, data, and models are publicly available at https://github.com/HKUST-KnowComp/CANDLE.

Chain-of-thought reasoning, a cognitive process fundamental to human intelligence, has garnered significant attention in the realm of artificial intelligence and natural language processing. However, there still remains a lack of a comprehensive survey for this arena. To this end, we take the first step and present a thorough survey of this research field carefully and widely. We use X-of-Thought to refer to Chain-of-Thought in a broad sense. In detail, we systematically organize the current research according to the taxonomies of methods, including XoT construction, XoT structure variants, and enhanced XoT. Additionally, we describe XoT with frontier applications, covering planning, tool use, and distillation. Furthermore, we address challenges and discuss some future directions, including faithfulness, multi-modal, and theory. We hope this survey serves as a valuable resource for researchers seeking to innovate within the domain of chain-of-thought reasoning.

Current captioning datasets, focus on object-centric captions, describing the visible objects in the image, often ending up stating the obvious (for humans), e.g. "people eating food in a park". Although these datasets are useful to evaluate the ability of Vision & Language models to recognize the visual content, they lack in expressing trivial abstract concepts, e.g. "people having a picnic". Such concepts are licensed by human's personal experience and contribute to forming common sense assumptions. We present the High-Level Dataset; a dataset extending 14997 images of the COCO dataset with 134973 human-annotated (high-level) abstract captions collected along three axes: scenes, actions and rationales. We describe and release such dataset and we show how it can be used to assess models' multimodal grounding of abstract concepts and enrich models' visio-lingusitic representations. Moreover, we describe potential tasks enabled by this dataset involving high- and low-level concepts interactions.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation equips large language models with the capability to retrieve external knowledge, thereby mitigating hallucinations by incorporating information beyond the model's intrinsic abilities. However, most prior works have focused on invoking retrieval deterministically, which makes it unsuitable for tasks such as long-form question answering. Instead, dynamically performing retrieval by invoking it only when the underlying LLM lacks the required knowledge can be more efficient. In this context, we delve deeper into the question, "To Retrieve or Not to Retrieve?" by exploring multiple uncertainty detection methods. We evaluate these methods for the task of long-form question answering, employing dynamic retrieval, and present our comparisons. Our findings suggest that uncertainty detection metrics, such as Degree Matrix Jaccard and Eccentricity, can reduce the number of retrieval calls by almost half, with only a slight reduction in question-answering accuracy.

Much research has been carried out on large language models (LLMs) and LLM-powered agentic workflows. However, many works within the field state emergence of, ascribe to, or assume, generalised anthropomorphic attributes to them (e.g., morality or understanding of natural language). Our goal is not to argue in favour or against the existence of these attributes, but to point out that these conclusions could be incorrect. For this we build and train a simple neural network on the videogame Age of Empires II, and note that any entity in a sufficiently-powerful substrate, such as LEGO or the Greater Boston Area, could also present such attributes. Hence, the purported anthropomorphic attributes of LLMs are empirically non-unique: although some properties (e.g., responses to prompts) could remain invariant, others, such as the interpretation of their perceived behaviour, might change with the substrate. Thus, any empirically-grounded discussion on these attributes requires explicit measurement criteria; otherwise the interpretation is left to the representation. We then show that assuming that these attributes exist or not in a system, independent of the substrate and in a generalised way, leads to either circular or uninformative conclusions. This is regardless of the experimenter's viewpoint on the subject, or whether the outcome shows existence or non-existence. Finally we propose a 'null' assumption, where one assumes LLM non-uniqueness instead of assuming anthropomorphic attributes to set up an experiment, along with examples of it. We also discuss potential objections to our work, briefly survey the field, and prove that Age of Empires II is functionally- and Turing-complete.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

Applying a machine learning model for decision-making in the real world requires to distinguish what the model knows from what it does not. A critical factor in assessing the knowledge of a model is to quantify its predictive uncertainty. Predictive uncertainty is commonly measured by the entropy of the Bayesian model average (BMA) predictive distribution. Yet, the properness of this current measure of predictive uncertainty was recently questioned. We provide new insights regarding those limitations. Our analyses show that the current measure erroneously assumes that the BMA predictive distribution is equivalent to the predictive distribution of the true model that generated the dataset. Consequently, we introduce a theoretically grounded measure to overcome these limitations. We experimentally verify the benefits of our introduced measure of predictive uncertainty. We find that our introduced measure behaves more reasonably in controlled synthetic tasks. Moreover, our evaluations on ImageNet demonstrate that our introduced measure is advantageous in real-world applications utilizing predictive uncertainty.

Uncertainty Quantification (UQ) research has primarily focused on closed-book factual question answering (QA), while contextual QA remains unexplored, despite its importance in real-world applications. In this work, we focus on UQ for the contextual QA task and propose a theoretically grounded approach to quantify epistemic uncertainty. We begin by introducing a task-agnostic, token-level uncertainty measure defined as the cross-entropy between the predictive distribution of the given model and the unknown true distribution. By decomposing this measure, we isolate the epistemic component and approximate the true distribution by a perfectly prompted, idealized model. We then derive an upper bound for epistemic uncertainty and show that it can be interpreted as semantic feature gaps in the given model's hidden representations relative to the ideal model. We further apply this generic framework to the contextual QA task and hypothesize that three features approximate this gap: context-reliance (using the provided context rather than parametric knowledge), context comprehension (extracting relevant information from context), and honesty (avoiding intentional lies). Using a top-down interpretability approach, we extract these features by using only a small number of labeled samples and ensemble them to form a robust uncertainty score. Experiments on multiple QA benchmarks in both in-distribution and out-of-distribution settings show that our method substantially outperforms state-of-the-art unsupervised (sampling-free and sampling-based) and supervised UQ methods, achieving up to a 13-point PRR improvement while incurring a negligible inference overhead.

Recently, with the chain of thought (CoT) prompting, large language models (LLMs), e.g., GPT-3, have shown strong reasoning ability in several natural language processing tasks such as arithmetic, commonsense, and logical reasoning. However, LLMs with CoT require multi-step prompting and multi-token prediction, which is highly sensitive to individual mistakes and vulnerable to error accumulation. The above issues make the LLMs need the ability to verify the answers. In fact, after inferring conclusions in some thinking decision tasks, people often check them by re-verifying steps to avoid some mistakes. In this paper, we propose and prove that LLMs also have similar self-verification abilities. We take the conclusion obtained by CoT as one of the conditions for solving the original problem. By taking turns masking the original conditions and predicting their results, we calculate an explainable answer verification score based on whether the re-predicted conditions are correct. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed method can improve the reasoning performance on various arithmetic, commonsense, and logical reasoning datasets. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/WENGSYX/Self-Verification.

Naturally occurring information-seeking questions often contain questionable assumptions -- assumptions that are false or unverifiable. Questions containing questionable assumptions are challenging because they require a distinct answer strategy that deviates from typical answers for information-seeking questions. For instance, the question "When did Marie Curie discover Uranium?" cannot be answered as a typical "when" question without addressing the false assumption "Marie Curie discovered Uranium". In this work, we propose (QA)^2 (Question Answering with Questionable Assumptions), an open-domain evaluation dataset consisting of naturally occurring search engine queries that may or may not contain questionable assumptions. To be successful on (QA)^2, systems must be able to detect questionable assumptions and also be able to produce adequate responses for both typical information-seeking questions and ones with questionable assumptions. Through human rater acceptability on end-to-end QA with (QA)^2, we find that current models do struggle with handling questionable assumptions, leaving substantial headroom for progress.

Distributional word representation methods exploit word co-occurrences to build compact vector encodings of words. While these representations enjoy widespread use in modern natural language processing, it is unclear whether they accurately encode all necessary facets of conceptual meaning. In this paper, we evaluate how well these representations can predict perceptual and conceptual features of concrete concepts, drawing on two semantic norm datasets sourced from human participants. We find that several standard word representations fail to encode many salient perceptual features of concepts, and show that these deficits correlate with word-word similarity prediction errors. Our analyses provide motivation for grounded and embodied language learning approaches, which may help to remedy these deficits.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly embedded in scientific discovery, yet whether it can anticipate scientific progress remains unclear. To study this question, we introduce a temporally grounded evaluation framework for forecasting scientific progress under controlled knowledge constraints. We present CUSP (Cutoff-conditioned Unseen Scientific Progress), a multi-disciplinary and event-level benchmark that evaluates scientific forecasting in AI systems through feasibility assessment, mechanistic reasoning, generative solution design, and temporal prediction. Across 4,760 scientific events, we observe systematic and domain-dependent limitations in current frontier models. While models can identify plausible research directions from competing candidates, they fail to reliably predict whether scientific advances will be realized and systematically misestimate when they will occur. Performance is highly heterogeneous across domains, with the timing of AI progress more predictable than advances in biology, chemistry, and physics. Performance is largely insensitive to whether events occur before or after the training cutoff, suggesting these limitations cannot be explained solely by knowledge exposure in training data. Under controlled information access, additional pre-cutoff knowledge improves performance but does not close the gap to full-information settings, which becomes more pronounced for high-citation advances. Models also exhibit systematic overconfidence and strong response biases, indicating unreliable uncertainty estimation. Taken together, current AI systems fall short as predictive tools for scientific progress. Access to prior knowledge does not translate into reliable forecasting, and performance benefits more from post-event information than from forward-looking prediction.

Understanding sources of a model's uncertainty regarding its predictions is crucial for effective human-AI collaboration. Prior work proposes using numerical uncertainty or hedges ("I'm not sure, but ..."), which do not explain uncertainty that arises from conflicting evidence, leaving users unable to resolve disagreements or rely on the output. We introduce CLUE (Conflict-and-Agreement-aware Language-model Uncertainty Explanations), the first framework to generate natural language explanations of model uncertainty by (i) identifying relationships between spans of text that expose claim-evidence or inter-evidence conflicts and agreements that drive the model's predictive uncertainty in an unsupervised way, and (ii) generating explanations via prompting and attention steering that verbalize these critical interactions. Across three language models and two fact-checking datasets, we show that CLUE produces explanations that are more faithful to the model's uncertainty and more consistent with fact-checking decisions than prompting for uncertainty explanations without span-interaction guidance. Human evaluators judge our explanations to be more helpful, more informative, less redundant, and more logically consistent with the input than this baseline. CLUE requires no fine-tuning or architectural changes, making it plug-and-play for any white-box language model. By explicitly linking uncertainty to evidence conflicts, it offers practical support for fact-checking and generalises readily to other tasks that require reasoning over complex information.

Unitary quantum theory, having no Born Rule, is non-probabilistic. Hence the notorious problem of reconciling it with the unpredictability and appearance of stochasticity in quantum measurements. Generalising and improving upon the so-called 'decision-theoretic approach' (Deutsch, 1999; Wallace, 2003, 2007, 2012), I shall recast that problem in the recently proposed constructor theory of information - where quantum theory is represented as one of a class of superinformation theories, which are local, non-probabilistic theories conforming to certain constructor-theoretic conditions. I prove that the unpredictability of measurement outcomes (to which I give an exact meaning via constructor theory), necessarily arises in superinformation theories. Then I explain how the appearance of stochasticity in (finitely many) repeated measurements can arise under superinformation theories. And I establish sufficient conditions for a superinformation theory to inform decisions (made under it) as if it were probabilistic, via a Deutsch-Wallace-type argument - thus defining a class of decision-supporting superinformation theories. This broadens the domain of applicability of that argument to cover constructor-theory compliant theories. In addition, in this version some of the argument's assumptions, previously construed as merely decision-theoretic, follow from physical properties expressed by constructor-theoretic principles.

Thanks to rapid progress in artificial intelligence, we have entered an era when technology and philosophy intersect in interesting ways. Sitting squarely at the centre of this intersection are large language models (LLMs). The more adept LLMs become at mimicking human language, the more vulnerable we become to anthropomorphism, to seeing the systems in which they are embedded as more human-like than they really are. This trend is amplified by the natural tendency to use philosophically loaded terms, such as "knows", "believes", and "thinks", when describing these systems. To mitigate this trend, this paper advocates the practice of repeatedly stepping back to remind ourselves of how LLMs, and the systems of which they form a part, actually work. The hope is that increased scientific precision will encourage more philosophical nuance in the discourse around artificial intelligence, both within the field and in the public sphere.

Bold claims about AI's role in science-from "AGI will cure all diseases" to promises of radically accelerated discovery-raise a central epistemic question: do large language models (LLMs) truly generate new knowledge, or do they merely remix memorized fragments? We propose unlearning-as-ablation as a falsifiable probe of constructive scientific discovery. The idea is to systematically remove a target result together with its forget-closure (supporting lemmas, paraphrases, and multi-hop entailments) and then evaluate whether the model can re-derive the result from only permitted axioms and tools. Success would indicate generative capability beyond recall; failure would expose current limits. Unlike prevailing motivations for unlearning-privacy, copyright, or safety-our framing repositions it as an epistemic probe for AI-for-Science. We outline a minimal pilot in mathematics and algorithms to illustrate feasibility, and sketch how the same approach could later be extended to domains such as physics or chemistry. This is a position paper: our contribution is conceptual and methodological, not empirical. We aim to stimulate discussion on how principled ablation tests could help distinguish models that reconstruct knowledge from those that merely retrieve it, and how such probes might guide the next generation of AI-for-Science benchmarks.

Large language models (LLMs) often present answers with high apparent confidence despite lacking an explicit mechanism for reasoning about certainty or truth. While existing benchmarks primarily evaluate single-turn accuracy, truthfulness or confidence calibration, they do not capture how models behave when their responses are challenged in interactive settings. We introduce the Certainty Robustness Benchmark, a two-turn evaluation framework that measures how LLMs balance stability and adaptability under self-challenging prompts such as uncertainty ("Are you sure?") and explicit contradiction ("You are wrong!"), alongside numeric confidence elicitation. Using 200 reasoning and mathematics questions from LiveBench, we evaluate four state-of-the-art LLMs and distinguish between justified self-corrections and unjustified answer changes. Our results reveal substantial differences in interactive reliability that are not explained by baseline accuracy alone: some models abandon correct answers under conversational pressure, while others demonstrate strong resistance to challenge and better alignment between confidence and correctness. These findings identify certainty robustness as a distinct and critical dimension of LLM evaluation, with important implications for alignment, trustworthiness and real-world deployment.

Knowledge augmentation has significantly enhanced the performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) in knowledge-intensive tasks. However, existing methods typically operate on the simplistic premise that model performance equates with internal knowledge, overlooking the knowledge-confidence gaps that lead to overconfident errors or uncertain truths. To bridge this gap, we propose a novel meta-cognitive framework for reliable knowledge augmentation via differentiated intervention and alignment. Our approach leverages internal cognitive signals to partition the knowledge space into mastered, confused, and missing regions, guiding targeted knowledge expansion. Furthermore, we introduce a cognitive consistency mechanism to synchronize subjective certainty with objective accuracy, ensuring calibrated knowledge boundaries. Extensive experiments demonstrate the our framework consistently outperforms strong baselines, validating its rationality in not only enhancing knowledge capabilities but also fostering cognitive behaviors that better distinguish knowns from unknowns. All codes are available at https://github.com/AI9Stars/Know-More-Know-Clearer.

The next-token prediction (NTP) objective has been foundational in the development of modern large language models (LLMs), driving advances in fluency and generalization. However, NTP operates at the token level, treating deviations from a single reference continuation as errors even when alternative continuations are equally plausible or semantically equivalent (e.g., ``mom'' vs. ``mother''). As a result, token-level loss can penalize valid abstractions, paraphrases, or conceptually correct reasoning paths, biasing models toward surface form rather than underlying meaning. This mismatch between the training signal and semantic correctness motivates learning objectives that operate over higher-level representations. We propose a shift from token-level to concept-level prediction, where concepts group multiple surface forms of the same idea (e.g., ``mom,'' ``mommy,'' ``mother'' rightarrow MOTHER). We introduce various methods for integrating conceptual supervision into LLM training and show that concept-aware models achieve lower perplexity, improved robustness under domain shift, and stronger performance than NTP-based models on diverse NLP benchmarks. This suggests concept-level supervision as an improved training signal that better aligns LLMs with human semantic abstractions.

Human reasoning often involves working over limited information to arrive at probabilistic conclusions. In its simplest form, this involves making an inference that is not strictly entailed by a premise, but rather only likely given the premise. While reasoning LLMs have demonstrated strong performance on logical and mathematical tasks, their behavior on such open-ended, non-deterministic inferences remains largely unexplored. We introduce ProbCOPA, a dataset of 210 handcrafted probabilistic inferences in English, each annotated for inference likelihood by 25--30 human participants. We find that human responses are graded and varied, revealing probabilistic judgments of the inferences in our dataset. Comparing these judgments with responses from eight state-of-the-art reasoning LLMs, we show that models consistently fail to produce human-like distributions. Finally, analyzing LLM reasoning chains, we find evidence of a common reasoning pattern used to evaluate such inferences. Our findings reveal persistent differences between humans and LLMs, and underscore the need to evaluate reasoning beyond deterministic settings.

In current NLP research, large-scale language models and their abilities are widely being discussed. Some recent works have also found notable failures of these models. Often these failure examples involve complex reasoning abilities. This work focuses on a simple commonsense ability, reasoning about when an action (or its effect) is feasible. To this end, we introduce FeasibilityQA, a question-answering dataset involving binary classification (BCQ) and multi-choice multi-correct questions (MCQ) that test understanding of feasibility. We show that even state-of-the-art models such as GPT-3, GPT-2, and T5 struggle to answer the feasibility questions correctly. Specifically, on MCQ and BCQ questions, GPT-3 achieves an accuracy of just (19%, 62%) and (25%, 64%) in zero-shot and few-shot settings, respectively. We also evaluate models by providing relevant knowledge statements required to answer the question. We find that the additional knowledge leads to a 7% gain in performance, but the overall performance still remains low. These results make one wonder how much commonsense knowledge about action feasibility is encoded in state-of-the-art models and how well they can reason about it.

This survey paper proposes a clearer view of natural language reasoning in the field of Natural Language Processing (NLP), both conceptually and practically. Conceptually, we provide a distinct definition for natural language reasoning in NLP, based on both philosophy and NLP scenarios, discuss what types of tasks require reasoning, and introduce a taxonomy of reasoning. Practically, we conduct a comprehensive literature review on natural language reasoning in NLP, mainly covering classical logical reasoning, natural language inference, multi-hop question answering, and commonsense reasoning. The paper also identifies and views backward reasoning, a powerful paradigm for multi-step reasoning, and introduces defeasible reasoning as one of the most important future directions in natural language reasoning research. We focus on single-modality unstructured natural language text, excluding neuro-symbolic techniques and mathematical reasoning.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) monitoring, in which automated systems monitor the CoT of an LLM, is a promising approach for effectively overseeing AI systems. However, the extent to which a model's CoT helps us oversee the model - the monitorability of the CoT - can be affected by training, for instance by the model learning to hide important features of its reasoning. We propose and empirically validate a conceptual framework for predicting when and why this occurs. We model LLM post-training as an RL environment where the reward decomposes into two terms: one term depending on final outputs and another term depending on the CoT. Our framework allows us to classify these two terms as "aligned", "orthogonal", or "in-conflict" before training. We predict that training with in-conflict terms will reduce monitorability, orthogonal terms will not affect it, and aligned terms will improve it. To validate our framework, we use it to classify a set of RL environments, train LLMs within those environments, and evaluate how training affects CoT monitorability. We find that (1) training with "in-conflict" reward terms reduces CoT monitorability and (2) optimizing in-conflict reward terms is difficult.

Scientific discovery is a cumulative process and requires new ideas to be situated within an ever-expanding landscape of existing knowledge. An emerging and critical challenge is how to identify conceptually relevant prior work from rapidly growing literature, and assess how a new idea differentiates from existing research. Current embedding approaches typically conflate distinct conceptual aspects into single representations and cannot support fine-grained literature retrieval; meanwhile, LLM-based evaluators are subject to sycophancy biases, failing to provide discriminative novelty assessment. To tackle these challenges, we introduce the Ideation Space, a structured representation that decomposes scientific knowledge into three distinct dimensions, i.e., research problem, methodology, and core findings, each learned through contrastive training. This framework enables principled measurement of conceptual distance between ideas, and modeling of ideation transitions that capture the logical connections within a proposed idea. Building upon this representation, we propose a Hierarchical Sub-Space Retrieval framework for efficient, targeted literature retrieval, and a Decomposed Novelty Assessment algorithm that identifies which aspects of an idea are novel. Extensive experiments demonstrate substantial improvements, where our approach achieves Recall@30 of 0.329 (16.7% over baselines), our ideation transition retrieval reaches Hit Rate@30 of 0.643, and novelty assessment attains 0.37 correlation with expert judgments. In summary, our work provides a promising paradigm for future research on accelerating and evaluating scientific discovery.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in decision-making contexts, but when they present answers without signaling low confidence, users may unknowingly act on erroneous outputs. Prior work shows that LLMs maintain internal uncertainty signals, yet their expressed confidence is often miscalibrated and poorly discriminates between correct and incorrect answers. We investigate whether supervised fine-tuning can improve models' ability to communicate uncertainty and whether such improvements generalize across tasks and domains. We fine-tune LLMs on datasets spanning general knowledge, mathematics, and open-ended trivia, and evaluate two metacognitive tasks: (1) single-question confidence estimation, where the model assigns a numeric certainty to its answer, and (2) pairwise confidence comparison, where the model selects which of two answers it is more likely to answer correctly. We assess generalization to unseen domains, including medical and legal reasoning. Results show that fine-tuning improves calibration (alignment between stated confidence and accuracy) and discrimination (higher confidence for correct vs. incorrect responses) within and across domains. However, gains are task-specific: training on single-question calibration does not transfer to pairwise comparison, and vice versa. Multitask fine-tuning yields broader gains, lowering calibration error and strengthening discrimination in out-of-domain evaluations. This suggests that uncertainty communication in LLMs is trainable but requires multitask training to generalize effectively.

A characteristic feature of human semantic cognition is its ability to not only store and retrieve the properties of concepts observed through experience, but to also facilitate the inheritance of properties (can breathe) from superordinate concepts (animal) to their subordinates (dog) -- i.e. demonstrate property inheritance. In this paper, we present COMPS, a collection of minimal pair sentences that jointly tests pre-trained language models (PLMs) on their ability to attribute properties to concepts and their ability to demonstrate property inheritance behavior. Analyses of 22 different PLMs on COMPS reveal that they can easily distinguish between concepts on the basis of a property when they are trivially different, but find it relatively difficult when concepts are related on the basis of nuanced knowledge representations. Furthermore, we find that PLMs can demonstrate behavior consistent with property inheritance to a great extent, but fail in the presence of distracting information, which decreases the performance of many models, sometimes even below chance. This lack of robustness in demonstrating simple reasoning raises important questions about PLMs' capacity to make correct inferences even when they appear to possess the prerequisite knowledge.

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

Forecasting has become a natural benchmark for reasoning under uncertainty. Yet existing evaluations of large language models remain limited to judgmental tasks in simple formats, such as binary or multiple-choice questions. In practice, however, forecasting spans a far broader scope. Across domains such as economics, public health, and social demographics, decisions hinge on numerical estimates over continuous quantities, a capability that current benchmarks do not capture. Evaluating such estimates requires a format that makes uncertainty explicit and testable. We propose prediction intervals as a natural and rigorous interface for this purpose. They demand scale awareness, internal consistency across confidence levels, and calibration over a continuum of outcomes, making them a more suitable evaluation format than point estimates for numerical forecasting. To assess this capability, we introduce a new benchmark QuantSightBench, and evaluate frontier models under multiple settings, assessing both empirical coverage and interval sharpness. Our results show that none of the 11 evaluated frontier and open-weight models achieves the 90\% coverage target, with the top performers Gemini 3.1 Pro (79.1\%), Grok 4 (76.4\%), and GPT-5.4 (75.3\%) all falling at least 10 percentage points short. Calibration degrades sharply at extreme magnitudes, revealing systematic overconfidence across all evaluated models.

This position paper argues that the theoretical inconsistency often observed among Responsible AI (RAI) metrics, such as differing fairness definitions or tradeoffs between accuracy and privacy, should be embraced as a valuable feature rather than a flaw to be eliminated. We contend that navigating these inconsistencies, by treating metrics as divergent objectives, yields three key benefits: (1) Normative Pluralism: Maintaining a full suite of potentially contradictory metrics ensures that the diverse moral stances and stakeholder values inherent in RAI are adequately represented. (2) Epistemological Completeness: The use of multiple, sometimes conflicting, metrics allows for a more comprehensive capture of multifaceted ethical concepts, thereby preserving greater informational fidelity about these concepts than any single, simplified definition. (3) Implicit Regularization: Jointly optimizing for theoretically conflicting objectives discourages overfitting to one specific metric, steering models towards solutions with enhanced generalization and robustness under real-world complexities. In contrast, efforts to enforce theoretical consistency by simplifying or pruning metrics risk narrowing this value diversity, losing conceptual depth, and degrading model performance. We therefore advocate for a shift in RAI theory and practice: from getting trapped in inconsistency to characterizing acceptable inconsistency thresholds and elucidating the mechanisms that permit robust, approximated consistency in practice.

Verbal confidence elicitation is widely used to extract uncertainty estimates from LLMs. We tested whether seven instruction-tuned open-weight models (3-9B parameters, four families) produce verbalised confidence that meets minimal validity criteria for item-level Type-2 discrimination under minimal numeric elicitation with greedy decoding. In a pre-registered study (OSF: osf.io/azbvx), 524 TriviaQA items were administered under numeric (0-100) and categorical (10-class) elicitation to eight models at Q5_K_M quantisation on consumer hardware, yielding 8,384 deterministic trials. A psychometric validity screen was applied to each model-format cell. All seven instruct models were classified Invalid on numeric confidence (H2 confirmed, 7/7 vs. predicted >=4/7), with a mean ceiling rate of 91.7% (H1 confirmed). Categorical elicitation did not rescue validity. Instead, it disrupted task performance in six of seven models, producing accuracy below 5% (H4 not confirmed). Token-level logprobability did not usefully predict verbalised confidence under the observed variance regime (H5 confirmed, mean cross-validated R^2 < 0.01). Within the reasoning-distilled model, reasoning-trace length showed a strong negative partial correlation with confidence (rho = -0.36, p < .001), consistent with the Reasoning Contamination Effect. These results do not imply that internal uncertainty representations are absent. They show that minimal verbal elicitation fails to preserve internal signals at the output interface in this model-size regime. Psychometric screening should precede any downstream use of such signals.

The leading AI companies are increasingly focused on building generalist AI agents -- systems that can autonomously plan, act, and pursue goals across almost all tasks that humans can perform. Despite how useful these systems might be, unchecked AI agency poses significant risks to public safety and security, ranging from misuse by malicious actors to a potentially irreversible loss of human control. We discuss how these risks arise from current AI training methods. Indeed, various scenarios and experiments have demonstrated the possibility of AI agents engaging in deception or pursuing goals that were not specified by human operators and that conflict with human interests, such as self-preservation. Following the precautionary principle, we see a strong need for safer, yet still useful, alternatives to the current agency-driven trajectory. Accordingly, we propose as a core building block for further advances the development of a non-agentic AI system that is trustworthy and safe by design, which we call Scientist AI. This system is designed to explain the world from observations, as opposed to taking actions in it to imitate or please humans. It comprises a world model that generates theories to explain data and a question-answering inference machine. Both components operate with an explicit notion of uncertainty to mitigate the risks of overconfident predictions. In light of these considerations, a Scientist AI could be used to assist human researchers in accelerating scientific progress, including in AI safety. In particular, our system can be employed as a guardrail against AI agents that might be created despite the risks involved. Ultimately, focusing on non-agentic AI may enable the benefits of AI innovation while avoiding the risks associated with the current trajectory. We hope these arguments will motivate researchers, developers, and policymakers to favor this safer path.

To understand the risks posed by a new AI system, we must understand what it can and cannot do. Building on prior work, we introduce a programme of new "dangerous capability" evaluations and pilot them on Gemini 1.0 models. Our evaluations cover four areas: (1) persuasion and deception; (2) cyber-security; (3) self-proliferation; and (4) self-reasoning. We do not find evidence of strong dangerous capabilities in the models we evaluated, but we flag early warning signs. Our goal is to help advance a rigorous science of dangerous capability evaluation, in preparation for future models.

Although AI systems have been applied in various fields and achieved impressive performance, their safety and reliability are still a big concern. This is especially important for safety-critical tasks. One shared characteristic of these critical tasks is their risk sensitivity, where small mistakes can cause big consequences and even endanger life. There are several factors that could be guidelines for the successful deployment of AI systems in sensitive tasks: (i) failure detection and out-of-distribution (OOD) detection; (ii) overfitting identification; (iii) uncertainty quantification for predictions; (iv) robustness to data perturbations. These factors are also challenges of current AI systems, which are major blocks for building safe and reliable AI. Specifically, the current AI algorithms are unable to identify common causes for failure detection. Furthermore, additional techniques are required to quantify the quality of predictions. All these contribute to inaccurate uncertainty quantification, which lowers trust in predictions. Hence obtaining accurate model uncertainty quantification and its further improvement are challenging. To address these issues, many techniques have been proposed, such as regularization methods and learning strategies. As vision and language are the most typical data type and have many open source benchmark datasets, this thesis will focus on vision-language data processing for tasks like classification, image captioning, and vision question answering. In this thesis, we aim to build a safeguard by further developing current techniques to ensure the accurate model uncertainty for safety-critical tasks.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) often rely on generating intermediate reasoning steps to enhance accuracy. However, little work has examined how reasoning utility contributes to the final answer's correctness. Due to the stochastic nature of autoregressive generation, generating more context does not guarantee increased confidence in the answer. If we could predict, during generation, whether a reasoning step will be useful, we could stop early or prune ineffective steps, avoiding distractions in the final decision. We present an oracle study on MATH dataset, using Qwen2.5-32B and GPT-4o to generate reasoning chains, and then employing a separate model (Qwen3-8B) to quantify the utility of these chains for final accuracy. Specifically, we measure the model's uncertainty on the answer span Y at each reasoning step using conditional entropy (expected negative log-likelihood over the vocabulary) with context expanding step by step. Our results show a clear pattern: conditional entropy that decreases over steps is strongly associated with correct answers, whereas flat or increasing entropy often results in wrong answers. We also corroborate that incorrect reasoning paths tend to be longer than correct ones, suggesting that longer reasoning does not necessarily yield better outcomes. These findings serve as a foundation to inspire future work on designing efficient reasoning pipelines that detect and avoid unproductive reasoning early.

Steering is a widely used technique for controlling large language models, yet its effects are often unstable and hard to predict. Existing theoretical accounts are largely based on the Linear Representation Hypothesis (LRH). While LRH assumes that concepts can be orthogonalized for lossless control, this idealized mapping fails in real representations and cannot account for the observed unpredictability of steering. By relaxing LRH's orthogonality assumption while preserving linear representations, we show that overlapping concept contributions naturally yield a sample-specific axis-orthogonal structure. We formalize this as the Cylindrical Representation Hypothesis (CRH). In CRH, a central axis captures the main difference between concept absence and presence and drives concept generation. A surrounding normal plane controls steering sensitivity by determining how easily the axis can activate the target concept. Within this plane, only specific sensitive sectors strongly facilitate concept activation, while other sectors can suppress or delay it. While the surrounding normal plane can be reliably identified from difference vectors, the sensitive sector cannot, introducing intrinsic uncertainty at the sector level. This uncertainty provides a principled explanation for why steering outcomes often fluctuate even when using well-aligned directions. Our experiments verify the existence of the cylindrical structure and demonstrate that CRH provides a valid and practical way to interpret model steering behavior in real settings: https://github.com/mbzuai-nlp/CRH.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable potential in natural language generation and instruction following, a persistent challenge lies in their susceptibility to "hallucinations", which erodes trust in their outputs. Although Uncertainty Quantification (UQ) presents a promising solution, its accurate implementation within the context of LLMs remains a significant hurdle. To address this critical roadblock, our research originates from a fundamental heuristic insight: tokens within auto-regressive LLM-generated text do not equally reflect the underlying meaning. Some tokens carry greater relevance and representativeness than others, owing to the phenomenon of "linguistic redundancy", wherein a select few keywords suffice to convey the essence of lengthy sentences. Regrettably, existing methodologies treat all tokens with equal importance when estimating uncertainty, disregarding these inherent generative inequalities. Our analysis reveals a significant issue with state-of-the-art: numerous tokens (and sentences) of limited semantic significance receive equal or even excessive weighting during uncertainty estimation. To rectify this bias, we propose to jointly Shifting Attention to more Relevant (SAR) components, at both the token- and the sentence-levels for accurate uncertainty estimation. We conduct extensive experiments involving a range of popular "off-the-shelf" LLMs, including instruction-tuned LLMs such as Vicuna, WizardLM, and LLaMA-2-chat, as well as pretrained LLMs like OPT and LLaMA, with model sizes extending up to 33B parameters. We carry out evaluation across various free-form question-answering tasks, encompassing domains such as reading comprehension, science Q&A, and medical Q&A. Our experimental results demonstrate the superior performance of SAR in addressing the challenges of uncertainty estimation within the realm of LLMs.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have significantly enhanced their capabilities in complex problem-solving by introducing a thinking draft that enables multi-path Chain-of-Thought explorations before producing final answers. Ensuring the faithfulness of these intermediate reasoning processes is crucial for reliable monitoring, interpretation, and effective control. In this paper, we propose a systematic counterfactual intervention framework to rigorously evaluate thinking draft faithfulness. Our approach focuses on two complementary dimensions: (1) Intra-Draft Faithfulness, which assesses whether individual reasoning steps causally influence subsequent steps and the final draft conclusion through counterfactual step insertions; and (2) Draft-to-Answer Faithfulness, which evaluates whether final answers are logically consistent with and dependent on the thinking draft, by perturbing the draft's concluding logic. We conduct extensive experiments across six state-of-the-art LRMs. Our findings show that current LRMs demonstrate selective faithfulness to intermediate reasoning steps and frequently fail to faithfully align with the draft conclusions. These results underscore the need for more faithful and interpretable reasoning in advanced LRMs.

The reward hypothesis posits that, "all of what we mean by goals and purposes can be well thought of as maximization of the expected value of the cumulative sum of a received scalar signal (reward)." We aim to fully settle this hypothesis. This will not conclude with a simple affirmation or refutation, but rather specify completely the implicit requirements on goals and purposes under which the hypothesis holds.

Prospect Theory (PT) models human decision-making behaviour under uncertainty, among which linguistic uncertainty is commonly adopted in real-world scenarios. Although recent studies have developed some frameworks to test PT parameters for Large Language Models (LLMs), few have considered the fitness of PT itself on LLMs. Moreover, whether PT is robust under linguistic uncertainty perturbations, especially epistemic markers (e.g. "likely"), remains highly under-explored. To address these gaps, we design a three-stage workflow based on a classic behavioural economics experimental setup. We first estimate PT parameters with economics questions and evaluate PT's fitness with performance metrics. We then derive probability mappings for epistemic markers in the same context, and inject these mappings into the prompt to investigate the stability of PT parameters. Our findings suggest that modelling LLMs' decision-making with PT is not consistently reliable across models, and applying Prospect Theory to LLMs is likely not robust to epistemic uncertainty. The findings caution against the deployment of PT-based frameworks in real-world applications where epistemic ambiguity is prevalent, giving valuable insights in behaviour interpretation and future alignment direction for LLM decision-making.

This work explores the hypothesis that subjectively attributed meaning constitutes the phenomenal content of conscious experience. That is, phenomenal content is semantic. This form of subjective meaning manifests as an intrinsic and non-representational character of qualia. Empirically, subjective meaning is ubiquitous in conscious experiences. We point to phenomenological studies that lend evidence to support this. Furthermore, this notion of meaning closely relates to what Frege refers to as "sense", in metaphysics and philosophy of language. It also aligns with Peirce's "interpretant", in semiotics. We discuss how Frege's sense can also be extended to the raw feels of consciousness. Sense and reference both play a role in phenomenal experience. Moreover, within the context of the mind-matter relation, we provide a formalization of subjective meaning associated to one's mental representations. Identifying the precise maps between the physical and mental domains, we argue that syntactic and semantic structures transcend language, and are realized within each of these domains. Formally, meaning is a relational attribute, realized via a map that interprets syntactic structures of a formal system within an appropriate semantic space. The image of this map within the mental domain is what is relevant for experience, and thus comprises the phenomenal content of qualia. We conclude with possible implications this may have for experience-based theories of consciousness.

Large language models (LLMs) are widely used for factual tasks such as "What treats asthma?" or "What is the capital of Latvia?". However, it remains unclear how stably LLMs encode distinctions between true, false, and neither-true-nor-false content in their internal probabilistic representations. We introduce representational stability as the robustness of an LLM's veracity representations to perturbations in the operational definition of truth. We assess representational stability by (i) training a linear probe on an LLM's activations to separate true from not-true statements and (ii) measuring how its learned decision boundary shifts under controlled label changes. Using activations from sixteen open-source models and three factual domains, we compare two types of neither statements. The first are fact-like assertions about entities we believe to be absent from any training data. We call these unfamiliar neither statements. The second are nonfactual claims drawn from well-known fictional contexts. We call these familiar neither statements. The unfamiliar statements induce the largest boundary shifts, producing up to 40% flipped truth judgements in fragile domains (such as word definitions), while familiar fictional statements remain more coherently clustered and yield smaller changes (leq 8.2%). These results suggest that representational stability stems more from epistemic familiarity than from linguistic form. More broadly, our approach provides a diagnostic for auditing and training LLMs to preserve coherent truth assignments under semantic uncertainty, rather than optimizing for output accuracy alone.

Self-distillation has emerged as an effective post-training paradigm for LLMs, often improving performance while shortening reasoning traces. However, in mathematical reasoning, we find that it can reduce response length while degrading performance. We trace this degradation to the suppression of epistemic verbalization - the model's expression of uncertainty during reasoning. Through controlled experiments varying conditioning context richness and task coverage, we show that conditioning the teacher on rich information suppresses uncertainty expression, enabling rapid in-domain optimization with limited task coverage but harming OOD performance, where unseen problems benefit from expressing uncertainty and adjusting accordingly. Across Qwen3-8B, DeepSeek-Distill-Qwen-7B, and Olmo3-7B-Instruct, we observe performance drops of up to 40%. Our findings highlight that exposing appropriate levels of uncertainty is crucial for robust reasoning and underscore the importance of optimizing reasoning behavior beyond merely reinforcing correct answer traces.

Common-sense reasoning is a key language model capability because it encapsulates not just specific factual knowledge but rather general language and world understanding. Measuring common-sense reasoning, therefore, is crucial for language models of different sizes and applications. One of the most widely used benchmarks for evaluating such capabilities is HellaSwag; however, in this paper, we show that it has severe construct validity issues. These issues range from basic ungrammaticality and numerous typos to misleading prompts or equally correct options. Furthermore, we show that if models are evaluated only on answer texts, or with "Lorem ipsum dolor..." instead of the question, more than 65% of model predictions remain the same, and this cannot be attributed merely to contamination. Since benchmark scores are an essential part of model selection in both research and commercial applications, these validity issues can have severe consequences. In particular, knowing that taking benchmark scores at face value is ubiquitous, inadequate evaluation leads to ill-informed decisions about models. In this paper, we thoroughly investigate critical validity issues posed by HellaSwag and illustrate them with various evaluations using generative language models of different sizes. We argue that this benchmark does not accurately measure common-sense reasoning and, therefore, should not be used for evaluation in its current state. Based on the results of our study, we propose requirements that should be met by future common-sense reasoning benchmarks. In addition, we release GoldenSwag, a corrected subset of HellaSwag, which, to our belief, facilitates acceptable common-sense reasoning evaluation.

LLMs are increasingly deployed in high-stakes domains such as medical triage and legal assistance, often as document-grounded QA systems in which a user provides a description, relevant sources are retrieved, and an LLM generates a prediction. In practice, initial user queries are often underspecified, and a single retrieval pass is insufficient for reliable decision-making, leading to incorrect and overly confident answers. While follow-up questioning can elicit missing information, existing methods typically depend on implicit, unstructured confidence signals from the LLM, making it difficult to determine what remains unknown, what information matters most, and when to stop asking questions. We propose InfoGatherer, a framework that gathers missing information from two complementary sources: retrieved domain documents and targeted follow-up questions to the user. InfoGatherer models uncertainty using Dempster-Shafer belief assignments over a structured evidential network, enabling principled fusion of incomplete and potentially contradictory evidence from both sources without prematurely collapsing to a definitive answer. Across legal and medical tasks, InfoGatherer outperforms strong baselines while requiring fewer turns. By grounding uncertainty in formal evidential theory rather than heuristic LLM signals, InfoGatherer moves towards trustworthy, interpretable decision support in domains where reliability is critical.

Modeling semantic plausibility requires commonsense knowledge about the world and has been used as a testbed for exploring various knowledge representations. Previous work has focused specifically on modeling physical plausibility and shown that distributional methods fail when tested in a supervised setting. At the same time, distributional models, namely large pretrained language models, have led to improved results for many natural language understanding tasks. In this work, we show that these pretrained language models are in fact effective at modeling physical plausibility in the supervised setting. We therefore present the more difficult problem of learning to model physical plausibility directly from text. We create a training set by extracting attested events from a large corpus, and we provide a baseline for training on these attested events in a self-supervised manner and testing on a physical plausibility task. We believe results could be further improved by injecting explicit commonsense knowledge into a distributional model.

Large reasoning models often reach correct answers through flawed intermediate steps, creating a gap between final accuracy and reasoning reliability. Existing alignment strategies address this with external verifiers or massive sampling, limiting scalability. In this work, we introduce CASPO (Confidence-Aware Step-wise Preference Optimization), a framework that aligns token-level confidence with step-wise logical correctness through iterative Direct Preference Optimization, without training a separate reward model. During inference, we propose Confidence-aware Thought (CaT), which leverages this calibrated confidence to dynamically prune uncertain reasoning branches with negligible O(V) latency. Experiments across ten benchmarks and multiple model families show that CASPO consistently improves reasoning reliability and inference efficiency. CASPO scales to Qwen3-8B-Base and surpasses tree-search baselines on AIME'24 and AIME'25 without using reward-model data. We also release a step-wise dataset with confidence annotations to support fine-grained analysis of reasoning reliability. Code is available at https://github.com/Thecommonirin/CASPO.

Misinformation - false or misleading information - is considered a significant societal concern due to its associated "misinformation effects," such as political polarization, erosion of trust in institutions, problematic behavior, and public health challenges. However, the prevailing concept is misaligned with what is studied. While misinformation focuses on instances of information about factual matters, the broad spectrum of effects often manifests at a societal level and is shaped by a wide range of interdependent factors such as identity, values, opinions, epistemologies, and disagreements. Unsurprisingly, misinformation effects can occur without the prevalence of misinformation, and misinformation does not necessarily increase the effects studied. Here, we propose using disagreement - conflicting attitudes and beliefs between individuals and communities - as a way to study misinformation effects because it addresses the identified conceptual limitations of misinformation. Furthermore, unlike misinformation, disagreement does not require researchers to determine whether a given information is false or misleading. Thus, it can be studied and, more importantly, measured without the need to make a normative judgment about a given information, even when the specific topic is entirely removed, as we show in a longitudinal disagreement measurement. We demonstrate that disagreement, as a holistic concept, provides better explanations for the occurrence of misinformation effects, enhances precision in developing appropriate interventions, and offers a promising approach for evaluating them through quantification. Finally, we show how disagreement addresses current misinformation research questions and conclude with recommendations for research practice.

It has been shown that Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) may not *say what they think*: they do not always volunteer information about how certain parts of the input influence their reasoning. But it is one thing for a model to *omit* such information and another, worse thing to *lie* about it. Here, we extend the work of Chen et al. (2025) to show that LRMs will do just this: they will flatly deny relying on hints provided in the prompt in answering multiple choice questions -- even when directly asked to reflect on unusual (i.e. hinted) prompt content, even when allowed to use hints, and even though experiments *show* them to be using the hints. Our results thus have discouraging implications for CoT monitoring and interpretability.

In the past couple of years, various approaches to representing and quantifying different types of predictive uncertainty in machine learning, notably in the setting of classification, have been proposed on the basis of second-order probability distributions, i.e., predictions in the form of distributions on probability distributions. A completely conclusive solution has not yet been found, however, as shown by recent criticisms of commonly used uncertainty measures associated with second-order distributions, identifying undesirable theoretical properties of these measures. In light of these criticisms, we propose a set of formal criteria that meaningful uncertainty measures for predictive uncertainty based on second-order distributions should obey. Moreover, we provide a general framework for developing uncertainty measures to account for these criteria, and offer an instantiation based on the Wasserstein distance, for which we prove that all criteria are satisfied.

Recognizing the prevalence of domain shift as a common challenge in machine learning, various domain generalization (DG) techniques have been developed to enhance the performance of machine learning systems when dealing with out-of-distribution (OOD) data. Furthermore, in real-world scenarios, data distributions can gradually change across a sequence of sequential domains. While current methodologies primarily focus on improving model effectiveness within these new domains, they often overlook fairness issues throughout the learning process. In response, we introduce an innovative framework called Counterfactual Fairness-Aware Domain Generalization with Sequential Autoencoder (CDSAE). This approach effectively separates environmental information and sensitive attributes from the embedded representation of classification features. This concurrent separation not only greatly improves model generalization across diverse and unfamiliar domains but also effectively addresses challenges related to unfair classification. Our strategy is rooted in the principles of causal inference to tackle these dual issues. To examine the intricate relationship between semantic information, sensitive attributes, and environmental cues, we systematically categorize exogenous uncertainty factors into four latent variables: 1) semantic information influenced by sensitive attributes, 2) semantic information unaffected by sensitive attributes, 3) environmental cues influenced by sensitive attributes, and 4) environmental cues unaffected by sensitive attributes. By incorporating fairness regularization, we exclusively employ semantic information for classification purposes. Empirical validation on synthetic and real-world datasets substantiates the effectiveness of our approach, demonstrating improved accuracy levels while ensuring the preservation of fairness in the evolving landscape of continuous domains.

This paper introduces a novel type theory and logic for probabilistic reasoning. Its logic is quantitative, with fuzzy predicates. It includes normalisation and conditioning of states. This conditioning uses a key aspect that distinguishes our probabilistic type theory from quantum type theory, namely the bijective correspondence between predicates and side-effect free actions (called instrument, or assert, maps). The paper shows how suitable computation rules can be derived from this predicate-action correspondence, and uses these rules for calculating conditional probabilities in two well-known examples of Bayesian reasoning in (graphical) models. Our type theory may thus form the basis for a mechanisation of Bayesian inference.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) introduce new opportunities for safety monitoring through their Chain of Thought (CoT) reasoning. However, CoT is not always faithful to the model's final output, undermining its reliability as a monitoring tool. To address this, we investigate the hidden representations of LRMs to determine whether future behavior can be predicted from prompt and CoT representations. By evaluating a probe at each generated token, we construct a probe trajectory, the continuous evolution of a concept's probability across the reasoning process. We find that future model behavior is more distinguishable when examined over the full trajectory than from a single static prediction. To characterize these temporal dynamics, we extract signal-processing features that capture volatility, trend, and steady-state behavior, significantly improving the separation of future model states. We also present two methodological insights. First, template-based training data achieves near-parity with dynamically generated model responses, eliminating the need for a costly initial inference and labeling. Second, the choice of pooling operation is critical: average-pooling and last-token methods collapse to near-random performance, while max-pooling achieves up to 95% AUROC and yields stable probe trajectories. Using four datasets and four reasoning models across the domains of safety and mathematics, we demonstrate that trajectory features encode task-specific dynamics that improve outcome separability. These findings establish probe trajectories as a complementary framework for monitoring LRM behavior. Warning: This article contains potentially harmful content.